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Chapter 1
Introduction
Innovation is often considered to be the driving force behind economic growth and
social welfare. This idea dates back to Schumpeter who states that ’the fundamental
impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new con-
sumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets,
[...]. [This process] incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within,
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism’ (Schumpeter, 1942). As
the creation of new innovation is risky, the private sector may fail to undertake the
optimal amount of research and development (R&D) activities. Consequently, it is
often argued that the state shall come in where the market may fail. There are
indeed several ways to achieve that private R&D is undertaken in an economy. Tax
policy surely is among the most important. The tax system immediately impacts on
the risk return profile of R&D activities and thus influences corporate innovation in
manifold ways. As a consequence, many countries employ tax incentives especially
designed to foster R&D activity. However, another argument why governments em-
ploy various tax incentives is tax competition. Not only do we observe a tendency
towards low corporate income tax rates within the European Union (EU), but also
a recent trend towards special tax regimes attracting specific forms of investment.
Most prominently, so-called patent box regimes have been introduced in recent years
by some European governments that allow profits from intellectual property (IP) be-
ing taxed at a low or zero corporate income tax rate. The intent of such regimes
does not seem to be the fostering of new R&D activity exclusively, but also the
attraction of IP from abroad.
This thesis is attributed to the guiding question how an innovation-friendly tax
system ideally looks like. The argument that Europe’s economic future crucially
depends on its ability to become a knowledge-based economy is also reflected in
the Europe 2020 strategy, where the EU agreed to raise public R&D spending to
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3% of the gross domestic product (GDP).1 It is widely accepted, that a constant
flow of innovations is a prerequisite for economic growth, global competitiveness and
wealth. On the level of the firm, this can be translated into the need of corporate
innovation for firm productivity and success in the long run. To argue which way of
subsidizing innovative activity of firms brings the desired results, it is important to
understand how firms will respond to the various forms of tax incentives for R&D.
The core research question of this thesis is thus, how R&D related tax regulations
influence R&D related business decisions at the micro-level.
Despite its importance, the interdisciplinary field of corporate taxation and R&D
is not heavily researched and contains a lot of open and unanswered questions. There
is consensus that taxation influences the creation of innovations in manifold ways.
Potential tax savings from the tax deductibility of R&D expenses and specific R&D
tax incentives have been proven to codetermine the decision on the location and
scale of new R&D activity. There is a body of previous work that investigates the
effects of corporate taxes on both real R&D activity (for a survey of the evidence
see Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Arundel et al., 2008; Spengel et al., 2009; Elschner
and Spengel, 2010) and on how firms organize their intellectual property (see for
example Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Boehm et al., 2012; Ernst et al., 2014; Griffith
et al., 2014). Furthermore, there is robust evidence that tax considerations can lead
firms to relocate and shift existing R&D activities on the one hand (Bloom and
Griffith, 2001; Wilson, 2009a; Paff, 2005), and intellectual property rights on the
other hand (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Boehm et al.,
2012; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014) to tax favorable jurisdic-
tions. However, it is still unclear to what extent real R&D activity and intellectual
property rights are mobile assets that are easily relocated due to tax planning con-
siderations. Moreover, previous studies observed an above-average number of patent
applications in low tax locations (for example Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Karkinsky
and Riedel, 2012). Nevertheless, these studies leave open how firms achieve the move
of intellectual property rights to low tax locations and thus, do not allow to draw a
conclusion how sensitive firms react to various anti-tax avoidance measures.
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on some of the above sketched questions and
provide empirical evidence on the behavior of firms regarding firms’ investments in
R&D. The responsiveness of firms to tax incentives, but also to anti-tax avoidance
measures is crucial if governments want to regulate and subsidize the market of inno-
vations. Therefore, the focus throughout the following analyses is a micro-economic
one and the methodological approach is empirical. In all Chapters, econometric
methods are applied to identify whether taxes do exert an impact on R&D related
business decisions and thus, have the power to influence firm behavior. In this sense,
1The Europe 2020 strategy can be viewed online at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/.
3the thesis provides empirical evidence using data on firms’ international activities
and taxes.
The thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, I give an overview of the the-
oretical foundations of R&D subsidies in general and of tax incentives for R&D in
particular. Theory argues in favor of subsidizing R&D activities due to the impor-
tant role of innovation for economic growth and welfare. Therefore, R&D activities
and firms’ innovative behavior have also been intensively studied by empiricists.
These findings will be summarized and briefly addressed to establish a common
ground of knowledge in this field of research. Furthermore, I move to the intercept
of R&D and taxation. In the empirical and theoretical literature, this rather small
field only offers some first insights, but leaves open many follow-up questions. Es-
pecially, in the light of recent developments in the field of corporate taxation and
the discussion about harmful tax practices of multinational enterprises (MNE) the
interdisciplinary field of taxation and corporate innovation receives recent attention.
Chapter 3 presents evidence from a survey among multinational R&D intensive
firms. The survey is an instrument in empirical research that allows to directly test
hypotheses, to ask for motives and considerations behind actions and to assess the
relative importance of factors influencing R&D related decisions. The survey was
conducted in collaboration with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), an internationally
operating tax consultancy. PwC distributed the questionnaire among selected client
firms and thus, enabled us to address a sample of a few, but globally operating firms.
The results presented in Chapter 3 are partly descriptive in nature and partly allow
to draw inferences about the relationship between the behavior of the surveyed
firms and their characteristics. The hypotheses tested relate to business decisions
regarding the investment in R&D. Consequently, questions on the location of R&D
and IP, on the scale of investment and on the design of R&D tax incentives are in the
focus of the survey. Furthermore, firm characteristics regarding the organizational
structure of the MNE are examined and it is assessed whether they are correlated
with the R&D intensity of the firm.
After having presented new insights into how R&D intensive multinationals think
about tax planning matters with respect to R&D investments, I go on to address a
specific research question that is related to the profit shifting literature. Chapter 4
examines the strategic selection of R&D projects to tax favorable locations. Previous
literature has shown that all kinds of tax incentives, be they tax credits, additional
allowances or reduced tax rates on R&D output, are effective in raising the quantity
of R&D related activity. This chapter assesses the impact of corporate tax incentives
on the quality of R&D projects, i.e. their innovativeness and earnings potential. It is
argued that traditional forms of R&D tax incentives, like additional allowances and
tax credits, exert different effects on the average profitability and innovativeness of
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R&D projects than low profit tax rates on patent income. To empirically assess the
predefined hypotheses, the universe of patent applications to the European Patent
Office (EPO) matched with firm information from Amadeus is exploited.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I address and empirically assess the question of how tax
aspects impact on location decisions of R&D investments. Specifically, I devote
the attention to the location choice of real R&D activity, because this question has
been largely left unattended by previous literature. Using new tax data collected in
collaboration with PwC, I test whether anti tax-avoidance measures are anticipated
by firms and affect the location decision of real R&D activity and the decision on
where patent ownership is located. The analysis is conducted by using a conditional
logit estimation model that allows to take characteristics of alternative locations
into consideration. The results should contribute to the empirical literature in this
field and extend it by findings regarding the tax effects on the location of real R&D
activity.
Finally, a conclusion is provided in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Theory and Evidence on R&D
Tax Incentives
2.1 The R&D Process
The investment in R&D is usually scheduled on a long-term basis. Generally, one
can distinguish between two phases: During the first stage of the investment process,
the firm conducts the research and development activities to create an intangible
asset and thus, incurs costs. In the second stage, after the intangible asset has been
created, the profit potential of the intangible asset can be exploited. If the project
was a success, the earnings generated in the second stage outweigh the costs incurred
in the first stage and the firm renders a profit. Otherwise, the firm would incur a
loss. From a tax perspective, the costs incurred in the first stage are expenses that
can be either tax-deductible or non-deductible items. Consequently, in the second
stage the profits are either fully taxable - in the case the expenditures were already
deducted in the first stage - or are only taxable in the amount that they exceed the
depreciation allowance - in the case the expenditure was not deductible in the first
stage, had to be activated in the balance sheets and is amortized in the second stage.
In the following, R&D tax incentives are classified into groups as to whether they
are applicable during the first or the second stage of the R&D investment process
(see also Spengel et al., 2009).
2.1.1 R&D Tax Incentives in the First Stage
Tax incentives for the investment in R&D can either relate to the tax base or to
the tax burden. Incentives relating to the tax base downsize the same by granting
additional deductions. These could be granted in the form of additional one-time
deductions for R&D assets such that more than 100% of the asset value is depre-
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ciable overall. Another possibility would be an accelerated depreciation that causes
an interest advantage for the firm. Furthermore, also current expenditure may be
subsidized by allowing to deduct more than the actual cost incurred. On the other
hand, the tax incentive can also be implemented by granting a tax credit to the firm
that reduces the overall tax burden. In this case, the tax credit is deductible from
the tax payable.
The promotive effect also critically depends on whether a refund of the tax in-
centive is granted or not. In the situation of a loss, the firm cannot make use of an
additional deduction or a tax credit, because it does not pay any taxes at all. To
facilitate the usage of the tax incentive, some countries grant a direct refund in cash.
This directly impacts on the liquidity of the firm and is thus, argued to be very effec-
tive to foster R&D activity (Spengel, 2013). Restrictions regarding the eligibility for
the tax incentive may also apply to cross-border situations. Some countries require
that the subsidized R&D activity must occur within the country and thus, do not
grant the tax incentive for R&D activities that are financed from a domestic firm but
carried out by some foreign firm. This mechanism discriminates against contracting
out R&D to a third or affiliated firm that resides abroad. Similarly, a mechanism
requiring that costs must be incurred in the country discriminates against cross-
border contract R&D. For example, an additional deduction on R&D expenditure
may only be granted if the R&D activity is also performed domestically. Reversely,
the country where R&D activity is conducted under a contract R&D agreement may
also have tax incentives in place. These, in turn, might also be restricted such that
it is required that the costs are incurred domestically. If the use of tax incentives
is not restricted in both countries involved in a contract R&D agreement, the firm
may make use of tax incentives in both countries. Moreover, a typical characteristic
of R&D tax incentives is whether the resulting IP must be retained in the country
after it has been created. Hence, a cross-border transfer of IP could result in the re-
capture of the tax incentive for R&D expenditure (a detailed overview of worldwide
tax incentives for R&D is presented in PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014; Deloitte, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).
The amount of the tax incentive is either determined by the total volume of R&D
expenditures incurred or by the incremental increase as compared to the previous
reporting period. Moreover, R&D tax incentives are often granted only up to a
threshold, which is an absolute amount that cannot be exceeded. A reason for
restricting the tax incentive is the main interest of the government to foster R&D
activities of small and medium sized enterprises. Furthermore, the activities of firms
that will be subsidized by a tax incentive have to be predefined. The requirements
that an activity is a research activity and is eligible for an R&D tax incentive are
laid down in the OECD Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002a).
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2.1.2 R&D Tax Incentives in the Second Stage
In recent years, so-called patent box regimes have been introduced in several coun-
tries. These regimes allow a lower or even zero corporate income tax rate for patent
income that is attributed to the patent box.1 In this sense, the patent box is a
tax incentive that relates directly to the tax rate that is imposed on income from
innovative activity. It has been argued that patent box regimes are another form
of R&D tax incentive, that aim at fostering R&D activity. However, it critically
depends on the design of the patent box regime whether R&D activity is subsidized
or merely the holding of IP rights.
Patent boxes can be designed in various ways (for an overview see Pricewater-
houseCoopers, 2012, 2013, 2014). First, it has to be defined what kind of IP qualifies
for the patent box and what sort of income may be attributed to preferential tax
regime. Some countries restrict the scope of the regime to patents only, while other
countries allow all kinds of intangible assets to qualify for the patent box. The scope
may range from patents and trademarks to designs, software copyrights or secret for-
mulas to know-how and mere business secrets. Some countries also further restrict
the patent box to self-created IP and do not allow acquired IP to benefit from pref-
erential treatment. Qualifying income may be net or gross income from qualifying
IP or limited to royalty income. The question whether net or gross income qualifies
for the patent box regime determines the deductibility of expenses that correspond
to the creation of the qualifying IP. If only the net income benefits from the reduced
tax rate, corresponding expenses are deductible only against the lower patent box
tax rate. However, if gross income is granted the preferential treatment, all expenses
relating to the creation of the IP are deductible against the statutory corporate tax
rate. Thus, the firm benefits from both deducting costs against a high tax rate and
at the same time from a low income tax rate on the profits accrued.
Moreover, patent box regimes regularly allow that the corresponding R&D activity
is performed abroad. This aspect together with the possibility that gross income
qualifies for the preferential tax rate are characteristics that strongly attract patents
and other intangibles. In this sense, it is debatable whether such patent box regime
really subsidizes R&D activity.
2.1.3 Interaction between First and Second Stage
A consistent tax system is established if costs and expenditures are deducted against
the same tax rate that is imposed on the corresponding profits. Consistence is
1A recent study by Evers et al. (2014) provides an in depth analysis of patent box regimes in
place and calculates effective tax rates using the methodology introduced by Devereux and Griffith
(1999) and Devereux and Griffith (2003).
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achieved if a firm operates in one country only, such that the investment and the
exploitation happen to be in the same jurisdiction. However, when R&D activities
are performed cross-border, a coherent taxation is not assured anymore and thus,
the R&D investment may not be consistently taxed. Taxpayers often make use of
such inconsistencies to achieve, for example, that costs are deducted against a higher
tax rate than profits are taxed or to gain a double-dip, i.e. double non-taxation.
With respect to cross-border arrangements of R&D activities, the first and second
stage of the R&D process interact in several ways. First, it is possible that the R&D
activities are contracted out to a third or an affiliate company that performs R&D
on behalf of the financing company. The services are remunerated by a fee. Hence,
a consistent taxation is ensured, because the fee is deductible in the hands of the
financing company, where also profits will be subject to tax. If the contract is set
up between affiliated companies the fee has to be at arm’s length. In this case,
the two stages are interrelated by the mark-up that determines how much profit
remains taxable in the country where the R&D activity was actually performed. In
this amount, the investment is taxed inconsistently and taxpayers may make use of
the inconsistency in their favor.
Moreover, the grant of a tax incentive is sometimes restricted to criteria that
relate to the other stage, as has been briefly mentioned in Section 2.1.1. An ad-
ditional deduction on R&D assets may only be granted if the resulting IP remains
in the country after it has been created. Reversely, patent box regimes may also
be restricted to qualifying IP that has been created domestically. The majority of
countries, however, allows that R&D is performed abroad. Furthermore, the de-
ductibility of R&D expenditure may be recaptured under the regime of a patent
box. This is the case, if the expenses that relate to the qualifying IP may only be
deducted against the lower patent box tax rate. Consequently, firms may have to
anticipate tax regulations that relate to the second stage already in the first stage of
the investment process to optimize their investment. Although the decision process
may be theoretically separated into distinct decisions about the location and the
scale of R&D activity as well as the location of IP ownership (Devereux and Maffini,
2007), they depend on each other and may thus, not be filed separately from each
other.
2.2 Theoretical Justification for R&D Subsidies
If R&D incentives are granted, the government intervenes in the market for R&D
with the aim to regulate it. As discussed above, R&D is commonly subsidized by
governments through a broad variety of measures. In Section 2.1 incentives for R&D
that are implemented within the tax code have been described. However, R&D may
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also be subsidized directly, through the application for research funds. Without
paying attention on how a subsidy is granted, the following section presents the
theoretical framework that justifies state intervention regarding R&D investments.
2.2.1 Technology and Economic Growth
Macroeconomic theory describes economic growth by the Solow growth model,
named after the economist Robert M. Solow (Solow, 1956). The Solow model defines
output Y to be a function of total capital C and total labor L. Thus, the production
function reads
Y = F (C,L). (2.1)
Furthermore, investment and depreciation are the two determinants of the capital
stock. While investment causes the capital stock to grow, depreciation is the loss of
value through wear and tear and thus, causes the capital stock to fall. At a certain
level of capital stock, the amount of investment equals the amount of depreciation
and the economy finds itself in an equilibrium state. In this state, investment and
depreciation just balance and the capital stock is neither shrinking nor growing over
time. Solow calls this state the steady-state level of capital, which represents the
long-run equilibrium of the economy.2 The long-run equilibrium also implies that
regardless of the level of capital, the economy will eventually move to the steady-state
level of capital. However, this basic model cannot explain the sustained economic
growth that is empirically observed all over the world, because it predicts that
eventually the economy will reach a steady-state level in which capital and output
are constant. Thus, the model must be extended by two further sources of economic
growth, which are population growth and technological progress.
To introduce population growth into the model, one needs to think in terms
of capital stock per worker. Thus, investment increases the capital per worker,
while depreciation and population growth decrease it. Alongside with investment
and depreciation, population growth is another factor influencing the capital stock
per worker. As the population grows the capital per worker is falling. In order
to keep per worker capital constant, investment must compensate not only for the
depreciation rate of capital but also for the need for capital per new worker. Because
the steady state of the economy requires that the capital stock per worker is constant
and unchanging, the economy must grow if it falls below the steady-state level
through an increase in the number of workers. In this extended model of growth,
2Economic growth in the Solow model is also influenced by the saving rate, which determines
the level of consumption in the economy. For a more detailed explanation of the model see Mankiw
and Taylor (2014a).
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again capital per worker and output per worker are constant if the economy is in the
steady state. Consequently, if the number of workers grows at rate n, total capital
and total output must also grow at rate n. Still, the model cannot explain sustained
growth in the standard of living, because this would correspond not to growth of
total capital but to growth of capital per worker while the model so far only assumes
constant capital per worker in the equilibrium state.
The model can be further extended by the factor of the so-called efficiency of
labor (Mankiw and Taylor, 2014a). Formally, the production function is extended
by the factor E such that
Y = F (C,L× E). (2.2)
The efficiency of labor E can be explained by the society’s knowledge about
production methods. For example, assembly-line production or computerization
improved the technology of production such that each hour of a worker could be used
more efficiently and thus, rendered a higher level of output of goods and services.
The term L × E can also be interpreted to be the effective number of workers,
where L is the number of actual workers and E the efficiency of each single worker.
Consequently, total output is determined by capital inputs C and effective workers
L × E. Let’s assume that technological progress causes the efficiency of labor to
grow. If the efficiency of labor grows at a constant rate, also output grows at this
rate as if the workforce had increased. The same considerations as for population
growth apply to technological progress. In the steady state, the capital per effective
worker as well as the output per effective worker are constant quantities. If efficiency
of labor grows at rate g, the effective workforce grows equally at rate g. If we
assume population growth to be zero, the actual workforce remains constant. As
a consequence, the output per actual worker is growing at rate g in the steady
state. Similarly, the economy’s total output grows at rate g. Ultimately, this model
explains sustained increases in the standard of living even though the economy is in
an equilibrium state regarding its stock of capital. In other words, only technological
progress explains why we empirically observe constantly rising living standards.
Moreover, according to the Solow model, only technological progress is responsible
for the growth in output per worker.
This conclusion emphasizes the need to stimulate the rate of technological
progress. However, the Solow model is simplifying reality in many terms. For
example, the model only considers one form of capital. In reality, however, there is
physical capital such as bulldozers, steel plants, computers and robots, and human
capital, such as knowledge, skills and education. In stimulating economic growth,
policymakers may consider which type of capital yields the highest marginal prod-
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ucts and thus, should be raised. Moreover, the model takes technological progress
as exogenously given and does not explain how technological progress itself is de-
termined. If the political aim is to raise technological progress, it needs to be well
understood how it is determined though. One explanation is given by the economist
Joseph Schumpeter, who viewed economic progress as a process of ’creative destruc-
tion’ (Schumpeter, 1942). In the center of his argumentation are the entrepreneurs
and their innovative activities. An innovation provides the entrepreneurs a monopoly
position for a certain time, which the entrepreneurs can exploit until other market
participants have imitated the invention. The monopoly profits motivate the en-
trepreneurs to innovate and they also constitute economic growth. At the same
time, innovation has a destructive power, because old products will be replaced
by new ones. According to Schumpeter, innovation forms the engine of economic
growth.
More recent studies also provide models that explain technological advance. This
research is referred to as endogenous growth theory. Early contributions were made
by Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988), while more recently, Aghion and Howitt
(1992) established a model of growth that is based on the idea of creative destruction.
In this literature, a core question is how knowledge is created and how the process
of research and development is determined in order to integrate the microeconomic
characteristics of R&D into macroeconomic models.3 These characteristics of R&D
can be summarized as follows (Mankiw and Taylor, 2014a): First, the outcome of
most R&D processes is knowledge, which is a public good. Thus, it is available to
everyone and the property rights have to be allocated artificially by means of patent
protection legislation. Second, R&D is highly profitable if the project was a suc-
cess, because the temporary right to exploit a monopoly is granted to the inventor.
Third, R&D renders positive externalities, because also competitors benefit from
the innovation made by one firm. Moreover, R&D is characterized by a high level
of asymmetric information in favor of the firm who is conducting the research but
at the expense of investors and other stakeholders. Last, R&D involves indivisible
goods, since high fixed costs are causing that investments are only profitable if they
exceed a high threshold of invested capital. Such big scale investments may trigger
the establishment of monopolies and competition to be distorted. In the follow-
ing, two core characteristics of R&D are discussed in more detail, as they are good
reasons why state interventions in the market of R&D are justifiable.
3An in depth discussion of this strand of literature would go beyond the scope of this thesis. For
an introduction to growth theory see for example Weil (2008).
12 Chapter 2. Theory and Evidence on R&D Tax Incentives
2.2.2 Technology Spillovers
Technology spillovers are positive externalities that occur in the market for R&D
(Mankiw and Taylor, 2014b). The reason for technology spillovers lies in the char-
acteristics of R&D: Knowledge is a public good, which means that it is neither an
excludable nor a rival good. Excludability refers to the fact, that no-one can be ex-
cluded from using the good, which applies for knowledge. The second characteristic
applicable to knowledge is rivalry, which describes the circumstance when the use
of the good by one person does not diminish another person’s use. When a firm
innovates, a new innovation becomes part of society’s technological knowledge pool
and everybody can access it without using it up. Hence, also competitors in the
market benefit as they can build on that new innovation when doing research in a
similar subject area. A new innovation will thus accelerate the process of further
innovations in the market. This social return does not have to be remunerated by
the users, as the access to knowledge is free. The fact that costs are borne only by
the inventing firm, while competitors are benefiting although they do not pay any
remuneration, may cause firms to invest too little into R&D and the market to fail.4
On the other hand, negative externalities may be present in the market for R&D
as well (Mankiw and Taylor, 2014b). Negative externalities lead to social costs
that are not borne by the person who has caused the costs. To internalize negative
externalities, taxes are imposed on the person who engages in the activity such that
the profits that arise in the hands of the person conducting the activity are reduced.
As a consequence, the person will engage in less activities causing the negative
externalities. With respect to R&D, a firm may harm its competitors in that it only
invents the minimum necessary to be the first one regarding a specific technology
but does not make a big contribution to technology as a whole. This phenomenon
describes that some firms only duplicate inventions of others and is known in the
growth literature as the ’stepping on toes’ effect (Jones and Williams, 1998).
In order to reach an optimal level of research quantity the state may intervene
by subsidizing or taxing privately conducted R&D activities. Theory suggests that
activities causing negative externalities should be taxed, while on the contrary ac-
tivities causing technology spillovers should be subsidized. The theory, however, is
ambiguous whether the effect from the positive or the effect from the negative ex-
ternality prevails. Empirical work in this area, however, documents that technology
spillovers are well in excess of negative externalities. The following Section 2.3 will
give an overview of the findings and sizes of the effects of R&D activities. To con-
clude, this empirical finding justifies that governments commonly subsidize research
activities on a large scale.
4This problem is even more relevant for basic research than for applied research.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal R&D Activity in the Presence of Spillovers
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Notes: Own source, according to Mankiw and Taylor (2014b).
To highlight the welfare effects achieved by subsidizing R&D graphically, one has
to differentiate between the internal or private rate of return, which is the return
that is directly realized by the firm itself, and the external or social rate of return,
which represents the externality borne by society. Figure 2.1 depicts the welfare
consequences of a subsidy for R&D if technology spillovers are present. Together,
the private rate of return rprivate and social rate of return
5 constitute the market
rate of return rmarket. On the opposite, the firm faces costs which are represented in
a constant cost function c. On the x-axis, the quantity of R&D activity is plotted,
while the y-axis represents the price. The quantity Qprivate of R&D activity is
conducted by the firm if it maximizes its payoff function. This is where the private
rate of return rprivate meets the cost function c. However, due to positive externalities
the market optimum for R&D activity lies above this quantity. The market rate of
return rmarket is higher than the private rate of return and meets the cost function
at a higher quantity of R&D. Thus, the state provides a subsidy s to the firm that
lowers the production costs to the level represented by the function c−s. Hence, the
optimal amount of R&D activity Qoptimal is conducted by the firm due to the grant
of a subsidy in the amount of the technology spillover. The green triangle represents
the net welfare effect of the subsidy. The net welfare effect is the gross welfare
effect less the subsidy granted to the firm. Graphically, the gross welfare surplus is
5Note that the terms private and social rate of return are not used consistently throughout the
literature on R&D. Alternatively, one could refer to the social rate of return as the total return to
R&D, which is the sum of the private return and the returns to all other participants in the market
except the firm itself.
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represented by the rectangle ABCD plus the triangle CEF and it is determined by
the changes in the consumer and producer surplus. The total subsidy s is represented
by the rectangle ABCD. Thus, the triangle CEF remains left as the net welfare
surplus. In practice, a successful technology policy crucially depends on whether the
externalities can be reliably estimated (Mankiw and Taylor, 2014b).
2.2.3 Asymmetric Information
Another characteristic of R&D is the presence of asymmetric information, which may
be another source for market failure (Spengel et al., 2009). Asymmetric information
describes a situation where contractual parties have a different level of information.
This is a very common feature of credit markets and is therefore also applicable for
the credit market for R&D investments. However, with respect to R&D investments
the problem of asymmetric information is especially crucial: First, R&D investments
are regularly scheduled on a long-term basis, which renders higher uncertainty about
the success of the project. Second, R&D investments often require a high amount of
capital. Thus, for the credit lender it is especially risky to provide capital to an R&D
investment project. As a result, banks and credit institutions will demand higher
risk premiums. These high interest rates will not be acceptable for those firms
who expect a successful investment. Consequently, less risky projects will reduce
their demands for credit contracts and leave the market. The resulting projects will
be those of high risk. If this phenomenon, commonly known as adverse selection,
continues to exist, the credit market for R&D investments will ultimately collapse.
How state intervention should look like in the presence of asymmetric information
is less straight-forward than it is for technology spillovers (Spengel et al., 2009), as
the information asymmetry exists also vis-a`-vis the government. Nevertheless, R&D
subsidies will reduce the problem as they also decrease the financial constraints of
the investing firm. Moreover, it will be especially important for R&D investing
firms to attract equity investors in order not to depend on credits that involve the
payment of high interest rates. Thus, a statutory regulation that impedes on the
inclusion of equity investors will increase the problem of asymmetric information on
credit markets for R&D investments.
To sum up, the previous Section 2.2 provided theoretical arguments in favor of
governmental intervention in the market for R&D. It has been emphasized that the
market may fail to allocate costs and profits to the responsible person and thus, may
fail to reach an optimal level of R&D activity. Because innovation is likely to be a
crucial driver of economic growth, underinvestment in R&D may cause low economic
growth rates. Hence, raising R&D activity to a sufficient level is desirable from a
welfare point of view. Governmental intervention, therefore, may be theoretically
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justified on the prescribed grounds.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
Two questions are crucial in the policies to promote R&D: First, the positive ex-
ternality has to be estimated properly in order to determine the size of the subsidy.
Second, the government has to ensure that the subsidy is effective in raising the
amount of R&D activity. The following Section 2.3 provides an overview of the
empirical evidence in the area of R&D spillovers and subsidies. The section is sub-
divided into two parts. The first part, Section 2.3.1, addresses the first question and
summarizes empirical findings with respect to spillover effects from R&D. Specifi-
cally, it provides an empirical foundation that technology spillovers are present in the
market for R&D, justifying governmental intervention to raise R&D to an optimal
level, and gives an overview of the sizes of spillover effects. This strand of research
is devoted to the estimation of private and social returns to R&D. The second part
is addressed in Section 2.3.2 and discusses evidence that explores whether R&D tax
incentives can be indeed effective in raising the level of R&D spending. This strand
of research is attributed to the estimation of tax effects on R&D investment.
2.3.1 Evidence on the Returns to R&D
The origins of research in the field of R&D returns date back to the seventies and
eighties. A first survey paper has been published by Griliches (1979). Later reviews
on special topics in this area were provided by Hall (1996), Mairesse and Sasse-
nou (1991), Mairesse and Mohnen (1994) and Hall et al. (2010), while the surveys
of Debresson (1990), Mohnen (1990) and Griliches (1998) address only technology
spillovers from R&D. The large body of research in this field highlights that the
estimation of private as well as of social returns to R&D is of high interest to both,
governments but also to the private sector. Since the investment in innovation is
capital intensive, it is of high interest to the investor how high the return on the
investment has been. The government, on the other hand, has an interest how high
the total return on investment is and whether spillovers are present in the market
for R&D.
The majority of studies calculated the returns to R&D by the estimation of a pro-
duction function, also referred to as the primal approach (for details see Hall et al.,
2010).6 The production function is estimated on the firm, industry, or aggregated
6Besides the estimation of a production function, two other approaches have been used in the
literature to determine the returns to R&D. One approach, known as dual approach, that is also well
established and frequently used is based on the estimation of a system of equations. Precisely, under
the assumption that a firm maximizes its firm value the cost and profit functions are estimated.
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country level, depending on the data sources used. According to this method, the
output of R&D investment is related to various input factors, such as labor, capi-
tal and knowledge. This function is based on a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function and takes on the following form
Y = A× Lα × Cβ ×Kγint ×Kδext × eu (2.3)
where Y is a measure for production, L a measure for labor, C a measure for
capital inputs, and K measures knowledge capital. One can differentiate between
internal knowledge of the firm Kint and external knowledge Kext that is available to
other firms in the market. The parameter A measures the influence of non-specific
factors and e is a disturbance term. Equation (2.3) can be easily translated into a
linear model by taking logs and thus, is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS)
(Greene, 2012). The coefficient estimates of labor, capital and both internal and
external knowledge capital represent the elasticity of output on the respective input
factor. In other words, the coefficient estimates of each input factor indicates how
strong output changes are due to a change in the input factor by one unit. Moreover,
the results can also be translated into percentage changes.
With respect to the private rate of return, the results vary strongly between below
10% and above 100% return on investment (Hall et al., 2010). The studies are not
fully comparable, because different time periods, different countries and different
estimation methods are used. Nevertheless, according to Hall et al. (2010), based
on the estimation of a production function as briefly sketched above, a reasonable
estimate for the private return to R&D in a developed country will lie in the range
between 20% and 30%. Slightly lower estimates will be received by following the
dual approach, an estimation based on the cost and profit functions of the firm.
Those will range between 10% and 20%.
Turning to the estimation of the social rate of return, the literature documents
a high variation in the results. In general, two approaches have been applied by
previous studies. First, case studies on specific R&D projects have been useful in
calculating the overall returns to the R&D investment (for an early example on the
agricultural sector see Griliches, 1958). One drawback, however, with case studies
is a bias towards studying winners instead of losers (Hall et al., 2010). Thus, the
results may be biased upwards and are difficult to generalize. On the other hand,
From them the demand for input factors and the supply of output respectively can be derived. The
basic idea of the model is presented in Bernstein and Nadiri (1991). Alternatively, a minor group
of studies relies on financial and reporting data of the firm and is summarized by Hall and Van
Reenen (2000), Czarnitzki et al. (2006) and Grandi et al. (2009). The idea is to econometrically
relate the firm’s assets to its total value as measured by market value or Tobin’s q. The accounting
approach is described in more detail by Lev (2001).
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an advantage is that the identification of specific returns to the R&D investment is
easier as compared to econometric approaches. As a second approach, econometric
analysis has been commonly used to determine social rates of return. Similarly to
the calculation of private rates of return described above in this section, it is based
on the estimation of a production function. The core question in this regard is the
estimation of the coefficient δ on the external knowledge capital parameter Kext, as
defined in equation (2.3).
The results on the calculation of the social rate of return based on the econometric
approach range between 80% (Goto and Suzuki, 1989) to negligible effects in a study
of Wolff and Nadiri (1993). Industry-specific estimates even reach an amount of
100% and above (see for example Bernstein and Yan, 1997; Bernstein, 1998; Griffith
et al., 2004). However, the results of various studies have to be compared with
great care due to a different measurement of spillovers across studies. Nevertheless,
Hall et al. (2010) emphasize that most studies document statistically significant and
sizable effects of technology spillovers from one industry to another. Thus, one can
conclude that the intervention by governments to foster and raise the level of R&D
activity is justifiable by empirical results indicating that R&D generate positive
externalities for society.
2.3.2 Evidence on the Effectiveness of R&D Incentives
In general, R&D incentives may be granted by means of direct subsidies or via
the tax system by some kind of tax incentives, as summarized in Section 2.1. One
advantage of direct grants lies in their accuracy to target the firms or industries that
should be subsidized. Thus, it is possible to monitor the financial position of the
firm and to ensure that the subsidy is not just a windfall gain to the firm (Elschner
and Spengel, 2010). On the other hand, R&D incentives granted in the form of a tax
incentive are accessible to every firm in a simple way. Hence, the incentive scheme
does not discriminate against small companies that are lacking information about
complex application procedures and time to manage the high level of bureaucracy.
In the following, empirical findings are briefly summarized on both, direct R&D
subsidies and tax incentives for R&D.
Regarding the effectiveness of direct R&D subsidies on the amount of private
R&D investment, earlier studies are less unanimous and report additionality effects
as well as crowding-out effects (for a review of the evidence see also Becker, 2014).
Additionality effects substantiate the hypothesis that governmental subsidies for
R&D raise the overall level of private R&D spending. On the contrary, the subsidy
would not lead to the desired result if crowding-out effects were present, which
would mean that firms substitute their private R&D funds for public funds but do
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not invest more in R&D overall. However, new econometric methods enabled to
control for selection bias, which has been present towards R&D intensive firms. As
these firms are more likely to conduct R&D even in the absence of a subsidy, the
crowding-out effect is likely to be found when studying R&D intensive firms. More
recent studies reject that crowding-out is present when R&D is publicly stimulated
(see for example Duguet, 2004; Carboni, 2011; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Aerts
and Schmidt, 2008; Hussinger, 2008).7 On the contrary, they report additionality
effects indicating that direct R&D subsidies are effective in raising the overall level
of R&D spending.
Moreover, a growing number of studies report that direct subsidies are more effec-
tive in raising R&D spending of small and medium sized firms than of large multina-
tional companies (see among others Lach, 2002; Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005). One
reason may be that small firms are more liquidity constrained. Empirical findings
pointing in a similar direction are documented by Gonza´lez and Pazo´ (2008) and
Becker and Hall (2013) who compare high- and low-tech industries. The authors
report that direct subsidies were more effective in raising research activities in the
low-tech sector, while Becker and Hall (2013) find no statistical significant effect for
the high-tech sector. They argue that these results are likely to reflect some kind
of inducement effect. The findings, therefore, argue in favor of windfall gains for
high-tech firms. Interestingly, recent research finds evidence that the relationship
between the amount of R&D subsidy and the level of private R&D investment fol-
lows an inverted U-shape (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003; Goerg
and Strobl, 2007). If this was the case, the increase of small grants exerts a positive
effect on the level of private spending. However, exceeding a certain threshold a
large grant will work in the opposite direction and decrease private spending, most
likely because large grants are partly windfall gains for the firm. To conclude, these
studies suggest that smaller grants which are available to a broad audience may be
more effective in raising the overall level of R&D spending than a few but large
grants.
With respect to R&D tax incentives, the empirical evidence is largely unanimous
that R&D tax incentives exert a positive effect on the size of R&D spending. Com-
monly, the effects of tax incentives are estimated in a price elasticity estimation.
Tax incentives are granted in the form of additional deductions or credits and thus,
reduce the price of the investment project. The so-called user cost of R&D are a
measure for the price of an investment in R&D and are based on a cost of capital
approach by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and King and Fullerton (1984) and further
7For an older study that finds both, additionality as well as crowding-out effects, see for example
Busom (2000).
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developed by OECD (1991) and Devereux and Pearson (1995).8 The user cost of
R&D are included as explanatory variable in the estimation of the amount of R&D,
measured for example by R&D expenses. The coefficient on the user cost represents
the price elasticity of R&D with respect to tax incentives. As an increase in the
tax credit rate or the tax allowance leads to a reduction of the user cost of R&D,
a negative coefficient estimate indicates that the tax incentive is effective in raising
the level of overall R&D spending. An elasticity of -0.5 for example means that a
tax incentive of 1 unit increases the overall R&D spending by half a unit.
In a review study of the literature, Hall and Van Reenen (2000) conclude that a
one dollar tax incentive for R&D causes the firm to spend one additional dollar on
research. This corresponds to a price elasticity of around unity, as has been found
by Bloom et al. (2002). Similarly, a recent review of the later evidence provided by
Becker (2014) sums up that the price elasticity across various studies lies around one.
The comparability of the studies is somehow critical as the studies consider different
countries in their analyses. Nevertheless, the results range from an elasticity of -0.14
in the Canadian province Quebec (Baghana and Mohnen, 2009) to -1.8 in a sample
of Italian firms (Parisi and Sembenelli, 2003). Therefore, the conclusion may be
drawn that R&D tax incentives are in any case instrumental in raising the volume
of investment in R&D of private firms. The empirical evidence provides negative
and statistically significant estimates of the long-run price elasticity throughout var-
ious studies. A recent meta-analysis by Negassi and Sattin (2014) supports these
holdings by finding robust evidence that R&D tax credits are strongly significant in
fostering private R&D activity. Similarly as for direct R&D subsidies, the degree of
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives critically depends on firm size and technology
intensity (Elschner et al., 2011b). Accordingly, small and medium sized enterprises
as well as technology intensive firms react stronger as compared to big and less tech-
nology intensive firms (for example Swenson, 1992; Mamuneas and Nadiri, 1996;
Harhoff, 2000; Baghana and Mohnen, 2009). Further determinants of the effective-
ness of an R&D tax incentive are its complexity and the continuity with which the
incentive is granted over time (Bloom, 2007; OECD, 2002b). Due to higher un-
certainty, complex incentives and incentives that are not granted continuously are
less effective in raising private R&D activity. A simulation study of Elschner et al.
(2011a), moreover, reveals that an immediate cash refund of unused tax incentives
exerts a positive impact on the effectiveness of the tax incentive.
Last, early evidence suggests that the timing effects of direct incentives and of
tax incentives for R&D are different. While tax incentives have a short-run effect
on R&D but little effects in the long-run, for direct incentives the opposite is the
8The measurement of the user cost of R&D is summarized in the Appendix to Hall and Van
Reenen (2000).
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case. These exert positive effects on R&D spending in the medium- to long-run,
rather than in the short-run (David et al., 2000; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie, 2003). A possible explanation could be that firms themselves decide
about the claim of a tax incentive and thus, may use the subsidy to finance projects
that render high profits in the short-run. On the contrary, direct subsidies are
granted by some governmental institution that decides which projects merit support.
Consequently, governmental institutions may favor projects that yield returns in
the medium- and long-run. Moreover, the study by David et al. (2000) finds that
direct and tax incentives are substitutes and that the increase in one incentive tool
reduces the effectiveness of the other tool. Becker (2014) concludes that public
policy in respect of R&D subsidies may be most effective if both tools, direct and
tax incentives, are granted in a coordinated way. Thus, the evidence supports the
argument of implementing both direct subsidies as well as subsidies via the tax
system (Atkinson, 2007).
2.4 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis is to further extend the empirical literature in the interdis-
ciplinary field of taxation and corporate innovation. Although it is well established
that R&D tax incentives are instrumental in raising the level of R&D activity, fur-
ther questions remain unanswered. For example, in an open economy where tax
competition is present, how do firms choose their location for R&D activity and for
the holding of IP rights? First evidence suggests that an above average number of
patent applications takes place in low-tax jurisdictions (for a more detailed discus-
sion of the evidence see Sections 3.1, 4.1 and Section 5.1). However, the literature
leaves open to what extent real R&D activity is also mobile and follows corporate
income tax rates. Furthermore, it is unclear which tax planning structures firms
implement in order to reach their desired target investment location.
Consequently, the core research question that will be addressed in the following
chapters is how firms react to existing tax regulations that are either designed to
incentivize R&D activity or to secure the fiscal sovereignty of states over profits from
R&D activity? The insights gained should shed light on the behavior of firms in the
complex field of taxation and innovation and lastly, on the microeconomics of R&D.
Chapter 3
A Survey Study on R&D
Intensive Multinationals*
3.1 Introduction
The focus of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of how tax planning
takes place in R&D intensive multinational firms. Innovative multinationals are
notorious for having increased tax planning opportunities. By locating intangible
assets at low tax affiliates, they can reduce the tax burden on a relevant fraction
of their economic rents. In recent years, our understanding of the existence and
functioning of this type of tax planning strategy has increased at a remarkable rate.
The empirical literature provides compelling evidence for a tax-driven allocation of
intangibles within multinational groups (see Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Dischinger
and Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014). Consistently,
the tax accounting literature documents that R&D intensive firms, all other things
equal, display lower effective tax rates (ETR) than non-innovating firms (Graham
et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2014).
The corporate production process in R&D intensive multinational firms, however,
does not only involve administration of intangible assets. These companies also
have to decide on where to set up R&D facilities and final output production for
consumers. Innovative activity indeed turns out increasingly mobile with firms lo-
cating their R&D units away from their home countries, and in multiple locations
(Abramovsky et al., 2008). Surprisingly, the existing literature has largely ignored
the particularities of tax planning in R&D intensive firms with respect to these
choices. In view of the OECD’s ambitions to take action against multinational tax
*This chapter is joint work with Jost H. Heckemeyer and Christoph Spengel and published as
working paper Heckemeyer et al. (2014).
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avoidance (OECD, 2013b), however, it seems very important to better understand
the role that tax considerations and tax executives play in investment decisions of
R&D intensive multinationals beyond the management of IP. In the same vein, in
their comprehensive review of empirical tax research Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)
call for more research on tax decision-making inside the firm.
Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012 of international top financial
and tax managers, we develop and test a theory, based on the organizational design
literature, for the intensity in which the tax department coordinates with managers
from other business units to intervene with real investment decisions. We argue
that in the decision-making process, the tax department can get involved in decision
control or engage in decision management. Following Fama and Jensen (1983b), de-
cision control involves the ratification and monitoring of initiated projects, whereas
decision management includes, in particular, the initiation and set-up of projects
and thus occurs at a much earlier stage of the decision process. According to or-
ganizational design theory, the optimal allocation of decision rights is determined
by coordination costs, i.e. the costs of knowledge transfer between managers, that
are incurred when centralization of management and control is high, and the costs
of autonomy that arise when management and control are exercised separately. We
argue that this coordination problem also drives the choice of whether the tax de-
partment serves a controlling function ensuring tax compliance in the investment
process or whether, instead, it acts more as a manager interfering with principal
investment choices such as location and financing. Moreover, we consider R&D in-
tensity to be an important determinant of both the costs of coordination and the
costs of autonomy. First, there is high pressure in R&D intensive industries to keep
the time to market short and the costs caused by time delays associated with co-
ordination between business units are very high. Second, costs of autonomy are
low in R&D intensive firms as tax-inefficiencies from autonomous decision-making
without involvement of tax experts can be reversed by separating and tax-optimally
allocating intangibles within the multinational group.
Furthermore, we enrich our analysis with descriptive statistics relating to business
decisions during the R&D investment process. We directly test hypotheses and ask
for the motives of firms regarding the decision how much resources are spent on R&D,
where R&D activity takes place and where IP should be hold, what drives firms to
consider locating patents at low-tax affiliates and how it is achieved. Previous studies
that focused on the link between corporate taxation and innovation have based their
analyses on large data, which did not allow them to answer questions like the above.
Moreover, large data does not allow to identify what kind of structures are set up
within multinational firms to organize R&D globally.
As archival data is inappropriate to address our research question, we conduct an
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in-depth survey among worldwide operating multinationals headquartered in differ-
ent countries and active in diverse industries. Survey studies have been increasingly
employed in tax, accounting and finance research to gain insights that would not
be obtainable on the basis of publicly available accounting information. For exam-
ple Graham and Harvey (2001) survey chief financial officers (CFO) on their views
and practice of cost of capital, capital budgeting and capital structure. Graham
et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of reported earnings and disclosure deci-
sions, Graham et al. (2011) analyze the location decision of real investments and
repatriation decisions, while in a follow-up study Graham et al. (2014) examine the
incentives for tax planning, especially focusing on reputational concerns. A survey
study of (Robinson et al., 2010) is more related to the managerial accounting liter-
ature and investigates the decision to evaluate the tax department as a cost center
as opposed to a profit center. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones
to provide survey evidence on the particularities of tax planning in R&D intensive
multinationals.
In this study, we present evidence from 47 respondent firms. Admittedly, the sam-
ple of respondents is small, but we emphasize that 30 respondent firms are among
the top 2,000 R&D investors and 15 are among the top 200 R&D investors world-
wide as listed on the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard.1 9 respondent
firms are among the Top 50 patent applicants at the European Patent Office.2 Al-
together, our sample firms spent more than $50,000 million on R&D, according to
their latest published financial statements, corresponding to approximately 8% of
the total business R&D spending within the OECD in 2012 or to 7.7% of the total
R&D expenditure spent in 2012 by the 2,000 largest R&D investors worldwide listed
on the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard.
Our descriptive analyses reveal that country characteristics like infrastructure,
culture, legal stability and skills of the workforce are more important than taxes for
the location decision of R&D as well as for IP. However, among various tax factors,
the most important factor for the location of R&D activity is the regulation that
determines the deductions for R&D expenditure, while the most important factor for
the location of IP is the double tax treaty network. We conclude that the R&D and
IP location decision are two distinct decisions that are made separately. From the
descriptive survey answers, it seems that in the location decision of IP tax planning
considerations are of higher importance as compared to the R&D location decision.
Regarding our regression analysis, we indeed document supporting evidence that
1The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scorboard lists the 2,000 largest R&D investors worldwide.
These 2,000 firms represent more than 90% of the total R&D expenditure by private businesses
worldwide. For more information, see http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.eu/scoreboard.html.
2See http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report.html.
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in R&D intensive multinational firms the tax department operates more as a con-
troller than as a manager. In particular, tax departments of R&D intensive firms
make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to minimize the tax burden of the
firm, are later involved in the decision-making process of a new investment project,
but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision on a new investment project
as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Conditional on R&D intensity, however,
the level of intangible assets in the firm is associated with more tax planning efforts
and ambitions. Our results are statistically significant and robust towards several
sensitivity checks.
Our findings add to a strand of research that studies the interrelationship be-
tween organizational architecture and tax planning. Recently, Armstrong et al.
(2012) investigate the impact of tax director compensation contracts on effective
tax rates. Phillips (2003) examines the effects of compensation based performance
measures of chief executive officers and business-unit managers and finds that after-
tax compensation significantly lowers the reported generally accepted accounting
principles-ETR (GAAP ETR) and cash ETR of a firm. Whereas these studies are
concerned with performance reward, Robinson et al. (2010) consider performance
measurement and evaluate why firms choose to evaluate a tax department as a profit
center as opposed to a cost center. In their analysis, they use the degree of coordi-
nation between the tax department and operating units as an exogenous variable.
In this Chapter, however, we want to explain the degree of coordination between the
tax department and managers from other business units. Thus, our study puts the
focus on the third component of organizational architecture, allocation of decision
rights, whereas the previous studies consider the first two components, performance
measurement and reward. Similar to these earlier papers, we take another important
step towards unraveling the black box of tax avoidance. In this sense, this Chap-
ter can also be connected to other studies which open part of the black box of tax
decision-making. In particular, Gallemore and Labro (2013) investigate the internal
information environment within firms and its effect on the reported ETR. They find
that firms with high internal information quality report lower ETRs. The unobserv-
able construct of internal information environment is measured by five proxies, which
are analyst following, analyst forecast accuracy, management forecast accuracy, the
speed by which management announces financial figures such as earnings after fiscal
year closing and the absence of material weaknesses in internal control. Further-
more, Dyreng et al. (2010) propose the conjecture that top executives may have a
certain style and therefore set a certain tone at the top with respect to tax planning.
They track executives who had worked for more than one firm over a longer period
of time and indeed find a significant effect of executives on the GAAP and cash
ETR. More recently, management research has started to focus on tax aspects, as
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well. Glaister and Hughes (2008) provide a case study on UK firms analyzing the
relationship between corporate strategy formulation and taxation. They find strong
support for the view that strategy decisions take priority, while tax decisions follow
subsequently in the order of precedence.
Our study contributes to several further strands of the literature. In general, there
is a universe of theoretical and empirical research dealing with the distorting effect
of taxation on investment decisions. This literature provides robust evidence that
taxes impact on both marginal and infra-marginal investment in domestic and cross-
border contexts (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011; Hassett
and Hubbard, 2002; Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Investment in R&D, however,
is special (Elschner and Spengel, 2010). It is particularly risky because innovation
efforts require a long-term perspective with high initial costs and uncertain outcome.
On the other hand, once successful, R&D tends to yield very high economic rents,
because intellectual property rights establish monopolies for a certain period of time.
Time to market plays a crucial role in order to be able to earn these rents. Moreover,
R&D activity is supposed to create positive externalities through unpaid knowledge
spillovers and considered to be crucial for competitiveness and economic growth.
As a consequence, various countries have put in place R&D tax incentives to foster
innovative activity. The effectiveness of this type of incentives has been studied
extensively in the past. R&D tax credits and additional allowances, for example,
are generally found to positively impact on the scale of R&D investment (Hall and
Van Reenen, 2000; Arundel et al., 2008; Spengel et al., 2009; Elschner and Spengel,
2010). Furthermore, there is evidence that tax considerations can lead firms to
relocate and shift existing R&D activities to tax favorable jurisdictions (Wilson,
2009b; Paff, 2005). Bloom and Griffith (2001) speak of ’footloose R&D’ to emphasize
the international mobility of R&D activity.
The most substantial international tax planning opportunities in R&D intensive
multinationals are associated with the output of the innovation process, i.e. valuable
intangible assets, rather than with inputs. A recent strand of research provides ro-
bust evidence for a tax-driven allocation of intangibles within multinational groups.
For example, Mutti and Grubert (2009) show that US companies obtain high roy-
alty revenues preferably in low tax subsidiaries. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find
that subsidiaries subject to relatively low corporate tax rates show a higher level of
intangible asset investment than other affiliates in a multinational group. Karkinsky
and Riedel (2012), Ernst and Spengel (2011) and more recently also Griffith et al.
(2014) substantiate this finding on the basis of patent data.
Finally, our study is connected to a strand of literature that investigates the
interrelationship between the tax sensitivity of capital investment and profit shift-
ing opportunities. The literature shows that if foreign earnings are exempt upon
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repatriation, or taxation is deferred, the host-country tax rate is an important de-
terminant of foreign direct investment (for example Janeba, 1995; De Mooij and
Ederveen, 2003; Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011). Shifting profits from a given host
country to low-tax affiliates reduces, all other things equal, the effective tax burden.
In other words, the effective tax rate levied on infra-marginal or marginal returns
is no longer determined by the local tax rate of the country where the real busi-
ness activity takes place but by the tax rate of the jurisdiction where profits are
shifted. As a consequence, profit shifting might reduce the sensitivity of investment
to local tax rates and, vice versa, restricting profit shifting opportunities can lead to
increased investment responses to the local tax rate (for example Hong and Smart,
2010; Haufler and Runkel, 2012). Empirical evidence for the negative relationship
between profit shifting opportunities through IP tax planning and the sensitivity of
investment to source country taxation is provided by Overesch and Schreiber (2010).
Based on German outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) micro data Overesch
and Schreiber (2010) find that R&D intensive firms’ outbound investments react less
tax sensitively than outbound investments of less R&D intensive firms. Our study
relates to this previous piece of research in that we try to investigate the functions
of the tax department in R&D intensive firms by using organizational design theory
and taking a closer look inside the firm.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 develops our
hypothesis. The research design and data are discussed in Section 3.3. Furthermore,
Section 3.4 explains our estimation approach. Last, Section 3.5 presents our results
and robustness checks and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Hypothesis Development
According to organizational design theory, the organizational architecture of a firm
depends on three columns: performance measurement, reward and punishment of
performance, and the partitioning of decision rights between agents within the firm
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992; Zimmerman, 2014). Previous studies have focused on
the first two columns of organizational architecture, that is the choice of performance
measurement of corporate tax departments (Robinson et al., 2010) and the role of
compensation-based incentives in corporate tax planning (Phillips, 2003; Armstrong
et al., 2012). In this study, we are particularly interested in the factors that deter-
mine the allocation of decision rights to the tax department and thus put the focus
on the third column of organizational design.
Along the decision-making process, the hierarchical structure of a firm must allo-
cate decision rights over four essential steps to different managers or agents (Jensen
and Meckling, 1992; Zimmerman, 2014). These four steps are the initiation of a cer-
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tain action, its ratification, followed by its implementation and, finally, monitoring
tasks. Fama and Jensen (1983b) use the term decision management to summarize
activities that fall under initiation and implementation and the term decision control
to summarize ratification and monitoring. Considering the construction of a new
plant, for example, the initiation proposal about whether and where to invest in new
facilities may primarily come from division managers with specialized knowledge of
the production process and product demand from customers.3 In the ratification
process, senior management assembles knowledge from specialists in finance, human
resources, legal, and other departments. Construction of the project, i.e. imple-
mentation, is the responsibility of the proposing managers or a separate facilities
department within the firm. After construction is completed, internal accountants
prepare financial reports to monitor the division operating the project.
Obviously, when firms are sufficiently complex, the relevant knowledge needed to
make an investment decision is dispersed among several agents in the firm. Hence,
several agents will be involved in the decision-making process and the firm needs
some mechanism to structure the way decisions are made. We are interested in the
role of tax experts in this process. We think that two scenarios are possible. On
the one hand, the tax department could primarily be involved in controlling tasks,
supporting ratification and monitoring of the project, and thus acting separately
from management activity. A tax department that acts as a controller rather than
a manager concentrates, for example, on ensuring that local and international tax
legislation is complied with but it does not intervene in the structuring of the project.
The management of the project would, in this case, be rather decentralized in the
hands of the specialized division managers. On the other hand, the tax department
could act much more as a manager and be involved in the initial stage of the decision
process, for example by preselecting potential investment locations and coordinating
directly with the initiating division managers. Thus, the decision process would be
more centralized and management and control functions would be exercised in a less
separated fashion.
The question of whether the tax department acts more as a manager or as a con-
troller reflects the optimal choice of coordination intensity with other departments
and divisions in the firm. Coordination intensity with experts and managers from
other departments or divisions will be increasing in the tax department’s interven-
tion in decision management. For example, if the tax department gets involved in
project initiation, specialized division managers and the tax department will have
to coordinate to preselect potential investment locations, taking into account impor-
tant tax aspects and non-tax factors related to local conditions of production and
demand. The cost of coordination result from communication and the so caused
3The example is taken from Zimmerman (2014), p. 146.
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delay in making a decision. Cost of delay are costs for missing out opportunities,
because transferring knowledge (i.e. coordinating) takes time (Szulanski, 2000; Zim-
merman, 2014).
In this coordination problem, the cost of coordination have to be balanced with
the cost of autonomy (Emery, 1969). Cost of autonomy emerge from the forgone
use of valuable knowledge in the decentralized decision-making process, which can
result in inefficient or even entirely wrong decisions. In our context, the costs of
autonomy (of the initiating division managers) can best be understood as forgone
tax savings due to inefficient use of the tax experts’ knowledge.4
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between coordination intensity I, repre-
sented on the horizontal axis, and associated costs C, represented on the vertical
axis. The ascending curves represent coordination costs, while the descending curves
represent the autonomy costs. With increasing coordination intensity the cost of co-
ordination increase, while the cost of autonomy decrease. The total costs are the
sum of coordination and autonomy costs, represented by the U-shaped curve. The
minimum of the total cost curve indicates the optimal level of coordination intensity,
here at I1.
5 In our context, the horizontal axis, depicting coordination intensity, also
reflects the nature of the tax departments’ tasks. At the right end of the continuum,
the tasks of the tax department are managerial in nature, i.e. highly coordination
intensive. At the left end, they are of a controlling type with little coordination
between tax experts and managers of other business units. Accordingly, the tax
departments’ choice of coordination intensity with other business units ultimately
reflects the decision on the nature of its tasks. Hence, the minimum of the total
cost curve represents the optimal bundle of the tax department’s managerial and
controlling tasks.
We argue that in R&D intensive firms, the optimal level of coordination inten-
sity between the tax department and other business units is lower relative to non-
innovating firms, here at I2.
6 In other words, the tax department in highly R&D
intensive firms carries out more controlling activities rather than managerial tasks
4We use the more general concept and term ’autonomy costs’ as e.g. in Emery (1969), instead of
referring to the term ’agency costs’ as used in Jensen and Meckling (1992), Fama and Jensen (1983a)
and Fama and Jensen (1983b). Agency costs occur when agents dispose of private information
and do not share common interests. Here, we want to leave open the question whether the tax
department and other specialized division managers have conflicting or congruent interests. In
any case, with decreasing coordination, the efficiency costs of autonomous decision-making tend to
increase.
5The optimal coordination intensity, i.e. the minimum of total costs, is at the point of equality
of the absolute slopes of the autonomy cost and the coordination cost curves, which in Figure 3.1
coincides with the intersection of the two curves.
6Again, the optimal coordination intensity, i.e. the minimum of total costs, is at the point of
equality of the absolute slopes of the autonomy cost and the coordination cost curves, which in
Figure 3.1 coincides with the intersection of the two curves.
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Figure 3.1: Coordination Intensity Choice
coordination cost curve
autonomy cost curve
total cost curve
I1I2 I
C
Notes: Own source, according to Emery (1969). The ascending curves represent the coordination
cost curves, while the descending curves represent the autonomy cost curves. The U-shaped curves
represent the total cost curves. The grey curves depict the initial situation. We hypothesize that
in R&D intensive firms both curves are shifted to the left, as represented by the black curves.
The total cost minimum is at the point of equality of the absolute slopes of the autonomy cost
and coordination cost curves. In this figure, the point of equal absolute slopes coincides with the
intersection of the two cost curves.
as compared to less R&D intensive companies. We present two principal reasons for
our hypothesis:
First, coordination costs in terms of delay costs from lost opportunities are es-
pecially high in R&D intensive businesses. The first applicant of a patent has the
chance to be granted a monopoly and to extract the associated economic rents, while
the runner-up will potentially face important economic and legal barriers to mar-
ket entry. Moreover, in many high-tech industries, products and innovations follow
sharp life cycle patterns. Missing out on the start of a new product cycle means
that chances to successfully commercialize one’s product are drastically reduced be-
cause the pioneers will have seized the market, at least for the lifetime of that new
innovation. As a consequence, many companies engaged in R&D put a strong focus
on ’time to market’ which becomes the primary target dimension in the manage-
ment of R&D projects (Brem, 2008). In Figure 3.1, the coordination cost curve for
R&D intensive firms is represented by the black ascending curve. It is shifted to
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the left relative to the ’standard’ coordination cost curve for non-innovating firms,
representing the increased costs of delay at given levels of coordination intensity.
A second reason for the optimal level of coordination intensity being comparably
low in R&D intensive firms relates to the costs of autonomy that arise as a de-
creasing function of coordination intensity. More specifically, we argue that R&D
intensive firms have enhanced opportunities to shift paper profits toward low-tax
jurisdictions because R&D activity tends to produce both highly mobile and highly
specific intangible assets, which can be separated from the R&D inputs and mi-
grated to low-tax subsidiaries in a tax efficient way.7 R&D intensive firms thus may
care less about taxes in the investment decision process because they have consid-
erable tax planning opportunities at a later stage, i.e. after the investment project
has been implemented, and can substantially reduce their effective tax burden no
matter where the real economic activity takes place.8 Hence, the autonomy costs
in terms of forgone tax savings that result from low coordination intensity between
the tax department and other division managers initiating an investment project
are low because inefficiencies from a tax point of view can be partially reversed by
tax planning with IP. Graphically, this mechanism available to R&D intensive firms
is reflected by the black descending autonomy cost curve which is shifted to the left
relative to the autonomy cost curve for non-innovating firms. As both the auton-
omy and the coordination cost curves for R&D intensive firms are shifted to the left,
so is the optimal coordination intensity between the tax department and initiating
division managers (from I1 to I2 in Figure 3.1).
In sum, the optimal level of coordination intensity in R&D intensive firms is
reduced for two reasons: First, coordination between R&D managers and the tax
department is costly, because the cost of delaying an R&D related decision may be
exorbitantly high. Second, R&D intensive firms often hold IP that enables them
to engage in tax planning no matter where the economic activity actually takes
place. These opportunities may help them to compensate tax inefficiencies from low
coordination in the initial stage of the investment decision by engaging in IP tax
planning ex post. Thus, our hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis: In R&D intensive firms, the tax department carries out
more controlling rather than managerial tasks than in less R&D intensive
firms.
We argue that the tax department’s management-control choice manifests itself
7For empirical evidence on the tax sensitivity of intangible asset location, see Dischinger and
Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012).
8In line with this notion, Overesch and Schreiber (2010) provide empirical evidence that the
impact of taxes on investment decisions decreases with increasing R&D intensity.
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in four dimensions, which we are able to directly observe in our survey. These
are the effort the tax department makes for tax planning relative to compliance and
reporting, the department’s ambitions to minimize the overall tax burden of the firm
relative to tax risk management, the temporal involvement of the tax department in
investment decisions and the ultimate decision rights the tax department has in the
investment decision. These characteristics are supposed to describe the nature of
the tax department’s tasks. We argue that the more the company’s tax experts act
as managers in the business decision process, the more time they spend on active
tax planning relative to mere reporting and compliance tasks. We also suppose that
a decision managing tax department tends to have high ambitions to minimize the
firm’s tax burden and it gets involved early in the initiation phase of the decision
process, whereas a controlling tax department comes in at later stages for ratification
and monitoring of decisions. With respect to ultimate decision rights, the strongest
right, the right to veto, will rather rest with the tax department that serves as a
controller rather than with a managing tax department.
Table 3.1: Predictions
Tax Department acts Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
more as a ...
high R&D intensity ... controller - - - +
low R&D intensity ... manager + + + -
Notes: + / - indicates the predicted direction of the effect of R&D intensity on each of the four
dimensions, efforts, ambitions, temporal involvement and rights.
As stated above, we hypothesize that high R&D intensity leads the tax depart-
ment to adopt more controlling tasks because the cost of coordination, particularly
in the form of time delay, may be exorbitantly high. What that means for each
separate dimension is shown in Table 3.1. We expect that a high R&D intensity is
associated with less tax planning effort, less ambitions and a later involvement of
the tax executives in the decision-making process. Therefore, the predicted effect
of R&D intensity on efforts, ambitions and temporal involvement is negative.9 On
the other hand, we expect that R&D intensity is positively associated with rights,
because this dimension is inversely related to the management-control-choice, i.e.
9We acknowledge that it may appear difficult to disentangle the effect that R&D intensity has
on tax planning efforts and ambitions. We argue that the tax department is less involved in active
investment decision management and planning both because it wants to avoid time delays and
because it can much more efficiently shift profits after the investment took place by migrating mobile
and firm-specific intangible assets to low-tax jurisdictions, i.e. through contract R&D agreements
(for a more detailed discussion on different migration strategies see Section 4.2). Obviously, this ex
post IP and profit migration requires some tax planning effort and ambition itself. In the empirical
analysis, we will try to isolate the influences on the four dimensions associated with the management
of IP.
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tax departments that have more controlling tasks are more likely to have a veto
right in the decision-making process. Consequently, the hypothesis that R&D in-
tensive firms’ tax departments act more as a controller rather than as a manager
comes along with a predicted positive effect of R&D intensity on the rights of the
tax department.
3.3 Research Method and Sample
3.3.1 Survey Approach
Many previous studies have investigated the effect taxes have on R&D investment
and most of them have empirically tested their hypotheses by means of large archival
data sets. Data that has commonly been used to study R&D investment is R&D
expenditure (Bloom and Griffith, 2001; Bloom et al., 2002), royalty income (Mutti
and Grubert, 2009), balance sheet data on intangible asset holdings (Dischinger
and Riedel, 2011) or the number of patent applications (Ernst and Spengel, 2011;
Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Boehm et al., 2012; Ernst et al., 2014). Instead, we
conducted a survey in cooperation with the internationally operating tax consultancy
firm PwC. A major advantage of surveys is the elicitation of otherwise unobservable
data (Serita, 2008). As we are interested to gain a deeper understanding of how firm
characteristics influence the role the tax department plays in the decision-making
process, archival accounting databases would not help us to address our research
question.
We designed the questionnaire and entered into a cooperation with PwC, who con-
ducted the survey among preselected global client firms. The preselection of firms
was done by PwC to compose a sample of large and multinationally operating firms.
After we had designed a first draft of the questionnaire, we made several revisions to
it based on feedback from academics in the areas of marketing, finance, accounting
and economics. Moreover, three firms beta-tested the questionnaire and provided
feedback on the length of the questionnaire and on the readability and comprehen-
sibility of the content to us. Finally, we asked 39 questions, while the questions
considerably differed in length and some questions comprised subsections.10 The
questionnaire is 20 pages long, where we assumed that it will take one minute per
page to answer the questions. We divided the questionnaire in three subparts. The
first part addresses the role of tax considerations in R&D-related business decisions.
The second part contains questions regarding the organizational integration of the
tax and R&D function. The last part asks for company characteristics of the re-
spondent firm.
10This study analyzes selected questions from the questionnaire.
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The questionnaire was sent out by PwC to its client firms in August 2012. The
survey was closed in October 2013. Throughout this period, we sent several re-
minders to the contacted firms. Out of 321 questionnaires that were sent out, 47
firms returned the questionnaire properly filled out. Thus, the response rate was
approximately 15%.
Survey data also entails some drawbacks. The major concern is measurement
error caused by inappropriate answers. The answer a respondent gives can be inap-
propriate due to the lack of knowledge or that the respondent feels uncomfortable
to openly and correctly answer the survey questions. Concerns on the part of re-
spondents to honestly answer survey questions might be a problem in our context
as international tax planning is generally not well received by public opinion. Re-
spondents might therefore, consciously or subconsciously, be tempted to conceal the
true role of tax considerations in their business decisions.
These potential difficulties have to be addressed carefully prior to conducting the
survey, especially in the design of the questionnaire and in the way the survey is con-
ducted. Following previous survey studies in the accounting and finance literature
(Graham and Harvey, 2001; Graham et al., 2005, 2011) we dealt with these issues
in several ways, which we discuss in the following. As we only asked tax experts
to fill out the survey, we do not worry that the respondents randomly chose their
answers. If the respondent was not motivated to fill out the survey, he could easily
refuse to do it. Also, we rely on the expert knowledge of the respondents and believe
that the questions we asked were understood correctly. Nevertheless, we included a
question to indicate the job title of the person who filled out the form. From the 47
respondents, 29 respondents are head of the tax department, one respondent is the
vice president of the tax department, four are CFO of the company, one respondent
is the vice president of the CFO, six are local tax managers, one respondent is the
CEO of the company, one the assistant to the CEO and another one the assistant
to the CFO and, finally, three respondents did not report their job title.
We are aware that some of our questions are sensitive as we also focus on tax
planning strategies. These questions are critical, because respondents might not
want to answer such questions correctly. First, we made clear that we are only
interested in legal tax planning schemes, which is distinct from illegal tax evasion.
Second, we decided that PwC conducts the survey for us, because firms will probably
have confidence in the integrity and discreetness of their consultancy firm. In the
survey, we made clear that all answers will be forwarded to us, the researchers, in
anonymous form. We also included a paragraph on data security and confidentiality
in the introduction to the questionnaire. We assured our respondents that the data
reported in the questionnaire would be treated confidentially and that results would
be published in aggregate form only. Last, we pointed out that respondents may
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also return an uncompleted questionnaire in case they were unable to answer some
of the questions. That information was also meant to ensure that respondents felt
free to leave some questions unanswered if they were uncomfortable with them.
3.3.2 Survey Data and Sample
The following Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide an overview of the characteristics of the 47
respondent firms. Half of respondents are located in Germany, followed by the US
and Switzerland. Furthermore, the sample comprises firms from Australia, Austria,
Finland, Hong Kong, Israel, Mexico, South Africa and the UK. Most firms are
publicly traded (35 firms), but our sample also comprises eleven private firms and
one firm that indicated some other ownership structure, although without specifying
it any further. The majority of respondent firms are operating in heavy industries
(16 firms), followed by the manufacturing industry (9 firms).
Table 3.2: Company characteristics of respondent firms
Group’s parent country (N = 47) # of firms Industry (N = 47) # of firms
Australia 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 1
Austria 1 Mining, construction 4
Finland 1 Manufacturing: food, textiles
Germany 25 and chemicals 9
Hong Kong 1 Heavy industries 16
Israel 1 Transport and utilities 3
Mexico 2 Wholesale and retail trade 1
South Africa 1 Banking, finance, insurance,
Switzerland 6 real estate 3
United Kingdom 1 Information technologies 4
United States 7 Health, pharmaceuticals,
biotechnologies 4
Ownership (N = 47) Public administration 2
Public 35
Private 11
Other 1
Notes: The group’s parent country indicates the country of incorporation of the global ultimate
owner company of the respective respondent firm. Industry classification is based on the US Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) standard industrial classification (SIC).
On average, our respondents have total assets of $70,800 million, total liabilities of
$52,300 million and total sales of $30,000 million. The average net income is $1,830
million and the return on assets is 6.19%. The average respondent firm employs
61,537 people (full-time equivalents), where 5,537 of these are employed in R&D,
and is approximately 87 years old. The average balance sheet amount of intangible
assets is slightly more than one tenth of the total assets ($7,960 million) and the
average spending on R&D is $1,240 million per year. The total R&D spending of
all sample firms amounts to approximately $53,400 million. This corresponds to
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approximately 30% of the total business R&D spending in the EU27 in 2012 or to
8% of the total business R&D spending within the OECD in 2012.11 This share
appears very high in view of the small number of firms we survey. However, the
distribution of R&D expenditure across firms worldwide is highly skewed, meaning
that the majority of R&D spending is concentrated in the hands of only a few firms.
This is highlighted by the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard published
by the European Commission (EC), which covers the top 2,000 investors in R&D
worldwide. These 2,000 firms represent more than 90% of the total R&D expenditure
by private businesses.12 Our sample contains 30 firms that are among the top 2,000,
and even 15 that are among the top 200 Scoreboard firms. In sum, our sample
covers 7.7% of the top 2,000 firms’ aggregate R&D expenditure in the year 2012.
Moreover, we emphasize that 9 respondents are among the Top 50 applicant firms
to the European Patent Office.
Table 3.3: Selected descriptive statistics of respondent firms
Variable # Observations Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Total assets 47 70,800 22,800 113 685,000
Total liabilities 47 52,300 14,200 167 625,000
Total sales 47 30,000 18,000 140 147,000
Net income 46 1,830 662 -778 13,600
Return on assets 45 6.19% 6.10% -34.64% 29.16%
Intangible assets 45 7,960 1,400 0 85,400
R&D expenses 43 1,240 193 0 6,790
Total employees 47 61,537 44,000 480 380,000
R&D employees 35 5,537 1,000 0 38,500
Firm Age 47 87 100 1 179
Notes: All financial statement information is in million US Dollars. Firm age is measured in years.
One limitation to survey research is selection bias in the answers due to self-
selection of respondents (Dillman, 1978). Firms or managers may decide them-
selves whether to answer the survey or not and therefore, they select themselves
into two groups, the group of respondents and the group of non-respondents. The
concern of selection bias is related to the generalizability of the results and conclu-
sions drawn from the survey. One form of selection bias is non-response bias that
arises if the group of respondents is systematically different to the group of non-
respondents in observable characteristics that influence the subject of interest in our
study (i.e. R&D related tax planning behavior). Another form of selection bias
11The total business R&D spending in the EU27 in 2012 amounts to $176,744.85 millions and
the total business R&D spending within the OECD in 2012 amounts to $649,214.01 millions. The
figures are taken from the OECD database on business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD).
The figures are measured at constant prices and PPP.
12See the European Commission’s press release on November 18, 2013:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-1000 en.htm.
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arises if the group of contacted firms systematically differs from the population that
is researched. Hence, we draw comparisons to address both of these concerns. First,
we compare the sample of respondents to bigger populations, i.e. to the group of
non-respondents and the group of firms that are part of the Standard & Poors (S&P)
1200 Index. Second, we compare our sample of contacted firms with the group of
S&P 1200 firms. The S&P 1200 Index is a stock market index that covers the 1,200
worldwide biggest and publicly traded companies. It comprises approximately 70%
of the world’s stock market capitalization. Since the bigger part of R&D is concen-
trated in the hands of a few but very large multinational firms, we are interested to
learn how our sample compares to this population of firms, and, therefore, use the
sample of S&P 1200 companies as a comparison group.
Table 3.4: Non-Response Bias Tests
All Firms Survey Survey
we Contacted Nonresponders Responders
S&P with Available with Available with Available
1200 Data Data Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
RDINT 675 0.03 128 0.04 85 0.04 43 0.03
IPINT 1,197 0.19 147 0.20 102 0.21 45 0.17
SIZE 1,209 23,800 149 31,900 102 32,800 47 30,000
ROA 1,209 0.07 147 0.07 102 0.07 45 0.06
LEV 1,206 0.60 149 0.79 102 0.62 47 1.17
GROW 1,207 0.15 146 0.05 101 0.05 45 0.07
INVINT 1,189 0.08 147 0.12 102 0.11 45 0.13
CAPINT 1,186 0.28 145 0.21 101 0.22 44 0.20
p-Value
1 vs. 2 1 vs. 4 2 vs. 4 3 vs. 4
RDINT 0.0573 0.7419 0.5462 0.3925
IPINT 0.0508 0.8792 0.2566 0.1199
SIZE 0.4426 0.1122 0.5241 0.3776
ROA 0.3641 0.8115 0.7779 0.6990
LEV 0.2773 0.4240 0.9342 0.9089
GROW 0.1006 0.7707 0.5527 0.4146
INVINT 0.0000 0.0005 0.4488 0.2992
CAPINT 0.0470 0.0888 0.6037 0.4780
Notes: Columns (1) to (4) represent different populations as stated. P-values are based on a
two-tailed Wilcoxon test and indicate significant differences among the different populations in the
variables observed. All variables are obtained from the Compustat Global and Compustat North
America Database and are measured as of 2012. R&D intensity, abbreviated by RDINT, is R&D
expenses (XRD) scaled by total assets (AT), IP intensity, abbreviated by IPINT is intangible assets
(INTAN) to total assets (AT), size is measured by total sales (SALE) and is in million USD, ROA is
the return on assets defined as net income (NI) scaled by total assets (AT), leverage, abbreviated by
LEV, is calculated as liabilities (LT) over total assets (AT), asset growth is the percentage change
in total assets to the one-year lag total assets (AT), inventory and capital intensity, abbreviated
by INVINT and CAPINT respectively, is total inventories (INVT) and net property, plant and
equipment (PPENT) respectively over total assets (AT).
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Table 3.4 contains descriptive statistics of all samples and p-values from a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test to indicate whether the samples are significantly different
from each other. To test for possible selection bias we group firms into four different
samples represented in columns (1) to (4) of Table 3.4. Column (1) comprises the
set of firms that during January 2011 and December 2013 were at least once part of
the S&P 1200 Index.13 Column (2) comprises all contacted firms that were sent a
questionnaire. Finally, this column is split in the group of non-respondents (column
(3)) and the sample of respondents (column (4)).
Overall, with respect to most characteristics we evaluate, our sample of respon-
dents is similar to the S&P 1200. The firms in the sample only differ from the S&P
1200 in terms of inventory and capital intensity. In other words, the S&P 1200 com-
panies have similar distributions of R&D intensity, IP intensity, total sales, return
on assets, leverage, and asset growth. Comparing all contacted firms with the S&P
1200 Index, our contacted firms differ significantly from the S&P 1200 in terms of
R&D and IP intensity, in inventory and in capital intensity. Nonetheless, they are
similar in terms of size, return on assets, leverage and asset growth. Comparing the
characteristics of respondent firms to those of the firms we contacted and to those of
non-respondents, we do not find that the respondent firms differ significantly from
these two groups.
To sum up, contacted and responding firms are different from S&P 1200 firms
along some few dimensions. Therefore, our results might not generalize to the whole
sample of S&P 1200 firms. Nonetheless, there is no indication for systematic differ-
ences between firms that answered our survey and those that did not answer.14
3.4 Estimation Strategy
Our aim is to explore whether R&D intensity influences the coordination intensity
of the tax department with other operational units within the firm. Since the tax
department’s management-control-choice is difficult to observe, we decided to mea-
sure specific characteristics of the tax department. Precisely, we assume that the tax
departments’ position on the continuum between management and control manifests
itself in four dimensions. These are the tax departments’ tax planning efforts, its
13The sample of column (1), therefore, contains slightly more than 1,200 firms.
14Generalizability requires a representative sample and, additionally, a sample size that is large
enough to reduce the margin of error to conventional levels. Even if our sample of respondents
was similar to the relevant comparison group in all characteristics, we would still be cautious
about generalizing our findings to the whole population of firms due to our small sample. Limited
generalizability is a general limitation of survey research in accounting and taxation and has been
encountered by previous studies as well (e.g. Graham et al., 2011, 2014). Still, we believe that
survey studies provide valuable contributions to unravel the black box of tax decision-making.
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tax planning ambitions, its temporal involvement and its ultimate decision rights.
The data on these four dimensions comes from the questionnaire. While the
first dimension - tax planning effort - is a proportion, the other three dimensions -
ambitions, temporal involvement and rights - are ordinal variables measured on a
five-point scale. Tax planning efforts are measured by the approximate time (in %
of total workload) that is spent on tax planning activities, as opposed to activities
linked to compliance and financial reporting, by tax executives. Ambitions, temporal
involvement and rights are measured on a five-point scale respectively, ranging from
0 to 4. We ask ’How important is the minimization of the group’s tax burden as
an objective for your group’s tax department?’ to measure the ambitions of the tax
department. A 0 on the response scale indicates that minimization of the group’s tax
burden is not at all an important objective of the tax department, while 4 indicates
that tax minimization is a very important goal. Furthermore, we ask ’Starting
from which stage during the planning phase of an investment project are the tax
executives involved in the decision-making?’ to measure the temporal involvement
in the decision process. 0 again indicates the lowest parameter value, which we
equate to a very late involvement of the tax executives and which we scenarize
as ’The decision has been made; tax executives optimize given the target location’.
A value of 4 instead means that the tax department gets involved very early and
preselects potential targets in the initiation phase of the decision process. Last,
ultimate decision rights are measured by the question ’During the planning phase
of an investment project, how would you characterize the role of the tax executives?’
and which ranges from 0, No rights, the decision is made without consultation of tax
executives, to 4, Tax executives have a veto right.
To analyze the relationship between R&D intensity and each of these four di-
mensions, we will perform bivariate tests and regression analyses. Throughout the
empirical analysis, we will take into account that our sample is small from a statisti-
cal point of view. Standard econometric methods used for hypothesis testing rely on
sampling distributions that are approximately normal. The assumption of normality
is without problems and justified by the central limit theorem if the sample size is
large. However, given our sample size of slightly less than 50 observations, assuming
a normal (approximate) sampling distribution may potentially be inaccurate. For
our bivariate tests, we will therefore use the Wilcoxon rank-sum test15 as a robust
non-parametric alternative to the common Student’s t-test (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann
and Whitney, 1947). However, the normal approximation to the sampling distribu-
tion can still be accurate in samples as small as 30 observations (p. 89 in Stock and
Watson, 2012). We will therefore make statistical inferences on the basis of t-tests
as well.
15Also known as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test, Mann-Whitney-U-Test, or U-Test.
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The regression analysis will estimate an empirical model of the following form
DIMi = β0 + β1RDINTi + β2SIZEi + β3ROAi + β4LEVi
+β5GROWi + β6INV INTi + β7CAPINTi + β8AGEi + i
(3.1)
where DIMi abbreviates the four different dimensions and RDINTi represents
R&D intensity, our variable of main interest.
Our hypothesis (see Section 3.2) predicts that with increasing R&D intensity
it becomes more likely that the tax department takes the position of a controller
rather than that of a manager. We measure R&D intensity (RDINT) by the firm’s
R&D expenses scaled by total assets. Furthermore, we include a number of control
variables that likely co-determine the tax department’s management-control-choice.
Previous literature substantiates the notion that tax planning opportunities and
incentives influence the actual tax avoidance behavior of firms (Manzon and Plesko,
2002; Mills, 1998; Rego, 2003; Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al., 2008). Since the tax
avoidance behavior of a firm is closely related to the nature of the tax department’s
tasks, we think that tax planning opportunities and incentives may also influence
the management-control-choice of the tax department. Consequently, the first set of
control variables capture real tax planning opportunities: Theoretically, it has been
argued that the size of the firm increases complexity and, therefore, impacts nega-
tively on the management-control-choice of a firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). The
empirical evidence, however, reports mixed results. Early evidence by Zimmerman
(1983) finds a positive effect of firm size on tax planning and documents that larger
firms face higher tax payments. More recently, studies regarding the determinants
of the ETR find negative (Boone et al., 2013; Chyz et al., 2013) as well as positive
(Hope et al., 2013; Chyz et al., 2013) significant elasticities of firm size. Hence, the
effect of firm size is a priori ambiguous. Our empirical analysis contains the loga-
rithm of total sales (SIZE) to control for firm size. In line with Fama and Jensen
(1983b), we expect that firm size likely increases complexity and consequently leads
to less coordination intensity.
Furthermore, we include the return on assets (ROA) to capture the profitability of
a firm, as the literature suggests that profitable firms might have more incentives for
tax planning (Chen et al., 2010; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Thus, we expect that
high profitable firms make more effort on tax planning. In general, we suppose that
profitability positively impacts on coordination-intensity. Furthermore, we include
leverage (LEV) calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets to control for the
debt tax shield benefit resulting from the deductibility of interest expenses. Lastly,
we control for asset growth (GROW) by calculating the one-year percentage growth
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rate of total assets. Although the findings of Keating (1997) and Bankman (1994)
suggest a negative impact of growth on tax planning efforts, more recent literature
often does not find statistically significant effects of growth on firms’ tax avoidance
behavior as, for example, reflected in the reported GAAP ETR (Robinson et al.,
2010; Chen et al., 2010; Phillips, 2003).
The second set of control variables capture book-tax planning opportunities. Con-
trary to real tax planning, where real activities are undertaken in a tax optimal way,
book-tax planning refers to the tax optimal reporting in the financial as well as in
the tax accounts. We include inventory intensity (INVINT) and capital intensity
(CAPINT), because inventory and capital intensive firms are more affected by differ-
ent valuation methods for tax and financial reporting purposes (Hope et al., 2013).
Given that these firms have more tax planning opportunities, we could expect a
positive effect on coordination intensity. On the other hand, the tax planning op-
portunities may also reduce the cost of autonomy and thus, cause the tax department
to act more as a controller. This argument would substantiate a finding of a negative
effect of inventory and capital intensity on coordination intensity. Taken together,
the effects are a priori ambiguous. We calculate inventory intensity as inventory
scaled by total assets and capital intensity as net property, plant and equipment
divided by total assets. Last, we also control for the age of the tax unit. We do not
have a prediction for the effect of tax unit age on coordination intensity, because
tax unit age has not been studied in empirical analyses of tax planning behavior so
far. On the one hand, older tax departments may have more routine and therefore
coordinate more efficiently. Hence, one would expect a positive impact of age on co-
ordination intensity due to lower coordination costs. On the other hand, a younger
tax department may have to make higher efforts on tax planning as compared to
compliance tasks, because it is not yet familiar with the task, which would result in
a negative effect of tax department age on coordination intensity.
In sum, we include several firm specific characteristics to control for a potential
systematic correlation between R&D intensity and firm specific characteristics. We
control for firm size (SIZE) by including the logarithm of total sales, profitability
(ROA) by including the return on assets, leverage (LEV) by including the quotient of
liabilities over total assets, asset growth (GROW) by including the one-year percent-
age growth rate of total assets, inventory (INVINT) and capital intensity (CAPINT)
by including the quotient of inventory over total assets and the quotient of plant,
property and equipment over total assets and the age of the tax department (AGE).
For purposes of our regression analyses, we dichotomize the ordinal dimensions
and estimate our regressions using OLS. The dichotomized variables take on the
value 1 if the respondent’s answer was 3 or 4, and takes on 0 otherwise. Thus,
the value 1, respectively, stands for tax minimization being an important or very
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Table 3.5: Cross-Correlation Table
Variables RDINT IPINT SIZE ROA LEV GROW INVINT CAPINT AGE
RDINT 1.0000
IPINT 0.1208 1.0000
(0.4402)
SIZE -0.1248 -0.0406 1.0000
(0.4253) (0.7914)
ROA -0.0108 0.1452 0.0996 1.0000
(0.9453) (0.3413) (0.5150)
LEV -0.1363 -0.1770 -0.3590 0.1052 1.0000
(0.3835) (0.2448) (0.0132) (0.4917)
GROW -0.0417 -0.0094 -0.0772 -0.0794 -0.1144 1.0000
(0.7908) (0.9511) (0.6142) (0.6040) (0.4544)
INVINT 0.0463 -0.1283 -0.2678 -0.1183 0.0404 0.0426 1.0000
(0.7682) (0.4010) (0.0753) (0.4391) (0.7924) (0.7813)
CAPINT -0.2293 -0.1337 0.1765 0.0768 -0.0453 0.1829 0.0932 1.0000
(0.1440) (0.3868) (0.2518) (0.6205) (0.7704) (0.2346) (0.5475)
AGE -0.1037 -0.0185 0.5122 -0.0927 -0.3120 0.2090 -0.3513 0.1626 1.0000
(0.5083) (0.9039) (0.0002) (0.5449) (0.0328) (0.1683) (0.0180) (0.2915)
Notes: The table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the empirical
analyses and reports p-values in brackets. Bold indicates that the Pearson correlation coefficient is
statistically significant at p < 0.05.
important goal, tax executives being involved early or very early, tax executives
having strong or even veto rights. We could also use non-linear response models to
estimate the three regressions with qualitative dependent variables (ambitions, tem-
poral involvement, decision rights). Indeed the linear probability model, which we
prefer, is not beyond redemption. In particular, the predictions from the model can-
not be constrained to the 0-1 interval (Greene, 2012).16 Alternatively, some of the
prominent problems associated with the linear probability model can be overcome
by making the probability for one a non-linear, rather than a linear, function of the
covariates. In contrast to the linear model, however, exact (small sample) proper-
ties of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator of logit and probit models cannot
be established (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984) and the literature on the small sample
behavior of the ML estimator for binary regression models is rather limited (Chen
and Giles, 2012). As outlined above, the central limit theorem can hold already in
small samples of 30 to 50 observations and the normal approximation to the distri-
bution of the OLS estimator should be appropriate. Thus, when using OLS we have
more confidence in our inferences about the true empirical relationship between the
explanatory variables of interest and the four dimensions of the tax department’s
role in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, we will check whether our results
are sensitive to the choice of linear vs. non-linear estimation.
16For an exchange on the usefulness of the linear probability model, see Angrist (2001) and
Moffitt (2001). Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the linear probability model is applied, among
many others, by Caudill (1988), Heckman and MaCurdy (1985), and Heckman and Snyder (1997).
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The data are primarily taken from the questionnaire. However, we also resort
to data from Compustat Global and Compustat North America. When neither
questionnaire data nor Compustat data is available, we also use the Worldscope
database provided by Thomson Reuters. In addition, we always cross-checked the
data obtained from the questionnaire with publicly available data from these alter-
native databases. Where we encountered any errors or even missing observations in
all three data sources, we hand-collected the data from the consolidated financial
statements directly. Nevertheless, we sometimes could not identify the necessary
data in the financial statements and some firms did not even publish their reports,
which leaves us with a few missing observations in our final sample. The consoli-
dated financial statement information refers to the last publicly available financial
statements from the date when the questionnaire was returned to us.
Table 3.5 presents cross correlations among our explanatory variables. R&D in-
tensity is negatively correlated with capital intensity, size in terms of total sales is
negatively correlated with leverage and inventory intensity and positively correlated
with the tax department’s age. The tax department’s age is, moreover, positively
correlated with asset growth and negatively correlated with leverage and inventory
intensity. Most correlations, however, are small and, thus, rule out potential con-
cerns about multicollinearity.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Analysis
The first part of our questionnaire is devoted to descriptive analyses. As Serita
(2008) states, one advantage of survey analysis is that hypotheses can be directly
checked without relying on inferential statistics. Furthermore, the relative impor-
tance of different influential factors can be identified.
As stated in Section 3.3.1, the literature on the interdisciplinary field of R&D and
corporate taxation is mostly based on big data analyses. Partly, studies aim at iden-
tifying the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives (for example Hall and Van Reenen,
2000; Bloom et al., 2002; Arundel et al., 2008). More recently, the tax planning
aspects in the context of R&D investments have been in the focus of researchers.
Accordingly, questions on the location choice of R&D and IP have been studied in a
number of papers (among others Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel,
2012; Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Griffith et al., 2014). The general finding that has
been substantiated in the cited studies is that the corporate tax rate exerts a neg-
ative effect on the holding of intangible assets. However, this finding leaves open
questions as to how real R&D activity is affected by corporate tax rates. Moreover,
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it is not evident what kind of structures are set up by MNEs to achieve a tax optimal
R&D investment. Therefore, we addressed these questions in a purely descriptive
analysis.
This first part adds to the empirical analysis to come in that it draws a picture
of the firms in our sample with respect to their views on R&D tax planning. It
provides insights as to what considerations are important to them and what motives
drive them to act like they do when investing in R&D and IP, respectively. In
contrast to the regression analysis, the descriptive statistics do not aim to answer
questions on the drivers of firm behavior, but rather like to describe general trends
in firm behavior without relating it to firms’ character traits. This is the focus of
our regression analysis, which closer investigates the role of the tax department in
R&D intensive firms (see Section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3).
All survey questions were measured on a five-point scale, ranging from 0 to 4. The
respondents were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with a given answer
by checking the boxes on the scale, where we also indicated the highest and the
lowest level of the scale. For example, when we ask for the importance of various
factors in a business decision, we stated that a value of 4 indicates that the factor
is ’very important ’ and a factor of 0 is ’not at all important ’. For the purposes of
the analysis of our results, we interpret a factor to be ’important’ if the variable
takes on the value 4 or 3 and to be ’not important’ if it takes on the value 0 or 1.
The value 2 lies in the middle of the five-point scale and since we do not indicate its
meaning, we abstain from interpreting it.
Table 3.6: Importance of Factors Influencing the Amount of R&D Spending
Factor # Obs. Average Rating
The availability of internal funds. 42 2.95
The availability of external funds. 42 1.64
The tax rate on profits, including patent box regimes. 41 1.32
The availability of R&D tax incentives in the location(s) 42 1.83
where your group conducts R&D activity.
The pressure your group faces to meet earnings benchmarks. 41 2.17
Notes: The table presents answers to the question: ’To what extent do the following factors influence
the amount of your group’s overall R&D spending? ’, where respondents were asked to indicate
whether a factor was ’not at all important’ or ’very important’ on a five-point scale.
According to Devereux and Maffini (2007) the investment decision of a firm can
be theoretically divided into three separate decisions, which are the decision on the
location of real activity, the amount of investment conditional on the investment
location, and the location of the profits that stem from the investment. In line
with this notion, the first set of survey questions addresses the business decisions
regarding the amount of R&D spending, the location where real R&D activity should
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take place and the location where the arising IP rights should be hold. Table 3.6
presents results to the question ’To what extent do the following factors influence
the amount of the group’s overall R&D spending? ’. We listed five factors and asked
respondents to indicate the importance of each factor as described in the previous
paragraph. We are aware that many other factors may equally impact on the decision
on the amount of R&D investment. However, the aim of our question is to learn
about the relative importance of tax, accounting and financial concerns. The first
two factors, the availability of internal and external funds, are financial concerns
and relate to the common notion that R&D investments are financially constrained
(see for example Hall, 2002; Harhoff, 1998; Hall et al., 1998). The last factor is an
accounting factor. Previous research in the accounting literature has shown that
managers cut R&D expenses to meet their earnings benchmarks (see for example
Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Roychowdhury, 2006).
We compare financial and accounting concerns with tax matters, which are rep-
resented by the second and third factors. Taken each factor by itself, only the first
and last factor seems to be important for firms as both receive an average rating
above 2. Thus, the availability of internal funds and the pressure to meet earnings
benchmarks are important factors in the decision on how much resources are spent
on R&D. Other factors, such as the availability of external funds, the availability of
tax incentives and the profit tax rate on R&D output are of minor importance. The
comparison shows that the availability of tax incentives is the third most important
factor, followed by the availability of external funds and the profit tax rate. This
result highlights that R&D investments seem to critically depend on equity capital
and the liquidity of firms. Thus, tax incentives may induce R&D investment if firms
are liquidity constrained.
Table 3.7: Importance of General Factors in R&D and IP Location Decision
R&D location IP location
decision decision
Factor # Obs. Average Rating P-value
Wage costs 37 1.84 0.95 0.0000
Tax costs 37 1.46 1.92 0.0389
Skills and availability of workforce 35 3.63 2.09 0.0000
Country environment, infrastructure, culture 37 2.78 2.57 0.1276
Legal stability and security of IP 38 3.13 3.42 0.1111
Notes: The table presents answers to the questions: ’In general, what factors are important for your
group when deciding whether to locate R&D activity (to hold patents) in one country or another? ’,
where respondents were asked to indicate whether a factor was ’not at all important’ or ’very
important’ on a five-point scale. P-values are based on a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test
(Wilcoxon, 1945) and indicate significant difference in the rating of factors in the R&D and IP
location decision.
Considering the location of R&D investments we ask firms about general country
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factors and their importance on the location choice. In a separate question we
address the importance of general country factors for the location choice of IP. Hence,
we are able to compare the factors with each other, but also to compare location
choices, both the location choice of R&D investments and the location choice of IP
holdings. The general factors are taken from A.T. Kearney’s global services location
index (A. T. Kearney, 2011) and are summarized to first wage costs, second tax
costs, third skills and availability of a country’s workforce, fourth the country’s
environment, its infrastructure and culture and fifth the legal stability and security
of IP rights. Table 3.7 presents the results on the importance of general factors
in the R&D and IP location decision. Not surprisingly, tax costs are among the
less important factors in both R&D and IP location decision as compared to other
country characteristics. For the location of R&D, tax costs are least important
and for the location of IP tax costs are second least important. More interesting
is the comparison of the two decisions with each other, since it reveals that the
two decisions are significantly different from each other in many respects. As the
p-values indicate, the average rating of three factors significantly differs in the two
decisions, while only with respect to country environment, infrastructure and culture
and with respect to the legal stability and security of IP the average rating does not
significantly differ. Regarding the tax factor, the results indicate that for the location
choice of IP taxes are slightly more important as they are for the location choice of
R&D activity. We thus take a closer look at specific tax factors in two follow-up
questions.
Table 3.8: Importance of Tax Factors in R&D and IP Location Decision
R&D location IP location
decision decision
Factor # Obs. Average Rating P-value
The applicable tax rate on profits 38 1.82 2.16 0.0596
Tax regulations relating to R&D expenditure 38 2.42 2.21 0.1070
(tax credits, deductions)
Imposition of exit tax upon the cross-border 38 1.97 2.26 0.0820
transfer of assets
Loss-offset provisions 37 1.68 1.41 0.1186
Transfer pricing regulations 37 2.32 2.32 0.8749
Double tax treaty network 37 2.32 2.49 0.3061
Notes: The table presents answers to the questions: ’Relative to all other factors your group
considers when deciding whether to locate R&D activity (to hold patents) in one country or another,
how important are the following tax factors? ’, where respondents were asked to indicate whether a
tax factor was ’not at all important’ or ’very important’ on a five-point scale. P-values are based
on a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) and indicate significant difference
in the rating of factors in the R&D and IP location decision.
We asked our respondents: ’Relative to all other factors your group considers
when deciding whether to locate R&D activity (to hold patents) in one country or
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another, how important are the following tax factors? ’, where the question is asked
twice, once regarding the location decision of R&D activity and once with respect
to the location of IP rights. The questions are targeted to determine the relative
importance of six specific tax factors as highlighted by Russo (2007). The average
ratings of Table 3.8 cannot be compared with the results from Table 3.7. Due to
concerns of salience, the average ratings of the specific tax factors are comparably
high in contrast to the rating of tax costs among general country factors. This is,
because only specific tax factors are compared with each other. If we had added
more country characteristics to the list of choices, respondents had possibly rated
tax factors lower as they did. However, the comparison of taxes and other country
factors was addressed in previous questions (see Table 3.7), while the focus of this
question is to compare only tax factors with each other. Following previous survey
studies (Graham et al., 2011), we added the phrase ’relative to all other factors’ to
the question to ensure that we control for other factors, such as country environment,
legal stability, workforce, etc.
The answers are presented in Table 3.8. Again, the p-values indicate whether the
average ratings are significantly different in the location decision of R&D activity
from the location decision of IP. Looking at the location decision of R&D activity,
the most important tax factor is the regulation relating to R&D expenditure that
includes also the regulations on R&D tax incentives, like additional allowances or tax
credits. Contrary, the most important factor in the IP location decision is the double
tax treaty network. Moreover, the applicable profit tax rate and the imposition of
an exit tax upon the cross-border transfer of an asset are important factors in the IP
location decision, while they are of less importance in the R&D location decision. In
sum, we conclude that the R&D and IP location decision are two distinct decisions
that are made separately. Two tax factors are rated differently in the two decisions
at the 10% significance level, one tax factor is rated significantly different only at
10.7%. It seems that in the location decision of IP tax planning considerations are
of higher importance as compared to the R&D location decision. However, this is
only a conjecture and it will be examined in greater detail in the following.
Because it is not possible to draw conclusions from Table 3.8 as to why the IP lo-
cation decision differs from the R&D location decision, we follow-up with a question
on the considerations in the IP location decision. We investigate considerations in
the decision to locate patents away from where R&D took place and motives why
firms considered to locate patents at a low-tax affiliate. Last, we also ask how firms
achieve to locate patents at a low-tax affiliate. Prior to our questions, we asked:
’Has your firm considered locating patents at an affiliate that is subject to compara-
bly low tax rates? ’ to avoid a downward bias caused by firms that never considered
the opportunity to geographically separate the location of IP from the location of
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Table 3.9: Specific Considerations in the IP Location Decision
How well do the following statements reflect your
group’s considerations in the decision to locate patents Average
away from where R&D took place? # Obs. Rating
If exit taxes are in place, they pose an important obstacle 26 2.35
to the cross-border transfer of patents within our group.
Our group uses contract R&D to locate patents in countries 27 2.74
different from where the associated R&D activity took place.
By using cost-sharing agreements, patents may be spread 26 1.65
across several countries.
Transferring patents is expensive. Therefore our group transfers 26 1.73
R&D activity to countries that are attractive for holding patents.
How well do the following statements reflect why your
group considered locating patents at an affiliate that Average
is subject to comparably low tax rates? # Obs. Rating
Because the expected return related to a patent is high. 16 3.06
Because there is a large difference in tax rates between countries. 16 3.0
Because patents are internationally mobile assets that can be separated 16 2.75
easily from other production affiliates in our group at low cost.
Because this reduces our group’s overall tax burden. 16 2.88
How does your group achieve locating patents Average
in low tax countries? # Obs. Rating
By conducting R&D in low tax countries. 15 1.47
By selling patents to affiliates in low tax countries. 15 2.4
Notes: The table presents answers to the questions stated in bold, where respondents were asked to
indicate on a five-point scale whether they ’strongly disagreed’ or ’strongly agreed’ with a statement.
R&D.17 Thus, the respondents to all follow-up questions that are presented in Table
3.9 have at least considered this opportunity.
On average, respondents agree that they considered the fact that contract R&D
is a means to geographically separate the IP location from the location where the
associated R&D activity took place. Moreover, they agree to the notion that exit
taxes are an important obstacle to the cross-border transfer of patents within the
group. These answers reveal that firms identified contract R&D as a tax planning
structure to achieve a geographical separation of R&D activity and the ownership
of the resulting IP rights. Moreover, the respondents on average disagreed with
the statement that they transfer R&D activity to countries that are attractive for
holding patents in order to avoid a costly transfer of patents. Thus, we conclude
that our respondent’s R&D activities are rather immobile factors. Last, our firms
disagree having considered that cost-sharing agreements are used to spread patents
across several countries indicating that cost-sharing agreements are less likely to be
17Note that this is also the reason why we observe only a reduced number of observations to the
questions presented in Table 3.9.
48 Chapter 3. A Survey Study on R&D Intensive Multinationals
considered as an alternative to contract R&D agreements.
Regarding the motives why firms considered to locate patents to low-tax affiliates,
our respondents on average agree with all choices that were given. The most impor-
tant motive to consider relocating patents to low-tax affiliates is that the expected
return related to a patent is high. This result also confirms the notion that high-
value patents are more likely to be relocated to low-tax locations as stated in Boehm
et al. (2012) and Ernst et al. (2014). Furthermore, a large tax differential between
countries is almost equally important, confirming first evidence by Dischinger and
Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012). Third, the relocation of patents
to low-tax affiliates reduces the overall tax burden of the MNE and fourth, can be
achieved in a rather simple way, because patents are mobile assets. Last, we asked
firms how they actually achieve to locate patents in low-tax countries. They answer
that they rather sell patents to affiliates in low-tax countries than conduct R&D ac-
tivity in a low-tax country to apply for patent protection afterwards. These insights
suggest that firms indeed view IP to be more mobile than real R&D activity. Thus,
tax planning is more simple and less costly when done with IP than with real R&D
activity.
Table 3.10: Organization of R&D within the MNE
Total Average
Form of organization # Obs. Points Rating
In-house: Our group employs R&D affiliates that bear 39 73 1.87
the costs and conduct R&D in-house.
Contract R&D: One or more affiliate(s) of our group 39 61 1.56
contract(s) out R&D to other affiliates.
Pool-financing: One or more affiliate(s) of our group share 39 38 0.97
the costs and undertake R&D activity in collaboration.
Outsourcing: R&D is contracted out to a third party, 39 32 0.82
e.g. universities.
Notes: The table presents answers to the question: ’How do you organize R&D within your group? ’,
where respondents were asked to rank the top three forms of organization and leave the other forms
blank.
More generally, we were also interested how R&D is organized within a multina-
tional firm to get an idea what kind of structures are commonly implemented by
firms. Table 3.10 presents results to the question ’how do you organize R&D within
your group? ’. We enforced respondents to rank the top three forms of organization
by entering a ’1’, ’2’ and ’3’ to avoid equal ratings of all available choices. The
answers show that the most prevalent form of organization is in-house R&D, which
refers to R&D that is carried out by the company who bears the costs of the invest-
ment and finally applies for patent protection, being the owner of the resulting IP.
Contract R&D is the second most important form of organization of R&D. In this
case, the R&D activities are contracted out to an affiliate company who carries out
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Table 3.11: Attributes of R&D Tax Incentives
Total Average
Attribute # Obs. Points Rating
The tax incentive immediately impacts on liquidity. 44 83 1.89
The administration of the tax incentive is simple. 44 49 1.11
The tax incentive enables planning certainty. 44 59 1.34
The tax incentive is applied without restrictions on the 44 36 0.81
location of R&D activity.
The tax incentive is applied without restrictions on the 44 42 0.95
location of patents.
Notes: The table presents answers to the question: ’Which of the following makes a tax incentive
most appealing to your group? ’, where respondents were asked to rank the top three choices and
leave the others blank.
the services on behalf of the financing company (for more discussion on tax plan-
ning issues with contract R&D see Chapter 5 Section 5.2). Third, pool-financing
agreements are listed at rank three. Pool-financing or cost-sharing agreements are
contracts among several affiliate firms to share costs and undertake R&D in col-
laboration. The resulting IP is also shared according to the contribution in the
pool. Last, the least important form of R&D organization is contracting out R&D
to third parties, like universities or research institutes. In sum, the results depict
that the traditional form of R&D still prevails. Nevertheless, contract R&D and
pool-financing agreements are ranked closely after traditional R&D revealing that
these forms are likely to be considered or implemented by multinational firms.
Finally, we posed one question relating to traditional R&D tax incentives, like
tax credits or additional allowances. We asked: ’Which of the following makes a
tax incentive most appealing to your group? ’. As prior literature has suggested
that these are effective in raising the overall amount of corporate R&D spending
(for a review see Hall and Van Reenen, 2000),18 we are interested in the attributes
of a tax incentive. For example, Spengel et al. (2009) suggests that a tax credit
that may be set off with the wage tax will be most effective in raising additional
R&D activity, because it directly impacts on the liquidity of the firm. In fact, he
claims a tax incentive that is also granted to firms if they are in a loss situation.
Furthermore, Bloom (2007) suggests that complex incentives and incentives that are
not granted continuously are less effective in raising corporate R&D activity. From
a tax planning point of view, we are also interested how restrictions that relate to
tax planning structures are evaluated by firms (see also Chapter 2 Section 2.1).
The results are presented in Table 3.11. Again, we enforced a ranking of the
choices to establish an order of precedence of the attributes considered. In line with
our conjecture, the most important attribute for a tax incentive is an immediate
18For a more detailed review and discussion of the evidence see Chapter 2 Section 1.3.2.
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impact on liquidity. A continuous grant that enables planning certainty and the
simplicity to administer the incentive are ranked second and third most important
among the alternatives. Tax planning considerations as reflected by the fourth and
fifth attribute (the tax incentive is applied without restrictions on the location of
R&D activity and the location of patents, respectively) are ranked least important.
The answers confirm previous findings in the literature that an immediate impact on
liquidity, planning certainty and simplicity are among the most important drivers of
the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. Our finding that tax planning attributes are
less important is in line with our previous findings, that tax planning considerations
are less present in business decisions relating to real R&D activity.
To sum up, the descriptive analyses reveal that the firms we surveyed say that
financial and accounting factors are important factors influencing the amount of
R&D spending, but taxes are less so; as compared with other country characteristics,
taxes are of less importance for the location decision of R&D as well as for IP;
however, among various tax factors, the most important factor for the location of
R&D activity is the regulation that determines the deductions for R&D expenditure
and the most important factor for the location of IP is the double tax treaty network;
they considered contract R&D agreements as a means to locate patents away from
where the associated activity takes place; considered locating patents at a low-
tax affiliate, because they expected the patent to yield a high return; and they
achieve this primarily by selling the patent to the low-tax affiliate; overall, they
most often engage in in-house R&D and that they view the impact on liquidity,
planning certainty and simplicity to be the most important attributes of R&D tax
incentives. In the analyses to come we go on to test, how tax considerations may
be implemented the decision-making process of R&D intensive and IP intensive
multinationals.
3.5.2 Bivariate Analysis
First, we present results from bivariate analyses. For each variable of interest, we
split the sample into firms above and below the respective median value. For exam-
ple, with respect to R&D intensity, we form one group of firms showing high R&D
intensity and another group of firms displaying low R&D intensity, where high and
low is defined by the median R&D intensity. We then use a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test to figure out whether tax departments in the two groups of firms take different
roles in the decision process, as reflected by their tax planning efforts, ambitions, the
timing of involvement and ultimate decision rights. Remember that the first dimen-
sion - tax planning efforts - is a continuous variable, whereas all other dimensions -
ambitions, temporal involvement and rights - are ordinal variables which are mea-
sured on a five-point scale ranging from 0 to 4. The bivariate analysis relies on this
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measurement. The ordinal indicator for tax planning ambitions takes on the value 0
if minimization of the group’s tax burden is not at all important and thus, indicates
the lowest parameter value. The highest parameter value is 4 and represents the
highest level of importance of the minimization of the tax burden. Similarly, a 0
for temporal involvement indicates that the tax department is involved late, while
a 4 indicates an early involvement. And last, tax executives have no rights in the
decision process and are not consulted if the variable takes on the value 0, while
they have a veto right if the variable takes on the value 4.
Table 3.12 presents findings from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test and shows, for each
of the four dimensions of interest, the probability that a draw from the ’low’ group,
in terms of the seven distinct characteristics respectively, is larger than a draw from
the corresponding ’high’ group. Under the null hypothesis, the two groups do not
systematically differ and the probability to draw a larger value from the first group
as compared to the second is 50 percent.
Considering the results displayed in Table 3.12, the survey-based indicators for tax
planning efforts, tax planning ambitions, the timing of involvement and the ultimate
decision rights tend to show higher values for firms with low R&D intensity. In other
words, the probability to draw higher values from the group of firms with low R&D
intensity as compared to the group of firms with high R&D intensity is larger than 50
percent. More precisely, the probability that less R&D intensive firms exhibit more
tax planning efforts than highly R&D intensive firms is 55.4%. Similarly, we find that
the probability that less R&D intensive firms have higher tax planning ambitions
is slightly above 50%, the probability that they are earlier involved in the decision-
making is 64.1%. The probability that they have stronger ultimate decision rights
is almost 60%. Although the differences between groups are, with the exception of
what we find for the timing of involvement, not statistically significant, the observed
tendencies regarding efforts, ambitions and temporal involvement are in line with
our conjecture that increasing R&D intensity leads tax departments to act more as
a controller than as a manager, with less tax planning efforts and ambitions and
an involvement at a later stage of the decision process. In turn, the dimension of
ultimate decision rights does not meet our expectation.
Interestingly, we find that low IP intensity is associated with lower tax planning
efforts and ambitions. While the relationship between R&D intensity and tax plan-
ning efforts and ambitions appears negative, IP intensity thus has a positive impact
on these dimensions. With respect to ambitions, the difference between less and
highly IP intensive firms is statistically significant at 10% (Wilcoxon test) or 5%
(t-test). We consider this finding in line with IP intensity being a more precise
proxy for tax planning opportunities subsequent to the investment decision than
R&D intensity which rather proxies for factors that prevents tax experts from get-
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ting actively involved in tax planning, i.e. high costs of delay and, accordingly, a
strong focus on time to market.
Furthermore, results in Table 3.12 document that the conventional determinants of
tax planning opportunities and tax planning behavior, which we take from previous
literature (see Section 3.1), do significantly impact on the temporal involvement of
the tax department but less so on the other dimensions of the tax department’s
role in the investment decision process. In particular, findings from the Wilcoxon
test suggest that tax executives in relatively small firms and less leveraged firms
get involved rather late in the decision process, i.e. the probability to draw higher
values of our temporal involvement indicator (where high values stand for early
involvement) is significantly reduced for these groups of firms. Moreover, in firms
with low levels of inventory and capital intensity, tax departments get involved
earlier. Finally, we find that younger tax departments tend to have weaker ultimate
decision rights.
Table 3.12: Bivariate Analysis
Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
RDINT low>high 55.4% 52.4% 64.1%∗ 59.5%
IPINT low>high 38.7% 34.8%∗?? 51.0% 54.8%
SIZE low>high 46.0% 53.0% 35.6%∗? 37.9%
ROA low>high 47.6% 55.3% 45.5% 44.3%
LEV low>high 45.7% 47.4% 30.6%∗∗??? 34.0%
∗∗
??
GROW low>high 44.5% 49.7% 42.2% 41.8%
INVINT low>high 53.7% 47.8% 65.1%∗? 56.9%
CAPINT low>high 39.3% 48.4% 61.5%? 55.6%
AGE low>high 49.9% 53.8% 42.3% 35.0%∗
Notes: Respondents are split by the median into two groups according to each conditioning variable,
listed on the left hand side of the table. It is then tested whether tax departments of one group and
tax departments of the other group of firms take different roles in the decision process, as reflected
by their tax planning efforts, ambitions, temporal involvement and ultimate decision rights. The
probabilities that one group differs from the other group are shown in the table and are based
on a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level. Stars (?, ?? and ? ? ?) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level based on a t-test. For example, with respect to R&D intensity, the probability that tax
departments of less R&D intensive firms make more tax planning efforts than tax departments in
high R&D intensive firms is 55.4%.
Overall, the picture from the bivariate analysis is mixed. On the one hand, some
of the results support the view that coordination of the tax department with other
operational units in R&D intensive firms is costly and may prompt tax experts in the
firm to act less as managers in the investment process but more as merely ratifying
controllers. On the other hand, only a few findings are statistically significant, an
outcome which could however be attributable to the small sample size. Importantly,
we find that significant differences between groups of firms according to the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test are in most cases confirmed by the alternative t-test for the difference
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between the group means of the four dimensions considered. We conclude that
inference based on conventional parametric procedures is accurate despite potential
concerns arising from the small sample size.
3.5.3 Regression Analysis
The main results from the regression analyses are presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14.
Again, we are primarily interested in whether R&D intensity has an impact on
the tax department’s role in the business decision process, as reflected by its tax
planning efforts, tax planning ambitions, the timing of involvement and ultimate
decision rights. While tax planning efforts is measured as a proportion, the other
dimensions - ambitions, temporal involvement and rights - are dichotomous variables
as described in Section 3.4. They are measured as binary variables, where the
variable takes on the value 1 if the original answer was 3 or 4 on the five-point scale
and 0 otherwise. Column 1 of Table 3.13 shows the response of tax planning efforts,
again measured by the approximate time (in % of total workload) that is spent on
tax planning activities, as opposed to activities linked to compliance and financial
reporting. Column 2 of Table 3.13 shows the response of tax planning ambitions,
measured as a dichotomous variable, which is 1 if tax minimization is an important or
very important objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise. Column 3 of Table
3.13 shows the results for temporal involvement, again measured as a dichotomous
variable, which is 1 if the tax department gets involved early or even very early
in the initiation phase of the decision process, and 0 otherwise. Column 4 of Table
3.13 shows the results for ultimate decision rights, again measured on a dichotomous
scale, where 1 reflects strong or even veto rights of the department.
Table 3.13 presents coefficient estimates from regressions of efforts, ambitions,
temporal involvement and rights on R&D intensity and control variables. Standard
errors robust to heteroscadasticity are given in parentheses. The coefficient estimate
of R&D intensity on efforts (specification (1)) is -2.193 and statistically significant
at 1%. This result means that an increase of R&D intensity by one percentage point
leads to a 2.2 percentage point decrease of the proportion of workload spent on tax
planning. The regression results from the dimension ambitions are reported in speci-
fication (2) and depict a different picture than the results from the effort-dimension.
The coefficient estimate of R&D intensity is not significant indicating that R&D
intensive firms are statistically not more or less ambitious to minimize their tax
burden as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Furthermore, we investigate at
which stage during the planning phase of an investment project tax executives are
involved in the decision-making (see specification (3) of Table 3.13). We find that
temporal involvement decreases in the R&D intensity. Precisely, an increase in R&D
intensity by one percentage point is associated with a decrease in the probability
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Table 3.13: Coordination Intensity in R&D Intensive MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
RDINT -2.193*** -3.354 -4.362** 3.609
(0.739) (3.337) (1.960) (2.412)
SIZE 0.033** -0.052 0.024 0.103*
(0.016) (0.063) (0.056) (0.058)
ROA -0.058 -0.944 0.728 0.410
(0.122) (0.702) (0.834) (0.709)
LEV -0.005 -0.040*** 0.024* 0.054***
(0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
GROW 0.384*** 0.143 0.700** 0.893***
(0.088) (0.383) (0.277) (0.259)
INVINT 0.400 -0.685 -0.854 -0.205
(0.335) (1.163) (0.699) (0.794)
CAPINT -0.047 0.771 -0.905 -0.216
(0.190) (0.605) (0.568) (0.606)
AGE -0.073** -0.057 0.100 0.136
(0.033) (0.095) (0.089) (0.087)
Constant -0.252 2.212 0.046 -2.469*
(0.311) (1.444) (1.291) (1.435)
Observations 39 41 42 42
R-squared 0.410 0.208 0.333 0.319
Notes: All regressions are based on OLS estimation. While the dependent variable ’efforts’ is a
proportion, the variables ’ambitions’, ’temporal involvement’ and ’rights’ are binary variables. The
dependent variable ’efforts’ (specification (1)) represents the workload spent on tax planning relative
to total workload; ’ambitions’ (specification (2)) is 1 if tax minimization is an important or very
important objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise; ’temporal involvement’ (specification
(3)) is 1 if the tax department gets involved early or even very early in the initiation phase of
the decision process, and 0 otherwise; ’rights’ (specification (4)) is 1 if the tax department has
strong or even veto rights in the decision process. The four dimensions are regressed on firm
characteristics, which are R&D intensity (RDINT), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage
(LEV), firm growth (GROW), inventory and capital intensity (INVINT and CAPINT) and age of
the tax department (AGE). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level. Heteroscadasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
that tax executives are involved early in the decision-making by 4.36 percentage
points. This finding supports our hypothesis that coordination costs are too high to
involve tax executives early in the decision-making process. Last, we regress the di-
chotomous indicator for ultimate decision rights on R&D intensity and controls and
present results in specification (4). Contrary to the other three dimensions efforts,
ambitions and temporal involvement, R&D intensity has a positive estimated coeffi-
cient. This would indeed suggest that with increasing R&D intensity tax executives
have stronger rights to oppose the decision made by other departments. However,
the positive coefficient of R&D intensity is not statistically different from zero at all
conventional levels of significance.
To sum up, we observe that R&D intensity seems to reduce the coordination
intensity of the tax department with other departments in the firm, at least in
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terms of two of the four investigated dimensions. These two dimensions are the
tax planning efforts measured as time of total workload attributed to tax planning
and the temporal involvement of tax executives in the decision-making process. Tax
executives indeed get involved at later stages of the investment decision and do not
intervene in initial decisions such as investment location choices. With respect to
the other dimensions, however, we find no evidence that R&D intensive firms have
more or less tax planning ambitions and decision rights than less R&D intensive
firms.
Table 3.14: Coordination Intensity in R&D and IP Intensive MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Efforts Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
RDINT -2.670*** -6.435** -3.860* 4.313*
(0.651) (2.719) (2.166) (2.407)
IPINT 0.279** 1.797*** -0.441 -0.619
(0.125) (0.512) (0.505) (0.408)
SIZE 0.031* -0.069 0.032 0.115**
(0.015) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
ROA -0.090 -1.146* 0.775 0.475
(0.117) (0.626) (0.868) (0.727)
LEV -0.005 -0.039*** 0.022* 0.052***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
GROW 0.390*** 0.187 0.682** 0.868***
(0.093) (0.361) (0.276) (0.259)
INVINT 0.476 -0.210 -0.833 -0.176
(0.307) (1.015) (0.712) (0.804)
CAPINT -0.089 0.533 -0.900 -0.209
(0.170) (0.555) (0.582) (0.592)
AGE -0.080*** -0.100 0.099 0.135
(0.024) (0.103) (0.086) (0.085)
Constant -0.196 2.586** -0.097 -2.670*
(0.324) (1.243) (1.330) (1.368)
Observations 39 41 42 42
R-squared 0.474 0.439 0.347 0.345
Notes: All regressions are based on OLS estimation. While the dependent variable ’efforts’ is a
proportion, the variables ’ambitions’, ’temporal involvement’ and ’rights’ are binary variables. The
dependent variable ’efforts’ (specification (1)) represents the workload spent on tax planning relative
to total workload; ’ambitions’ (specification (2)) is 1 if tax minimization is an important or very
important objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise; ’temporal involvement’ (specification
(3)) is 1 if the tax department gets involved early or even very early in the initiation phase of the
decision process, and 0 otherwise; ’rights’ (specification (4)) is 1 if the tax department has strong or
even veto rights in the decision process. The four dimensions are regressed on firm characteristics,
which are R&D intensity (RDINT), IP intensity (IPINT), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA),
leverage (LEV), firm growth (GROW), inventory and capital intensity (INVINT and CAPINT)
and age of the tax department (AGE). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Heteroscadasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Clearly, R&D intensive firms tend to hold more intangible assets as compared
to less R&D intensive firms. A look at Table 3.5 documents a positive correlation
(12.08%) between the R&D intensity and the IP intensity of our respondent firms.
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As intangible assets are highly specific, their true value is hardly observable for
national tax authorities, which provides leeway for transfer price distortions. As
a consequence, a transfer of IP to low-tax affiliates may be attractive and require
less planning efforts than direct intervention in initial decisions about the set-up
and location of production facilities. If it is indeed easier for tax planners to tax-
efficiently migrate IP within a multinational than it is for them to tax-efficiently
structure real R&D investments, firms may accept forgone tax savings due to tax-
inefficient R&D investments and will reverse part of those tax inefficiencies by means
of tax-optimal transfers of their intangibles ex post. In other words, tax planning
in R&D intensive firms takes place, but it takes place less with respect to R&D
but with respect to IP location. In Figure 3.1 presented in Section 3.2, these ex
post profit shifting opportunities by means of IP migration trigger a shift of the
autonomy cost curve in Figure 3.1 to the left.
If IP intensity is indeed a determinant of the tax department’s function in the
firm, the coefficients for R&D intensity reported in Table 3.13 are actually ’biased’
in the sense that they reflect the net effect of variation in R&D intensity and co-
varying IP intensity. We now would like to disentangle the effect of R&D and the
effect of IP on the tax department’s role by additionally including a specific proxy
for IP tax planning opportunities into our previous regression framework. We em-
ploy IP intensity (IPINT), calculated as the balance sheet item of intangible asset
holdings scaled by total assets. As IFRS requires capitalization of both acquired and
self-created intangible assets,19 the IP intensity we extract from the consolidated ac-
counts of the responding public20 European multinational firms proxies well for the
success of past innovative activity and arising actual profit shifting opportunities.
Some countries allow for the capitalization of acquired intangibles only.21 Still, even
in these cases IP intensity reflects that part of profit shifting potential associated
with acquired IP. The results of augmenting the empirical model with IP intensity
are presented in Table 3.14.
Interestingly, we see that the effect of R&D intensity persists and is even stronger
19IAS 38.57 defines under which circumstances self-created IP has to be capitalized in the books.
Accordingly, ’development costs are capitalized only after technical and commercial feasibility of
the asset for sale or use have been established. This means that the entity must intend and be able
to complete the intangible asset and either use it or sell it and be able to demonstrate how the asset
will generate future economic benefits’.
20Note, that only publicly traded European firms are obliged to report their consolidated financial
statements based on IFRS, see the Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 19 July 2002. In our sample, these are 17 firms.
21According to US GAAP, Standard ASC 350, internal research and development costs are gen-
erally immediately expensed. There are a few exceptions for computer software or website devel-
opment. Moreover, our dataset contains five publicly traded Swiss companies. In Switzerland,
since 2005 most Swiss companies that are listed on the main board of the Swiss Exchange have an
obligation to report either in IFRS or in US GAAP.
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if we additionally control for IP intensity. Considering Column (1) of Table 3.14, a
one percentage point increase in R&D intensity statistically significantly decreases
the share of tax planning efforts in the tax department’s total workload by -2.670
percentage points. At the same time, IP intensity shows a small but significant
and positive impact on tax planning efforts. In particular, a one percentage point
increase in IP intensity increases the share of tax planning efforts in the tax de-
partment’s total workload by 0.279 percentage points. This finding supports our
conjecture that efforts associated with IP tax planning do not outweigh the reduc-
tions in tax planning efforts associated with the tax experts’ reduced intervention
in real investment decisions. As shown in Column (1) of Table 3.13 already, the
net effect of R&D intensity on tax planning efforts thus is negative. Looking at
the dimension ambitions (Column (2) of Table 3.14), including IP intensity into
the regression model turns both coefficients of R&D and IP intensity significant.
While an increase in the R&D intensity by one percentage point leads to a decline
in the probability that the respondent rates the minimization of the tax burden as
important goal for the tax department by 6.44 percentage points, the same increase
in the IP intensity leads to an increase in the probability to have an ambitious tax
department by 1.8 percentage points. Interestingly, the effects are contrary to each
other, which explains our previous finding in Column (2) of Table 3.13, where R&D
intensity captures the net effect and therefore turned out insignificant. With respect
to the dimension temporal involvement of the tax executives in the decision-making
process (Column (3) of Table 3.14), the effect of R&D intensity persists when we
include IP intensity. In particular, a one percentage point increase in R&D intensity
is associated with a decline in the probability that the tax executives are involved
early in the decision-making by 3.86 percentage points. Similarly, the effect of IP
intensity is also negative, though insignificant. Nevertheless, this finding supports
our conjecture that tax planning takes place only at a later stage in the R&D pro-
cess. Consequently, R&D and IP intensive firms do not see the need for involving
tax executives early in the decision-making on a new investment project. Rather,
they optimize the legal structure given the target location of an investment, because
the cost of autonomy is lower as compared to the cost of coordination. Last, we
investigate the effect of R&D and IP intensity on the ultimate decision rights of tax
executives. The first results in Column (4) of Table 3.13 did not show a significant
impact of R&D intensity on rights. When including IP intensity though, we indeed
find that R&D intensity exerts a significantly positive effect on rights (Column (4)
of Table 3.14). Thus, a one percentage point increase in R&D intensity is associated
with an increase in the probability that the tax experts have a veto right in the
decision-making process by 4.31 percentage points.
Overall, our results reveal interesting insights in the decision-making of R&D and
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IP intensive firms and suggest that tax planning activities take place at different
stages in the R&D process. Coordination between the tax department and other
operational units is negatively affected by R&D intensity. In other words, within
R&D intensive firms coordination with the tax department is too costly and there-
fore, the tax department adopts more controlling than managerial tasks. If the
tax department is less strongly involved in the management, the firm runs into the
danger to incur costs by forgone tax savings. This, however, can be mitigated by
tax planning opportunities that arise with respect to intangible assets. Overall, our
findings reconcile previous evidence that taxes matter less for R&D intensive firms
when it comes to investment choices (Overesch and Schreiber, 2010) while over-
all they have been shown to report lower ETRs on average (Graham et al., 2011;
Robinson et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2014).
3.5.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we document the results from a large series of sensitivity analyses
assessing robustness of the results from our baseline estimations in Tables 3.13 and
3.14.
First, we include industry dummies as suggested by Wilson et al. (1993). Wil-
son et al. (1993) provides descriptive and qualitative evidence that the industry a
firm operates in strongly determines the organizational and incentive structure of
firms. For example, the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industry may be similar in
many respects, but differ substantially with respect to gross margins. Pharmaceu-
ticals have higher gross margins and, therefore, will incur higher losses if they fail
to become the first patent applicant. Consequently, their costs of delay, which are
part of coordination costs, are much higher than those of firms operating in other
industries. Furthermore, the chemical industry differs from the pharmaceuticals in-
dustry in that transportation costs are substantially higher in the chemical industry.
Hence, firms in the chemical industry face a higher pressure to locate their produc-
tion facilities close to their major markets and suppliers to minimize transportation
costs. The baseline regressions presented in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 are re-estimated
with the inclusion of industry dummies. The results are shown in Table 3.15. De-
spite the reduction in degrees of freedom associated with the inclusion of industry
dummies, the coefficients of RDINT again turn out significant and show expected
signs. Quantitatively, the effects of R&D intensity on the four dimensions of the tax
department’s role within the business process are larger than without modeling of
industry fixed effects. According to the results shown in Table 3.15, the effect of IP
intensity is smaller in magnitude and is statistically significant only with respect to
the ambitions of the tax department (specification (4) of Table 3.15).
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As a second robustness check we extended our empirical model by a further vari-
able that captures whether compensation contracts of tax executives are based on
some kind of after-tax performance measure. The variable is drawn from our survey.
We ask whether compensation of tax executives is based on some kind of perfor-
mance measure and give four possible options, namely yes, an after-tax measure;
yes, a before-tax measure; yes, other and no. We then dichotomize the variable to
include it in our regression framework as compensation variable (COMP), where
it takes on the value 1 if compensation of tax executives is based on some after-
tax performance measure and 0 otherwise. Disregarding compensation contracts
of tax executives could lead to omitted variable bias. Performance-based compen-
sation typically aims at limiting agency costs as suggested by contracting theory
(Jensen and Meckling, 1992). Performance measurement that is based on after-tax
measures may motivate managers to care more about the tax consequences of their
decisions. Consequently, managers may coordinate more intensively with the tax
department. Thus, the four dimensions we use to measure the tax departments
management-control-decision are likely influenced by compensation contracts. A
common after-tax performance measure in this respect is the reported GAAP ETR
of the firm, because it measures the total tax expense scaled by pre-tax profit. Em-
pirical evidence suggests that indeed firms whose managers are compensated based
on some after-tax performance measure report lower ETRs on average (Armstrong
et al., 2012; Phillips, 2003). We therefore include the tax executives compensation
into our modified model. The results are presented in Table 3.16. In general, the
results support our hypothesis that the tax department in R&D intensive firms acts
more as a controller than as a manager. Including compensation in the empirical
model even renders the coefficient estimates of our variables of interest slightly larger
in size. The compensation variable itself, however, stays mostly insignificant. More-
over, we considerably lose observations when including COMP in our regressions as
it is missing for a number of firms. We therefore consider it as a robustness check
and do not include it in our baseline analyses.
Furthermore, we re-estimate our baseline analyses using a non-linear probability
model and present the results in Table 3.17. In our baseline model we decided to
follow a linear approach, due to better small sample characteristics of OLS than
non-linear probability models. To check robustness, we run the non-linear probit
model using the dichotomized variables. The probit regression model is designed
for estimation with a binary dependent variable and for capturing the non-linearity
in the probabilities (Greene, 2012). Table 3.17 presents average marginal effects of
the included covariates on the probabilities to show high tax planning ambitions,
get involved early, and be assigned strong ultimate decision rights, respectively.
Considering the results from the probit regression, the estimates of R&D intensity
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are significant and show the expected signs just as in the baseline model. For IP
intensity we also find effects similar to our baseline results. However, according to
column (6) of Table 3.17, IP intensity has a negative and significant effect on the
ultimate decision rights of the tax department, whereas its effect was insignificant
according to the baseline findings. With the exception of specification (2) of Table
3.17, estimated effect sizes of both R&D and IP intensity turn out quantitatively
consistent to the baseline findings.
Thus, we conclude that our results are qualitatively, and mostly quantitatively,
robust towards different estimation methods. Furthermore, the results also hold
when estimating an ordered probit regression model using the original variables
that range from 0 to 4.22
3.6 Conclusion
By locating intangible assets at low-tax affiliates, R&D intensive multinationals can
reduce the tax burden on a relevant fraction of their economic rents. The corporate
production process, however, does not only involve administration of intangible as-
sets. These companies also have to decide on where to set up R&D facilities and final
output production for consumers. This study contributes to better understand the
particularities of tax decision-making in R&D intensive multinational firms. In par-
ticular, we focus on the allocation of management and control functions to the tax
department, adding a new facet to the literature dealing with the interrelationship
between tax decision-making and organizational architecture.
Using data from a confidential survey taken in 2012 of 47 top financial and tax
managers of very large multinational companies, we develop and test a theory, based
on the organizational design literature, for the intensity in which the tax department
coordinates with managers from other business units to intervene with real invest-
ment decisions. According to organizational design theory, the optimal allocation
of decision rights to managers inside the firm is determined by coordination costs
that are incurred when centralization of management and control is high and the
costs of autonomy that arise when management and control are exercised separately.
We argue that this coordination problem also drives the choice of whether the tax
department serves a controlling function or whether, instead, it acts more as a man-
ager. We consider R&D intensity to be an important determinant of both the costs
of coordination and the costs of autonomy. First, there is high pressure in R&D
intensive industries to keep the time to market short and coordination costs in form
of time delays associated with coordination between business units are very high.
22The results from the ordered probit estimation are not tabulated but available from the authors
upon request.
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Second, costs of autonomy are low in R&D intensive firms as tax-inefficiencies from
autonomous decision-making without involvement of tax experts can be reversed by
separating and tax-optimally allocating intangibles within the multinational group.
We indeed document supporting evidence that in R&D intensive multinational
firms the tax department operates more as a controller than as a manager. In
particular, tax departments of R&D intensive firms make less tax planning effort,
are less ambitious to minimize the tax burden of the firm, are later involved in the
decision-making process of a new investment project, but are more likely to have
a veto right in the decision on a new investment project as compared to less R&D
intensive firms. Conditional on R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets
in the firm is associated with more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results
are statistically significant and robust towards several sensitivity checks.
We acknowledge that our findings can only be considered a first piece of evidence
due to the qualifications associated with small sample surveys. However, this first
piece of evidence is important as it represents another illustration of the association
between organizational design theory and the integration of the tax function in the
hierarchical structure of firms. In this sense, we take another important step towards
unraveling the black box of tax avoidance. Opening further parts of this black box is
urgently required in view of the OECD’s and the G20’s major initiative to restrain
what they call base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) (OECD, 2013a,b). Under-
standing the intentional and unintentional consequences of profit shifting restrictions
requires a good understanding of the tax planning mechanisms inside multinational
firms and how these interact with business decision processes.
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Table 3.17: Robustness Check: Probit Estimation Model
Ambitions Temp. Inv. Rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDINT -3.692 -31.701*** -4.116** -3.882** 5.354*** 6.615***
(2.348) (11.304) (1.927) (1.957) (2.072) (2.325)
IPINT 11.073*** -0.388 -0.814*
(3.448) (0.389) (0.489)
SIZE -0.037 -0.331*** -0.006 0.008 0.023 0.044
(0.062) (0.107) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055)
ROA -2.082* -5.264*** 0.862 0.712 0.946 0.734
(1.217) (1.628) (0.727) (0.732) (0.633) (0.662)
LEV -0.607 -0.727 0.542 0.378 0.723* 0.451
(0.527) (0.597) (0.480) (0.518) (0.417) (0.519)
GROW 0.677 1.859*** 0.852 0.779 1.277** 1.150**
(0.902) (0.677) (0.612) (0.545) (0.578) (0.566)
INVINT -0.693 0.307 -0.900 -0.975 -1.222 -1.345
(0.918) (0.748) (0.590) (0.628) (0.910) (0.847)
CAPINT 0.813 -0.376 -0.855 -0.934 0.371 0.514
(0.658) (0.382) (0.523) (0.578) (0.438) (0.453)
AGE -0.039 -0.792*** 0.084 0.086 0.180*** 0.221***
(0.090) (0.296) (0.068) (0.065) (0.060) (0.073)
Observations 41 41 42 42 42 42
Notes: The table presents average marginal effects for non-linear probit estimations. The dependent
variables ’ambitions’, ’temporal involvement’ and ’rights’ are binary variables. The dependent
variable ’efforts’ (specification (1) and (2)) represents the workload spent on tax planning relative to
total workload; ’ambitions’ (specification (3) and (4)) is 1 if tax minimization is an important or very
important objective of the tax department, and 0 otherwise; ’temporal involvement’ (specification
(5) and (6)) is 1 if the tax department gets involved early or even very early in the initiation phase
of the decision process, and 0 otherwise; ’rights’ (specification (7) and (8)) is 1 if the tax department
has strong or even veto rights in the decision process. The four dimensions are regressed on firm
characteristics, which are R&D intensity (RDINT), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage
(LEV), firm growth (GROW), inventory and capital intensity (INVINT and CAPINT) and age of
the tax department (AGE). Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level. Heteroscadasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Chapter 4
Corporate Taxation and the
Quality of Research and
Development*
4.1 Introduction
In recent decades, corporate tax policies related to research and development have
been high on governments’ agendas in many countries. While, traditionally, tax
incentives to foster R&D investment have been provided in the form of special tax
allowances and tax credits, several countries recently also lowered their tax rates on
patent income, including, among others, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium.
Another addition to the list is the United Kingdom, which reduced its tax rate on
patent income from 23% to 10% in April 2013 with the intention ’to strengthen the
incentives to invest in innovative industries and ensure [that] the UK remains an
attractive location for innovation’.1
The economic literature argues that R&D tax incentives, irrespective of their par-
ticular design, increase inefficiently low R&D investments in the private sector, as
they internalize positive externalities of technological inventions on other agents in
the economy (Nadiri, 1993).2 On top, R&D tax incentives may be instrumental in
*This chapter is joint work with Christof Ernst and Nadine Riedel and published as Ernst et al.
(2014).
1See paragraph 4.40 of Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury, Pre-Budget Report 2009, December 2009.
The UK regime will be phased in over four years. In 2013, companies were only entitled to 60% of
the full benefit, which will increase to 70%, 80%, 90% and 100% in subsequent years (Evers et al.,
2014).
2Empirical evidence confirms that the social returns to R&D substantially outweigh their private
returns (see for example Griliches, 1994; Jones and Williams, 1998; Griffith et al., 2004).
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attracting internationally mobile R&D activities from abroad. A number of em-
pirical studies assessed the effect of special tax provisions on the quantity of R&D
activities, commonly reporting significant and sizable effects for both, R&D tax al-
lowances/credits and low patent income tax rates (for example Hines and Jaffe, 2001;
Bloom and Griffith, 2001; Bloom et al., 2002; Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Karkinsky
and Riedel, 2012).
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of R&D tax incentives on
the quality of R&D projects. We account for two quality dimensions: the project’s
profitability before taxes and subsidies and its degree of innovation. As will be
shown, project profitability and innovativeness are positively correlated, i.e. high
private returns go hand in hand with high levels of innovation, which in turn trigger
high social returns through technological spillovers on other agents in the economy.
Our empirical analysis will account for the impact of R&D tax incentives, as
captured by the average and marginal effective tax rates, on project quality. At
the extensive margin (i.e. if MNEs are capacity constrained and decide on the
location of a fixed number of R&D projects), MNEs have an incentive to distort the
location of projects with a high expected profitability towards entities with a low
average effective tax rate. In particular, conditional on the projects’ expected future
income and the expected corporate tax rates at potential hosting entities, MNEs may
strategically distort the location of their new R&D projects. Changes in expected
project value and corporate tax rates may also trigger relocations of ongoing R&D
projects (although the latter may involve non-negligible relocation costs).3 As R&D
is well-known to earn above average returns (for example Hall et al., 2010), we will
proxy for the average effective tax burden by the patent income tax rate (as the
average effective tax converges to the patent income tax if profitability is high, see
Devereux and Griffith (2003)).4 Generous R&D tax credits and allowances are, in a
very general sense, not expected to be instrumental in attracting a positive selection
3Note that recent survey evidence suggests that the average duration of R&D projects until
the patent application is rather short, less than two man-years in the large majority of cases (see
Nagaoka and Walsh, 2009). As tax reforms are commonly announced months or even years in
advance, MNEs that decide on the location of R&D projects and form rational expectations on
future tax rates likely obtain a quite precise predictor for the tax burden on the future income
stream from the projects. The introduction of the UK patent box regime in 2013 was, e.g., an-
nounced in 2009 already. A number of companies declared to boost investment activity in the
UK after the government announcement (see e.g. GlaxoSmithKline’s press release on Novem-
ber 29, 2010: http://www.gsk.com/media/press-releases/2010/government-patent-box-proposals-
transform-uk-attractiveness-for-investment.html). On top, besides the relocation channel spelled
out in the main text, the quality of R&D projects may respond to changes in corporate taxation
since high corporate taxes reduce the incentive to exert effort and may thus lower the quality of
R&D. This applies for owner-managers as well as for dependent employees if the latter own shares
or stock options in the company or owners adjust incentive contracts in response to tax changes.
4While most countries tax patent income at the statutory corporate tax rate, some implemented
special low tax rates on patent income (see also Section 4.2.3).
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of highly profitable projects since their value to the firm depends on the size of R&D
expenditures instead of expected earnings.5
At the intensive margin, low patent income taxes and special R&D tax al-
lowances/credits may induce a genuine increase in the R&D activity undertaken
in a country by reducing project costs. With a downward sloping marginal product
curve, the new projects have a lower profitability though and thus the average prof-
itability (and in consequence also the average innovativeness) of the project pool is
expected to decrease. Our empirical analysis will model the marginal effective tax
burden on R&D by the so-called B-index which accounts for R&D tax credits/tax
allowances as well as for the country’s corporate income tax rate.
The theoretical considerations show that low patent income taxes and generous
R&D tax allowances/tax credits may exert very different effects on the average
profitability and innovativeness of R&D projects. Taken together, we expect that
an expansion of R&D tax allowances/credits reduces the average profitability of
projects undertaken in a country, while effects related to low patent income tax
rates are theoretically ambiguous. As project profitability and innovativeness are
positively correlated, the argumentation furthermore carries over to the R&D’s de-
gree of innovation. See also our theoretical discussion in an earlier working paper
version (Ernst et al., 2013).
To empirically assess the link between R&D tax incentives and R&D quality,
we exploit information on the universe of patent applications to the EPO between
1995 and 2007 which is drawn from the PATSTAT data base. To proxy for the
earnings potential and innovativeness of the technology protected by the patent, we
follow previous research and exploit three indicators: the patent’s number of forward
citations, its family size (i.e. the number of countries in which the corporation filed
for patent protection) and the number of industry classes stated on the patent.
The patent information is moreover linked to data on multinational firms in Europe
that allows us to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across patent
inventing affiliates. On top, the data is augmented by information on national
R&D tax incentives. We further include information on the effective patent income
tax rate, which accounts for taxes levied on patent income in the royalty receiving
country as well as for withholding taxes levied in the royalty paying country in case of
cross-border royalty streams and the unilateral and bilateral method to avoid double
taxation. Moreover, we follow the existing literature and construct the B-index that
accounts for special R&D tax allowances and R&D tax credits.
5 Since tax authorities commonly do not grant tax refunds, this holds true as long as affiliate
profits are high enough to ensure the affiliate can exploit the full value of the tax allowance/credit.
If the value of the tax allowance/credit exceeds profits, incentives to select high-value R&D projects
to countries with attractive R&D tax credit and allowance schemes may prevail. See Ernst et al.
(2013).
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Our results suggest that patent income taxation exerts a significantly negative
effect on average patent quality. Quantitatively, we find that a decrease in the patent
income tax rate (which proxies for the average effective tax rate) by 10 percentage
points raises patent quality by around 1-5%. This result prevails in a number of
sensitivity checks which control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in patent
quality across industries, countries and firms. The B-index (which captures the tax
burden on marginal investment) in turn exerts a negative effect on patent quality.
Consequently, while both R&D tax allowances/credits and low patent income taxes
raise R&D quantity (as shown by previous research), our analysis suggests that their
impact on project quality differs substantially: while low patent income taxes raise
average project quality, generous R&D tax allowances/credits tend to reduce it.
The study contributes to several strands of the economic literature. First, it
directly relates to papers which assess the impact of R&D tax incentives on R&D
expenditure. For the US, Hall (1993) and Hines (1994) study the responsiveness of
corporate R&D to the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit and find significant
R&D price elasticities. Similarly, Hines and Jaffe (2001) determine how US R&D
expense deduction rules affect the location of R&D by US multinationals. Bloom
et al. (2002) confirm a significantly positive effect of R&D tax credits on the level of
R&D expenditures using macro data for major OECD countries (for survey papers
on the topic see also Hall and Van Reenen, 2000; Arundel et al., 2008).6 Second,
Griffith et al. (2014), Ernst and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012)
find a negative effect of patent income taxes on the number of corporate patent
applications.
Our study adds to the sketched literature by stressing that tax provisions for
patent income may not only impact on the quantity of R&D and patent holdings but
also on their quality. In this sense, the study is related to recent contributions that
emphasize the importance of quality aspects in assessing the welfare consequences
of corporate taxation. Becker and Fuest (2007) and Becker and Riedel (2012) crit-
icize that conventional studies solely focus on the effect of corporate taxes on the
quantity of capital investment. The welfare effects of the investment, however, crit-
ically depend on the number of jobs created, the associated profit and tax revenue
base, and the project’s innovativeness. Our results confirm the importance of this
argumentation.
The Chapter is structured as follows: Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe our data set
and estimation methodology. The results are presented in Section 4.4 and Section
4.5 concludes.
6In a recent paper, Ernst and Spengel (2011) report some impact of R&D tax incentives on the
number of corporate patent applications. Buettner and Wamser (2009) find positive effects of R&D
tax incentives on the volume of FDI of German multinationals.
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4.2 Data
In order to assess the link between R&D tax incentives and project quality, the
empirical analysis merges information on corporate innovative activities as captured
by patent data to information on R&D tax incentives in Europe.
4.2.1 Patent and Firm Data
To proxy for R&D activity, we will make use of the universe of patent applications
to the EPO drawn from the PATSTAT data base. Firms seeking patent protection
in a number of European countries may file an application directly at the EPO and
designate the relevant national offices in which protection is sought.7 Filing a patent
with the EPO firstly enables a firm to make a single application, which is cheaper
than filing separately in each national office, and, secondly, allows the firm to delay
the decision over which national states to further the application in.
The data includes information on the patent applicant and inventor, the technol-
ogy of the patent and patent citations. The right to patent an invention belongs to
the inventor or to anyone who by law or contract is entitled to file the application
(Muir et al., 1999). Commonly the employer is entitled to file an application for
an invention made by an employee. In these cases, the employer is the applicant
and legal owner of the technology and consequently also the relevant subject for
taxation (Quick and Day, 2006; Ernst and Spengel, 2011)8 while the employee has
to be listed as the inventor on the application.9
Note that in most cases (more than 90% of the patent applications), inventor and
applicant are located in the same country. As recent papers suggest that multi-
national firms can set up structures which allow them to geographically split the
location of inventor and patent applicant in order to shift income to low-tax coun-
tries (see for example Boehm et al., 2012), we drop the according patents from our
analysis and focus on the ’standard’ case where the inventing unit and the patent
owner are located in the same country.
The PATSTAT data base comprises patent applications for the years 1978 to 2007.
In the analysis to come, we will account for patent applications from 1995 onwards
7The EPO is not a body of the European Union and, as a result, the states which form part
of the European Patent Convention (the legal basis for the EPO) are distinct from those in the
European Union. See: http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html.
8Note, however, that in some countries the principle of economic ownership applies, implying
that legal and economic owner may diverge. In such cases, information on the legal owner can be
used as a proxy for the party that will eventually be subject to taxation only.
9The employer can also transfer ownership of the invented technology to the employee who may
then file for patent protection. We consider these cases to be rare events though as firms do not
have an incentive to waive ownership of a technology that is expected to earn positive income.
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Table 4.1: Country Statistics
Country Number of Patents Country Number of Patents
Austria 3,127 Hungary 166
Belgium 2,217 Ireland 331
Bulgaria 9 Italy 11,886
Switzerland 8,495 Lithuania 1
Czech Republic 75 Netherlands 8,080
Germany 74,620 Norway 969
Denmark 2,536 Poland 53
Spain 1,453 Portugal 70
Finland 3,788 Romania 2
France 23,842 Sweden 6,805
Great Britain 12,145 Slovenia 50
Greece 60 Slovakia 10
Total 160,790
Notes: The table shows the country coverage for our sample of EPO patent applications, which we
obtained from the PATSTAT database.
as our tax and firm data is restricted to that period and limit the sample to patents
that were eventually granted. Furthermore, we merge the patent information to the
European firm-level data base AMADEUS provided by Bureau van Dijk. The link
between the data bases is achieved through standard name matching procedures.10
Success rates of that procedure are comparable to previous studies (Thoma et al.,
2010). On average around 67% of the patents in our data are matched over all
sample years and countries. For more details on the matching procedure, see Ernst
and Spengel (2011). The match rates for the five largest EU countries by popula-
tion are 47% for Spain, 55% for France, 68% for Germany, 63% for Italy and 72%
for the United Kingdom. Table 4.1 presents host country statistics for the patent
applications in our data.
4.2.2 Construction of the Patent Quality Indicators
As described above, the purpose of this study is to assess the effect of the design of
the corporate tax system on the quality of R&D projects. In the following, project
quality is proxied by the quality of patents invented in a country (see Section 4.4
for a discussion of this approach) as determined by a factor analysis.11 In line with
previous research, the factor model accounts for three separate indicators of the
patent’s underlying, latent quality: the patent’s forward citations, its family size
and the number of technical fields. The estimates of the factor model can be used
10Following previous efforts (Abramovsky et al., 2008), the name of the AMADEUS firm was
matched to the name of the applicant on the patent application. Note that corporations may take
on the role as patent applicant, while patent inventors are necessarily non-corporates.
11See Hall et al. (2007). We are grateful to Grid Thoma for providing us with this data.
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to construct an estimator for patent quality conditional on the indicators. In the
following, we will give a brief description of the information employed to derive the
quality index. For more details on this approach see Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2004) and Hall et al. (2007).
Following previous studies, we consider the patent’s family size, i.e. the number of
jurisdictions in which the firm has filed for patent protection, to be a good proxy for
the patent’s expected earnings potential. In particular, as filing for patent protection
involves considerable costs (Helfgott, 1993), it only pays for a firm to protect its
invention in many markets if the expected earnings potential is sufficiently large.
The number of forward citations received by a patent within the five year period
from the publication date, in turn, serves as a proxy for the invention’s innovativeness
as it indicates whether the technology is the basis for future inventions.12 Last, the
construction of the patent quality index also accounts for the number of technological
classes named on the patent which have been shown by previous research to be an
indicator of technological quality (Lerner, 1994).13
Several authors have also stressed that the value of patents varies across industries
and across time. To account for that, we follow previous studies (Hall et al., 2007)
and use quality measures that control for technology and year fixed effects (which is
not decisive for our results though). Descriptive statistics for the quality measures
are presented in Table 4.2. The composite quality index (CQI) accounts for all
three quality dimensions (forward citations, family size and industry classes) and
controls for technology and year fixed effects. The average index is approximately
0, varying strongly between −2.5 and +7.3. There is also substantial cross-sectional
and longitudinal variation of the average patent quality across countries and firms
as can be seen from Table 4.2.14 Accordingly, the average quality index varies across
countries from −.3561 to .1471 with a standard deviation of 0.1707. The average
variation within countries as measured by the standard deviation of the composite
quality index within a single country is approximately 0.6791. On average, 5.9
12Forward citations have an important legal function in the sense that they limit the scope of
property rights which are awarded to a patent. In the case of EPO patents, inventors are not
required to cite prior technology used in the development of their patent but the references are
added by patent examiners. On the one hand, this implies that not necessarily all innovations
which draw on an existing patent in fact acknowledge the reference. On the other hand, an external
patent examiner has the benefit of following a consistent and objective patent citation practice.
13For the purpose of guaranteeing a reasonable level of precision, the construction of the quality
measures accounts for an eight-digit international patent classification (IPC) reported in the patent
document.
14Note that we do not observe any changes in the quality of a particular patent over time. The
analysis, in turn, will focus on changes in the average quality of the pool of patent applications.
Furthermore note that our data allows us to identify the location of the technology inventor at the
time of the patent application only. If an ongoing R&D project was relocated (in response to tax
incentives), we do not observe the original location in our data.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable # Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Composite Quality Index 160,790 -.1958 -.2494 -2.5289 7.2887
Mean - Between Countries 24 -.1076 -.1629 -.3561 .1471
Mean - Between Countries-Years 245 -.0818 -.0509 -1.2632 .6923
Mean - Between Affiliates 38,832 -.2913 -.3263 -2.3226 5.4258
Stand. Dev. - Within Countries 23 .6791 .6889 .3450 .8585
Stand. Dev. - Within Countr.-Y. 233 .6496 .6574 .0235 1.387
Stand. Dev. - Within Affiliates 14,501 .4329 .4070 .000 2.5738
Quality Index - Forward Citations 160,790 -.2769 -.3026 -2.3566 7.2058
Quality Index - Family Size 160,790 -.0801 -.1349 -1.7970 5.2683
Patent Income Tax 160,790 .3904 .3829 .0 .59
B-index 112,058 .9944 1.029 .428 1.069
GDP 160,790 1.55e+12 1.80e+12 1.27e+10 2.90e+12
GDP pC 160,790 26,128.32 25,913.16 5,365.83 51,862.42
Polity2 160,790 9.8513 10 8 10
TPI Corruption Index 160,790 7.6987 7.9 2.9 10
Total Assets 25,896 6,732.671 232.1615 0.001 128,568
(in million US dollars)
Notes: The Composite Quality Index is a measure for patent quality derived from a factor model
accounting for the patent’s forward citations, its family size and the number of industry classes
(conditional on industry and year fixed effects). The Forward Citations (Family Size) Index is an
analogous measure which accounts for the number of forward citations (family size) of the patent
only. Patent Income Tax stands for the statutory tax rate on patent income. The construction
of the B-index follows Equation (2) in Section 3. GDP and GDP pC depict the host country’s
gross domestic product and gross domestic product per capita respectively in US dollars. The
polity2 index captures information on concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority
in governing institutions. The polity2 index varies from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly
democratic). TPI Corruption Index stands for the Transparency International corruption perception
index which ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (absence of corruption). Total assets depicts the
total assets of the patent-filing firm in in millions of US dollars.
patents are held per affiliate. Where an affiliate holds more than one patent, the
average variation of the quality index within one affiliate is 0.4329.
The separate quality indices for forward citations and family size exhibit a similar
distribution. Furthermore note that the family size and forward citation indices are
positively correlated (correlation coefficient 0.34, statistically significant at 1% level),
which suggests that, on average, a high level of innovativeness (as measured by the
forward citation index) goes along with a high earnings potential (as measured by
the family size index).
4.2.3 Corporate Taxation
As described above, our analysis will assess the effect of the corporate tax system
on patent applications, accounting for two types of tax incentive instruments: the
(output-based) patent income tax rate and (input-based) tax credit and allowances
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measures.
Information on the patent income tax in the host country of the patent applicant
is obtained from Ernst and Young’s corporate tax guides, the International Bureau
of Fiscal Documentation’s country analyses and other sources. Most countries tax
patent income at the same rate as other corporate income. In recent years, a growing
number of countries have, however, introduced special low tax rates on patent income
(e.g. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). While many of these special
provisions were introduced after 2007 and are, thus, not reflected in our data, our
tax measure accounts for special tax provisions where applicable. In particular,
during our sample period France implemented a special low tax rate on patent
income of 19% in 2000 (standard corporate tax rate: 33%) which was then, in
a second reform, lowered to 15% in 2005. Ireland furthermore exempted patent
income altogether during our whole sample period and Hungary enacted a patent
box regime in 2003 which reduced the tax rate on patent income to 9.5%. Finally,
the Netherlands enacted a special low patent income tax rate of 10% in 2007 (see
also Evers et al., 2014). Since the analysis to come will account for the sketched
cases, we refer to the tax parameter as patent income tax rate instead of corporate
income tax rate.
The average tax rate applicable to the patents in our data is 39%, varying strongly
between 0% and 59%. The high average rate reflects that many patents in our data
are filed from large economies, like Germany, which also charged high tax rates
on corporate income within our sample period. Furthermore note that the patent
income tax rate exhibits significant variation over time (within standard deviation of
.062). Precisely, our sample period saw 15 major reductions in the patent income tax
rate (or corporate income tax rate respectively) of 5 percentage points or more (in
the countries of Austria (2005), Belgium (2003), Bulgaria (2007), Germany (2001),
France (2000), Hungary (2003), Italy (1998), Lithuania (2002), Netherlands (2007),
Poland (2004), Portugal (2004), Romania (2000 and 2005) and Slovakia (2000 and
2004)). There were moreover numerous smaller adjustments in the patent income
tax rate.
Yet, using this statutory tax rate as a measure for the tax burden on patent
income disregards that several countries additionally levy a so-called withholding
tax on royalty payments from their border. In case of cross-border royalty streams,
patent income is, thus, not only taxed in the country that receives the royalty income
but may also be taxed in the royalty paying country. Withholding tax rates are
commonly determined in bilateral double taxation agreements between countries.
The according information is retrieved from recent and historic bilateral tax treaties
and from Ernst and Young’s corporate tax guides. To avoid double taxation, royalty
receiving countries commonly grant a tax credit for withholding taxes paid on the
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royalty income.15 Thus, the effective tax rate te on a cross-border royalty stream
is the maximum of the royalty income tax rate tk in the patentee’s host country k
and the royalty withholding rate twjk charged on royalty streams from a country j
to country k: te = max(tk, twjk).
To determine the average tax on royalty income related to a particular patent, we
have to make assumptions on the structure of royalty streams received by a patent
owner. In a first step, we assume that the pattern of the royalty stream corre-
sponds to observed aggregate bilateral royalty payments. However, as the quality
and earnings potential of a patent may impact on the structure of royalty payments,
using bilateral royalties for the construction of the effective tax measure may give
rise to endogeneity concerns in the empirical analysis to come. We will therefore
alternatively assume that the relative size of the royalty streams corresponds to the
countries’ size distribution as measured by the countries’ GDP. This assumption
reflects that production and sales activities are plausibly positively correlated with
market size and, thus, trigger higher payments for the use of the protected invention.
Alternatively, we will proxy for the pattern of royalty streams related to a patent by
exploiting information on the patent offices where the firm filed for patent protection
for the technology. The underlying rationale is that sales through affiliates in these
markets will trigger royalty and license payments to the patent owner. Formally,
the definition of the effective tax rate reads
te =
J∑
j=1
Wj ·max(tk, twjk) (4.1)
where j indicates the host country of the royalty paying party and twjk depicts the
respective royalty withholding rate charged on royalty income paid from country
j to the patentee’s host country k. Wj stands for the weighting matrix. If Wj is
constructed based on the relative size of aggregate bilateral royalty payments and
the countries’ GDP distribution respectively, the effective tax measure accounts for
partner countries in EU27 and major non-EU countries, namely Australia, Canada,
China, Switzerland, Japan and the US.16 If royalty streams are modelled by infor-
mation on the patent family, Wj is a uniform weighting scheme and the number of
partner countries accounted for in the construction of te is the subset of the EU27
and major non-EU countries named above where the firm filed for patent protec-
15There were a few exceptions to the credit method. If no double tax treaty was in force for
a specific country in a specific year (especially in the 1990ies) the unilateral method to avoid
double taxation was applied to calculate the effective income tax rate, e.g. deduction of the foreign
withholding tax.
16The information on annual bilateral royalty payments used for the construction of the index
was obtained from the International Monetary Fund. Information on countries’ GDP was obtained
from the World Development Indicators Database.
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tion.17
Another alternative way to construct the effective tax measure is to exploit in-
formation on the structure of multinational corporations in our data. Precisely,
inventions protected by corporate patents are often exploited within the boundaries
of the multinational firm only to avoid knowledge dissipation to competitors (Zuniga
and Guellec, 2009). We thus reconstruct te assuming that royalties are paid to the
patentee from all other firms belonging to the multinational group. Ideally, follow-
ing the above logic, one might want to weigh the information by affiliate size. As
size information is missing for a relatively large number of cases in the AMADEUS
data base though,18 we follow previous studies (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011) and
construct an unweighted average te =
∑
j
1
J ·max(tk, twjk) where j indicates each
of the J other affiliates within the multinational group (apart from the patenting
affiliate), including the parent firm, and twjk again denotes the withholding tax rate
charged by their host country on royalty payments to the patentee. As sketched in
the introductory section, for highly profitable investments, the effective tax rate on
patent income converges against the average effective tax rate.
Following previous work, we moreover construct the so-called B-index which cap-
tures the tax component in the costs of an R&D investment (Warda, 2002; Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003), accounting for special tax allowances
and credits, and serves as a measure for the tax burden on marginal R&D invest-
ment. Formally,
Bk =
1− Zk · tk
1− tk (4.2)
where tk stands for the corporate income tax rate in country k and Zk represents a
measure for the deductibility of R&D expenditures, including tax allowances or tax
credits granted for R&D investments. The numerator reflects the after-tax cost of
one unit of expenditure in R&D and the B-index consequently captures the minimum
pre-tax earnings required for the project to break even and to go ahead. If an R&D
17Note that, as our main data set comprises patent applications to the European patent office, the
construction of te assumes that the firm filed for patent protection in all countries that were members
of the European Patent Office in the year of the patent application. For our first sample year 1995,
this comprises the countries of Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France,
United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden. Countries
that became members during our sample period are: Bulgaria (2002), Cyprus (1998), Czech Re-
public (2002), Estonia (2002), Finland (1996), Hungary (2003), Island (2004), Lithuania (2004),
Latvia (2005), Malta (2007), Poland (2004), Romania (2003), Slovenia (2002) and Slovakia (2002).
Furthermore note that royalties paid from parties in the host country of the patentee itself are also
accounted for in the construction of te, in the cases where the weighting matrix reflects the country
size distribution and the construction is based on the patent offices where the firm filed for patent
protection. It holds twjk = 0 if j = k.
18Note that AMADEUS contains ownership information on a worldwide basis. For most sub-
sidiaries and parents outside Europe, accounting information which allows to proxy for subsidiary
size is not available though.
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investment can be fully expensed in a fiscal year, the B-index is equal to one since
Zk equals one. A tax incentive, granting for example an additional deduction on top
of the normal deduction of R&D expenditures, reduces the value of Bk below one, as
Zk is then larger than one. Consequently, the lower the B-index the more attractive
is the tax system for R&D investments and vice versa (see also Ernst and Spengel,
2011). The average B-index in our sample is .99 (comprising information for the
years 1998 to 2006). The variable furthermore exhibits relevant variation over time
(within standard deviation of .028). Precisely, our sample countries experienced 10
major adjustments in the B-index by more than 0.05 through the introduction or
reform of R&D tax credit and allowances schemes (in the Czech Republic (2005),
Spain (2000), France (2004 and 2006), UK (2002), Italy (2004), Portugal (2002,
2004, 2006) and Slovenia (2006)). Moreover, the sample period has seen numerous
smaller adjustments in R&D tax incentive schemes.
4.2.4 Control Variables
Last, we augment our data by information on other country characteristics, like
GDP per capita (as a proxy for economic development), the size of population (as a
proxy for country size) and a corruption perception index obtained from the World
Development Indicator Database and Transparency International respectively. We
furthermore include information on the concomitant qualities of democratic and
autocratic authority in a country’s governing institutions using the so-called Polity2
Index. Note that Transparency International’s corruption perception index ranges
from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (absence of corruption), while the Polity 2 Index
varies from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
4.3 Estimation Strategy
As described above, the aim of our analysis is to identify whether the structure of the
corporate tax system affects the quality of R&D projects undertaken in a country.
To do so, we proxy for project quality by the patent quality indicators described in
the previous section and estimate a model of the following form
qikat = β0 + β1τkt + β2Xikat + φa + µt + iat (4.3)
where qikat indicates the quality of patent i filed at time t by multinational affiliate
a located in country k. The explanatory variable of main interest is τkt, which is
the vector of corporate tax parameters comprising the statutory tax rate on patent
income levied by the host jurisdiction of the patenting firm and the effective tax rate
on patent income (which proxy for the average effective tax rate) and the B-index
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described in the previous section (which captures the tax burden on marginal R&D
investment).
To control for time-constant heterogeneity in average patent quality across firms
and industries, we moreover include a full set of affiliate fixed effects and industry
fixed effects (as determined by the first industry class named on the patent) in the
estimation.19 The set of regressors is furthermore augmented by a full set of year
fixed effects to absorb common shocks to patent quality which simultaneously affect
all patents in the data. Additionally, we include time-varying country controls for
market size (as measured by the host country’s GDP), the degree of development
(as measured by the host country’s GDP per capita) and the country’s political and
governance situation (as measured by the Transparency International corruption
index and the Polity2 Index). Last, we augment the vector of control variables
by firm size information as measured by the affiliate’s total assets to control for a
potential systematic correlation between corporate taxation, firm size and patent
quality.
4.4 Results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.8. The tables display the co-
efficient estimates and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which are adjusted
for clustering at the country-year level.
4.4.1 Baseline Results
In Specification (1) of Table 4.3, we regress the composite quality measure on the
statutory tax rate levied on patent income in the host country of the patent ap-
plicant, controlling for country and year fixed effects. The coefficient estimate is
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an increase in the patent in-
come tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the quality index by 0.035. Evaluated
at the sample mean, this corresponds to a decline by 1.5%.20
Specifications (2) and (3) reestimate specification (1) augmenting the vector of
regressors by a full set of industry fixed effects and time-varying country controls.
The inclusion of the additional control variables leaves the qualitative and quantita-
19As ownership information is only available in cross-sectional format in the AMADEUS database,
affiliates are assumed to not change their host location over time. Consequently, affiliate fixed effects
nest host country fixed effects.
20As the composite quality index may take on negative values, the semi-elasticity is evalu-
ated at the sample average of the variable plus the absolute value of the variable’s minimum:
|min(CQI)|+avg(CQI) = 2.5289− 0.1958 = 2.3331, see Table 4.2. It follows that 0.035/2.3331 =
1.5%.
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tive results largely unaffected. Specification (4), furthermore, includes a full set of
affiliate fixed effects which absorb any time-constant heterogeneity in the quality of
R&D projects across patent inventing firms. The sample is moreover restricted to
patents filed by firms that are part of a multinational group.21 Specification (5) adds
firm size as measured by the logarithm of the firm’s total assets as an additional
control variable. Both specifications confirm our previous findings and suggest a
significantly negative impact of the patent income tax rate on patent quality. Quan-
titatively, specification (5) indicates that an increase in the statutory tax rate on
patent income by 10 percentage points decreases the patent quality index by 0.095.
Evaluated at the sample mean, this corresponds to a decline by 4.1%.22
As a robustness check, we further reran the analysis using the patent’s number of
forward citations and family size as proxies for its degree of innovation and earnings
potential. The results are presented in specifications (6) to (9). Similar to the
previous estimates, we find that patent taxation reduces the quality measure. An
increase in the tax rate by 10 percentage points lowers the family size index and
the forward citation index by around 0.07. Evaluated at the sample mean, this
corresponds to a decrease by 4.1% (3.4%) (see specification (7) and specification (9)
respectively of Table 4.3). To the extent that the patent’s family size and forward
citations serve as a proxy for the earnings potential and the degree of innovation of
the underlying R&D project, the estimates thus suggest a significant reduction in
the two welfare components.
As sketched in Section 4.2, our sample period saw a number of large patent in-
come tax adjustments. Specifications (10) to (12) separately assess the effect of
the largest adjustment in the patent tax rate within our sample frame which was
the introduction of a special low patent income tax rate of 19% in France in 2000
(statutory corporate tax rate: 33.3% plus surcharges). Precisely, we implement a
21Precisely, a firm is defined to be part of a multinational group if it owns a foreign affiliate with
more than 50% of the ownership shares, or is owned by a foreign parent with more than 50% of the
ownership shares or is owned by a parent firm in the same country which in turn owns at least one
foreign affiliate with more than 50% of the ownership shares.
22Note that the sample size is reduced when we restrict the sample to MNEs and augment the
model by affiliate fixed effects in Specification (4) and the total asset control in Specification (5).
The sample reduction in Specification (4) on the one hand reflects that not all patent applicants
can be matched to firms in the Amadeus data base and on the other hand that some of the matched
patents are filed by national firms. The sample reduction in Specification (5) reflects that the total
asset information is missing for a relevant number of firm-year-cells. Note that the restriction to
multinational firms in Specification (4) increases the absolute coefficient estimate, while the inclusion
of the affiliate fixed effect reduces it. Running the model on the sample in Specification (4) but
without affiliate fixed effects yields a coefficient estimate of −0.91 (significant at the 1% level).
The absolute increase in the coefficient estimate in Specification (5) relative to Specification (4) is
moreover driven by the sample restriction. The coefficient estimate for the sample in Specification
(5) without the inclusion of the total asset control is −0.96 (significant at the 1% level).
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differences-in-differences model of the following form:
qikat = α0 + α1FRXPOSTkt + α2Xikat + φk + µt + ikat (4.4)
where FRXPOSTkt indicates patents filed in France after the reform year 2000. The
definition of the other variables corresponds to Equation (4.3). Note that country
and year fixed effects are included and the sample is limited to patent applications
filed between 1997 and 2003, i.e. three years prior and after the reform. Specification
(10) of Table 4.3 uses all other countries in our sample as control group, while
specification (11) limits the control group to countries that did not experience a
major adjustment in their patent income tax rate (i.e. corporate tax rate if no special
tax applies for patent income) or adjusted their tax credit or tax allowance scheme.
The latter control group comprises the countries of Finland, Ireland, Netherlands
and Sweden. Both specifications suggest that patent quality in France increased after
the year 2000 relative to the countries in the control group. As Specification (10)
includes a number of countries that substantially reduced their corporate income tax
rates within this period as well, it is not surprising that the coefficient estimate for
the treatment effect increases when the control group is reduced to countries without
a major reform in Specification (11). Quantitatively, Specification (11) suggests that
average patent quality increased by 0.083, or, evaluated at the sample mean, by 3.6%.
Augmenting the model by affiliate fixed effects in Specification (12) leads to a slight
drop in the coefficient estimate which remains statistically significant though.
Moreover, the effective tax burden on patent income does not only depend on
the statutory tax on patent income charged by the host country of the royalty
recipient but may, in case of cross-border payments, be equally determined by royalty
withholding taxes charged by the royalty paying country. As laid out in Section 4.3,
we account for this by constructing an effective tax rate on patent income which
takes both rates into account. The results are presented in Table 4.4. Specifications
(1) to (6) employ an effective tax rate measure which is constructed based on the
assumption that the patentee receives royalty payments from other EU and non-
EU countries and that the relative size of the royalty streams matches aggregated
observed bilateral royalty streams. The effective tax rate measure in specifications
(7) to (12) (specifications (13) to (18)) assumes royalty payments to be determined by
partner country size (the patent family). Finally, Specifications (19) to (24) employ
an effective tax rate measure which is constructed based on the assumption that
the patentee receives royalties from all other affiliates within the same multinational
group. The results confirm our qualitative and quantitative baseline findings for
the statutory patent income tax rate, irrespective of whether the composite patent
quality index is used as the dependent variable or the indices reflecting forward
citations or patent family size.
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Table 4.5: Clustering of Standard Errors at Different Levels
Panel A: Composite Quality Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Income Tax -0.315∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.112) (0.121) (0.197) (0.155) (0.129)
Cluster Ctry Ind Firm Ctry Ind Firm
Panel B: Family Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Income Tax -0.245∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.077) (0.092) (0.142) (0.094) (0.100)
Cluster Ctry Ind Firm Ctry Ind Firm
Panel C: Forward Citations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Patent Income Tax -0.213∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.316 -0.316∗ -0.316∗∗
(0.133) (0.141) (0.135) (0.190) (0.189) (0.144)
Cluster Ctry Ind Firm Ctry Ind Firm
# Observations 160,790 160,790 128,101 116,913 116,913 116,913
Country Controls X X X X X X
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Country Fixed Effects X X X
Affiliate Fixed Effects X X X
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors adjusted for country clusters (’ctry’), industry clusters (’ind’) and firm clusters
respectively in parentheses. The dependent variable is the composite patent quality index (Panel
A) and the family size (Panel B) and forward citations index respectively (Panel C). For details on
the variable definition, see the notes to Table 4.2. All specifications include a full set of year fixed
effects and the country control variables GDP, GDPpC, Polity2 and TP Corruption Index.
Note, moreover, that our results are robust to adjusting standard errors for clus-
ters at different levels. While our baseline specifications report standard errors
that allow for correlation of residuals in the same country and year cell, we reran
our specifications calculating standard errors that account for correlation within
country clusters, industry clusters and firm clusters respectively. Panel A of Table
4.5 presents the results of specifications which reestimate the models presented in
columns (3) to (4) of Table 4.3 (which use the composite quality index as dependent
variable). The modification leaves the statistical significance of the coefficient esti-
mates for the patent income tax variable unaltered. Analogous results are found if
the family size index or the index for the number of forward citations is used as the
dependent variable in Panels B and C.
The specifications presented in Table 4.6 furthermore test for a potential link be-
tween the B-index and patent quality. Specifications (1) to (3) regress the composite
patent quality index on the B-index and the host country’s patent income tax rate.
The coefficient estimate for the tax variable, again, shows a negative sign, indicating
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a statistically significant and economically relevant impact of patent income taxes
on patent quality. Quantitatively, an increase in the tax rate by 10 percentage
points reduces patent quality by 0.92 or 3.9% (see Specification (3)). The coeffi-
cient estimate for the B-index is positive and turns out statistically significant in
Specifications (2) and (3), indicating that reductions in the marginal tax burden on
R&D investment, as e.g. induced by an expansion of R&D tax allowances/credits,
reduce the average quality of R&D projects undertaken in a country.23 Quantita-
tively, a reduction in the B-index by 0.10 (implying that a 1 Euro investment in
R&D has to earn 10 cent lower pre-tax income in order to break even) lowers the
average patent quality by 0.059 and thus by 2.5%. This result is in line with the
theoretical notion that, with a downward sloping marginal product curve, marginal
R&D projects induced by generous tax allowances/credits or low patent income
taxes, reduce the average profitability of the project pool. We furthermore reran
the regressions using the patent’s family size (see specifications (4) to (6)) and its
forward citations (see specifications (7) to (9)) as the dependent variable. While the
coefficient estimates for the patent income tax rate remain statistically significant
and large in all specifications, the B-index loses in terms of size and significance in
the specifications which employ the number of forward citations as the dependent
variable. The results thus suggest that, while project profitability as proxied by the
family size of the patent decreases with a reduction in the marginal effective tax
burden, the degree of innovation as proxied by the number of forward citations is
not significantly affected.24
Furthermore note that the construction of the B-index also accounts for the tax
burden on R&D income. To separate out effects related to the policy instruments
of low patent income taxes and generous R&D tax credits/allowances, we also ran
specifications with a modified B-index variable, which captures the after-tax income
required for a project to break even and corresponds to the numerator of the B-
index defined in Equation (4.2). The results are presented in Specifications (10) to
(12). Qualitatively, they resemble our baseline findings. The coefficient estimate for
the patent income tax somewhat drops in size. Specification (3) suggests that an
increase in the patent income tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the patent
quality by 0.038 or 1.6%.
23Recall that higher tax credits/allowances reduce the B-index.
24As a robustness check, we also ran specifications which included the B-index as the only tax
measure, which does not change our results.
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4.4.2 Robustness Checks and Discussion
The analysis so far has accounted for corporate tax incentives in the year of patent
application. Two issues are important to discuss in this context. Firstly, as described
in the introductory section, MNEs may have an incentive to distort the location
of valuable R&D projects to affiliates with a low corporate tax rate. Thus, the
decision on the R&D location is, in most cases, made several months prior to the
patent application and to the income flow related to the R&D. Note that, for the
average R&D project, the time of the project until patenting is rather short though,
in 75% of the cases less than 24 man-months (see a recent survey of US and Japanese
firms, Nagaoka and Walsh (2009) and footnote 3 in this Chapter).25 Consequently,
MNEs have to form expectations on the future patent income tax rate that will
apply to income from the project at the time when it makes its location decision.
As corporate tax reforms are commonly announced and enacted months or even
years in advance, uncertainty on the taxation of the income stream may be small
for projects with a short (scheduled) project horizon. For projects with a longer
(scheduled) project horizon, the MNE has to form expectations on the development
of the corporate income tax rate in potential host countries. With extrapolative
expectations, expectations depend on the history of the corporate tax rate, in the
easiest case agents assume the future corporate tax rate to correspond to today’s
corporate tax rate. With rational expectations, the expected corporate tax rate in
turn corresponds to the mathematical expectation of the future tax rate given the
available information today. Modeling the tax incentives by the patent income tax
rate and R&D tax allowances/tax credits in the year of the patent application, as
we did in the baseline analysis, assumes rational expectations of MNEs which have
enough information at hand to predict future corporate tax rates at potential hosting
locations (at the time when the income stream arises, presumably the year of the
patent application) when deciding upon the location of R&D projects. Extrapolative
expectation would in turn suggest to include lagged values of the tax variables to
proxy for tax incentives at the time when the MNE makes the R&D location decision.
Following this notion, Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4.7 rerun our baseline
specifications replacing the patent income tax rate in the year of the patent appli-
cation with the first lag of the patent income tax. The coefficient estimates turn
out negative and statistically significant, indicating quantitatively slightly smaller
effects than the baseline model. Specifications (3) and (4) simultaneously account
25Man-months of course do not necessarily directly correspond to the actual length of the project
until patenting. On the one hand, the project period in months may be shorter since more than
one employee may be assigned to the project. On the other hand, the period may be longer as
employees may work on several projects simultaneously. In any case, the survey suggests that the
time span between the kick-off of the R&D project and the application for patent protection is
rather short.
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for the patent income tax in the application year as well as the patent income tax
in the year(s) prior to the application. The results suggest that deeper lags of the
patent income tax do have explanatory power and exert a statistically significant
effect on the quality of R&D projects. Specifications (5) and (6) rerun the model
in Specification (4) using the family and forward citation index as the dependent
variable respectively. Again, the pattern of the results remains unchanged. Specifi-
cations (7) and (8)) augment the set of regressors by information on the B-index in
the year of the patent application as well as in prior years. The estimates suggest
that marginal project costs as modelled by the B-index impact on project quality
particularly strongly in years indicated by deeper lags, i.e. the years when the de-
cision on the implementation and (initial) location of the R&D is made. This is
intuitive as the size of the B-index is decisively driven by tax allowances and tax
credits granted for R&D investments whose benefits largely accrue at the start of
the project.
Table 4.8 furthermore assesses the sensitivity of our results to controlling for
transfer pricing legislations that aim to limit multinational profit relocations to low-
tax countries. As technologies resulting from R&D are an important input in the
production process of modern MNEs, a significant fraction of intra-firm trading
activities is related to patented innovations. In general, MNEs have an incentive to
distort prices on royalty payments for high- and low-value R&D alike. High-value
R&D may, however, be used more intensely within the multinational group and may
thus offer more opportunities for price distortions. The implementation of transfer
pricing regulations and the associated limitation of profit shifting opportunities (for
empirical evidence see Lohse and Riedel, 2013) may thus in particular drive high-
value R&D from the country. If changes in transfer pricing laws and R&D tax
incentives are correlated, our coefficient estimates of interest may be biased. To
assess this possibility, we collected information on transfer pricing legislations in our
sample countries. In particular, we defined a dummy variable which takes on the
value 1 if transfer pricing requirements are implemented into national tax law.26
The specifications in Table 4.8 augment our baseline models by this transfer pricing
indicator. While we do not find a statistically significant impact of transfer pricing
rules on the average quality of R&D projects located in a country, the impact of the
patent income tax and the B-index resemble the baseline findings.
Moreover, as described in Section 4.2, the analysis disregards patents where ap-
plicant and inventor are located in different countries to avoid findings that reflect
tax-motivated international profit shifting through patent relocations to low-tax
26In doing so, we follow Lohse et al. (2012) and code the dummy as 1 if the country’s national tax
law requires intra-firm transfer prices to be set according to the arm’s length principle and if the
tax law provides further details on the applicability of the principle (e.g. specifies methods which
MNEs are allowed to pursue to determine arm’s length prices).
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Table 4.8: Transfer Pricing Rules
Comp. Qual. Index Family Forward Composite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Patent Income Tax -0.308∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.242∗ -0.548∗∗∗
(0.0812) (0.120) (0.0808) (0.139) (0.142)
B-index 0.515∗∗∗
(0.196)
Transfer Pricing Rules -0.007 -0.023 -0.005 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.024) (0.035)
Industry Fixed Effects X X X X X
Country Controls X X X X X
Country Fixed Effects X
Affiliate Fixed Effects X X X X
# Observations 160,790 116,913 116,913 116,913 80,936
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors adjusted for country-year clusters in parentheses. The dependent variable is the
composite patent quality index (specifications (1)-(2) and (5)) and the family size (specification (3))
and forward citations index respectively (specification (4)). For details on the variable definition,
see the notes to Table 4.2. All specifications include a full set of year fixed effects and the country
control variables GDP, GDPpC, Polity2 and TP Corruption Index.
countries. Geographical splits of patent applicant (i.e. the owner of the technology
who is subject to tax) and the inventor can e.g. be implemented through contract
research schemes, where an R&D unit undertakes research for a group affiliate in
a tax-haven country which finances the project and bears its risk. The R&D unit
earns a small fixed profit margin on its costs, while the residual income accrues with
the contracting entity in the low-tax country.27 In contrast, relocating ownership
of the technology after patent protection was granted tends to be unattractive from
a profit shifting perspective as tax authorities in high-tax countries would require
that a transfer price corresponding to the patent’s true value is charged for the
transaction.
Another issue that merits discussion is the use of the patent quality measure to
proxy for the quality of R&D projects. In particular, strategic patenting may involve
that different subparts of one innovation are protected by a number of interconnected
patents. This directly implies that increases in the quality of an R&D project may
partly show up through increases in the number of patents filed by a corporation.
Using the number of patent applications as the main regressand, like done in previous
research (see for example Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012;
Griffith et al., 2014), might thus capture both, responses in the quality and quantity
27Boehm et al. (2012) analyze patent applications to the EPO and find that geographical patent
splits are partly motivated by tax considerations.
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of R&D projects to corporate taxation. The merit of our approach is in turn that it
allows for an isolated identification of the quality effect by investigating the impact
of patent income taxation and R&D tax incentives on the quality of patents filed by
a corporation, conditional on the number of patent applications.
To sum up, the findings suggest that, in line with our theoretical considerations,
low average tax rates on patent income (as proxied by the statutory patent income
tax rate) raise the average quality of R&D projects undertaken in a country (by
attracting a positive selection of high-value patents to the economy). Low marginal
effective tax rates are in turn found to decrease the average patent quality (by
triggering new R&D investments with lower quality). This also implies that differ-
ent R&D tax instruments exert a very different impact on the average quality of
R&D projects undertaken in a country. While input-based measures like R&D tax
allowances and credits (that influence the marginal tax burden on R&D) exert a
negative impact on average project quality, low patent income taxes turn out to be
instrumental in raising R&D quality.
4.4.3 Welfare Consequences
Finally note that the welfare consequences of generous R&D tax credits/allowances
and low patent income tax rates are theoretically unclear. From an individual coun-
try’s perspective, granting special tax incentives may decrease national welfare if the
quantitative response of private sector R&D to the incentive is weak and the poli-
cies therefore only generate windfall gains to the corporate sector, while overall tax
revenues decline. The sign and size of the welfare consequences moreover critically
depend on the existence and structure of technological spillovers to other firms in
the economy.
The patent quality effects discussed in this study decisively affect the welfare as-
sessment of the policy instruments. Precisely, our analysis suggests that R&D tax
credits and allowances reduce the average project quality (by expanding marginal
R&D investments). Any positive welfare consequences of increases in R&D quan-
tity induced by generous R&D tax credits and allowances are thus counteracted by a
reduction in average project quality (i.e. lower profitability (and thus a lower contri-
bution to the country’s corporate tax base) and lower innovativeness (and thus less
spillovers on other firms in the economy)). In terms of low patent income tax rates,
the welfare assessment is positive from a national perspective as low patent income
taxes do not only expand R&D activity (as suggested by previous work) but also
trigger the inflow of R&D activity with above average quality. The picture looks less
optimistic from an international perspective though. Precisely, as countries compete
for internationally mobile R&D projects, projects gained by one country are lost by
90 Chapter 4. Corporate Taxation and the Quality of R&D
another. As governments do not account for the consequences of their policy choices
on other countries, patent income tax rates are set inefficiently low from a global
perspective. Accounting for the quality effects of low patent income taxes discussed
in this study further fuels this race-to-the-bottom.
4.5 Conclusion
In recent years, a large and growing empirical literature has shown that corporate
taxation negatively impacts on corporate investment behavior at the extensive and
intensive margin. Most existing papers, however, restrict their view on testing for
corporate tax effects on investment quantity. The welfare implications of corporate
taxation in turn critically depend on the effects of corporate taxation on investment
quality, e.g. the profitability and innovativeness of R&D activity (see Becker and
Riedel, 2012). The aim of this study was to empirically assess the effect of the
design of the corporate tax system on the quality of innovations resulting from
R&D activity.
The analysis uses data on patent applications to the EPO between 1995 and 2007
which is linked with firm level information. Proxying for a project’s earnings poten-
tial and innovativeness by patent quality measures constructed from information on
the patent’s family size, its number of forward citations and the number of industry
classes, we find that low tax rates on patent income tend to increase average patent
quality. The effect also turns out to be economically relevant. A decrease in the
patent income tax rate by 10 percentage points raises patent quality by around 1-
5%. Tax allowances and tax credits for R&D investment are in turn found to exert
a negative impact on observed project quality.
These results may have important implications for the design of tax instruments
related to innovation policy. In recent years, several governments in Europe signif-
icantly reduced their tax rates on patent income. Policy makers justified the tax
adjustment with the aim to attract innovative R&D activities. Our findings confirm
this notion and suggest that low patent income tax rates are indeed instrumental
in attracting R&D projects with an above average earnings potential and innova-
tiveness. Interestingly, an analogous effect does not exist for R&D tax allowances
and R&D tax credits as their deduction value is unrelated to project quality. Thus,
while both tax policy measures may help to attract and increase the size of R&D
projects (i.e. R&D quantity), only low patent income taxes are found to exert a
positive effect on project quality.
Chapter 5
Tax Effects on R&D Location
Decisions
5.1 Introduction
This study addresses the question how taxes influence R&D location decisions. The
reduction of trade barriers has led to an increase in international trade and cross-
border activities of firms. In an environment of competition among states for the
settlement of firms, firms can choose where to locate their business activities in a
cost minimizing way. Taxes play a non-negligible role in these decisions and a vast
strand of literature has investigated this issue (for a review of the literature see De
Mooij and Ederveen, 2006; Devereux and Maffini, 2007). R&D investments differ
from other investments in that they involve higher uncertainty and risk on the one
hand, but also in that they render higher economic rents if the project was a success,
on the other hand. These specialties of R&D investments may provide a different
incentive structure to firms and may trigger different reactions with respect to taxes.
Previous studies have focused on the high profit potential of R&D investments and
emphasized that this is a strong incentive to locate the output from R&D activities,
such as patents, trademarks and other intellectual property, to low-tax countries
(see among others Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith
et al., 2014). I, in turn, focus on the effect of taxes on the decision where real R&D
activity - the input side of R&D - is located and contribute to the existing literature
by presenting a more complete picture of both, the location decision of R&D input
and R&D output. Investigating the input side to R&D is equally important to
studying the output side, as it reflects where real R&D activity with all its positive
side effects, such as employment and technological spillovers, is located. As the
movement of intellectual property does not necessarily reflect the move of real R&D
activity (Clausing, 2010), it is important to closer examine how real R&D activity
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reacts to various tax regulations.
The analysis of this paper is twofold. In a first step, I examine whether taxes
can distort the location choice of firms with respect to their real R&D activity. In
a second step, I draw my attention to the location decision on where the applicant
and owner of the patent resides. To do so, I exploit information on worldwide
patent applications that reveals country information about where the patent inventor
resides and country information about where the owner of the patent resides. Patent
inventor information is used to measure where real R&D activity took place. To
analyze whether the location of real R&D activity is distorted by tax factors, I
estimate a conditional logit model where the dependent variable is location choice.
Furthermore, location choice is regressed on tax factors and several control variables.
On the other hand, I use patent owner information in a similar way to investigate
whether tax factors exert an impact on the location choice of the patent owner
country.
The results suggest that tax factors do impact on R&D location decisions, but
they exert different effects in different location choices. With regard to the inventor
country, taxes impact positively on location choice indicating that a country with a
higher tax rate is more likely to be chosen as an inventor location than a country
with a lower tax rate. This finding can be explained by the fact that deductible
costs are most valuable in high-tax countries. As during the phase of invention only
costs occur, the firm primarily benefits from deducting these costs against a high
tax rate. On the contrary, the effective tax burden does not significantly impact
on the location choice of a patent owner country. However, the exit tax rate of
a country negatively and statistically significantly impacts on the owner country
decision. Together these findings suggest that while the effective tax burden in
the owner country does not play a significant role for the firm, the firm anticipates
adverse tax effects from cross-border relocations of patents caused by an exit taxation
regime and thus, is less prone to locate a patent in a country with a high exit tax
rate.
Sensitivity checks reveal that patents of high quality react more sensitive to high
tax rates than patents of lower quality. While the findings for the inventor location
choice also hold for high-quality patents, the results of the owner location choice
suggest that high-quality patents are less likely to be owned in countries that trigger
a high tax burden for the firm. This finding confirms the notion that taxes negatively
distort the location choice for patents towards countries with lower tax burdens, if
patents are expected to yield high returns on investment (for previous evidence see
Ernst et al., 2014; Boehm et al., 2012).
The findings presented in this study compare to previous literature in that they
complement earlier findings with respect to the inventor country choice in R&D
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location decisions. So far, many studies have investigated the location choice of
the ownership of intellectual property rights. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) rely on
balance sheet data and document an above average amount of intellectual property
rights held in low-tax subsidiaries. Their results are evidence that R&D tax planning
takes place, but it is still unclear what kind of structures firms implement to lower
their overall tax burden. According to Clausing (2010) the literature leaves open to
what extent geographical relocations of intellectual property rights reflect the move
of real R&D activity. Thus, the findings of Dischinger and Riedel (2011) can be
explained either by a move of intellectual property rights or a move of real R&D
activity cross-border to low-tax locations. The answer to this question is of high
economic relevance, because different welfare effects may be caused by the move of
intellectual property rights only or the move of real R&D activity as a whole. In
this context, Bloom and Griffith (2001) document first evidence for ’footloose’ R&D.
They investigate the amount of research activity that is conducted in the UK and
focus on who finances the R&D activity. They find that there is a trend towards an
increase in private R&D that is conducted by a foreign owned firm and/or financed
from abroad but takes place within the UK. Furthermore, they find evidence that this
internationalization of R&D activity is partly motivated by tax reasons. Specifically,
they show that domestic R&D responds not only to the domestic but also to the
foreign user cost of R&D, which incorporates also tax aspects like tax allowances
and tax credits. In the same direction, Wilson (2009a) and Paff (2005) report a tax
induced shift of existing R&D activities to tax favorable jurisdictions.
Following up on these studies, Ernst and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel
(2012) presented evidence on tax planning considerations in the context of R&D
investments using patent data in order to proxy for R&D. Both studies find that
patent applications negatively respond to taxes indicating that a low corporate tax
rate attracts firms to own intellectual property rights and apply for patent protection
in that country. Both Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) and Ernst and Spengel (2011)
estimate a negative binomial model by counting the number of patent applications
in a country and regressing them on the statutory tax rate and controls. They
report a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate of the corporate
statutory tax rate, suggesting that the likelihood for patent applications decreases in
the corporate tax rate. The negative binomial model, which is a poisson model with
a different assumption about the error term, is closely related to the conditional logit
model. In fact, the more sophisticated conditional logit model results in a poisson
model if the regressors are not alternative-specific. Nevertheless, the two models
differ in their basic assumptions such that Schmidheiny and Bruelhart (2009) argue
that the coefficient estimates from the conditional logit model and the poisson model
denote the boundaries with regard to location choice models in applied research. In
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this sense, this study presents evidence that, in terms of the size of the coefficient, is
at the lower bound on the range of coefficient estimates resulting from the poisson
model, the nested logit and the conditional logit model.
Two more recent studies also present evidence on the location choice of the patent
applicant based on conditional logit estimations (Boehm et al., 2012; Griffith et al.,
2014). Boehm et al. (2012) concentrate their analysis on patents that observe a geo-
graphical split between the country where the patent was invented and the country
where the patent applicant resides and the patent is owned. The authors report that
these kinds of patents make up only 8% of all patents they observe in the universe of
patent applications to the EPO. However, they suspect tax planning activities be-
hind these structures and indeed find statistically significant evidence that low-tax
countries attract ownership of foreign invented patents. The most closely related
study by Griffith et al. (2014) similarly examines the location choice for patent own-
ership, though in a mixed logit framework allowing for random coefficient estimates
(Train, 2009). They find that lower tax rates are likely to exert significant effects
on the location of patent ownership.
This study extends the existing literature by investigating the location choice for
real R&D activity exploiting patent data. So far, most studies have concentrated on
the location of patent ownership, because that is also the location where the profits
stemming from intellectual property are subject to tax. Hence, tax planning activ-
ities may be detectable where profits accrue. For example, Altshuler and Grubert
(2006) emphasized that intangible assets play an important role in allowing firms to
structure their activities in a tax favorable manner. As intangible assets often do not
have a market equivalent, there is no possibility to establish a transfer price that is
at arm’s length according to comparable market prizes. This opens up room to ma-
neuver and to set a transfer price that is beneficial to the multinational’s overall tax
position (for more detailed evidence on this topic see Klassen et al., 2013). Indirect
evidence has been provided by Grubert and Mutti (1999) and Hines (1994) in that
they document that firms in low-tax locations show a relatively high profitability.
Nevertheless, from a welfare perspective it is also of interest whether the location
where innovative activity takes place is distorted by the tax system. As welfare con-
sequences from R&D are not only tax revenues from profitable investment projects,
but also technological spillovers and positive effects on employment, it is crucial to
understand the tax effects on innovative behavior of firms. Specifically, it is not fully
evident from the literature to what extent taxes impact on the location choice of
firms regarding their real R&D activities. This gap in the existing literature should
be addressed by this study. Bloom et al. (2002) have addressed the question whether
the size of R&D investments is affected by taxes and find that R&D tax incentives
have the potential to raise the investment volume of firms in R&D. Regarding, how-
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ever, the question of location choice only few evidence exists so far. Most closely
related is a study by Hines and Jaffe (2001) for the US. The authors document
that taxes do impact on the location where innovative activity takes place within
US multinational enterprises. They focus, however, on the specific impact of tax
incentives for R&D in the US and abroad and calculate a measure that captures the
tax deductibility of R&D expenses. Hines and Jaffe (2001) find that R&D expense
deductibility has a positive effect on location choice for innovative activity.
The research question of this study is whether adverse tax regulations on the profit
from an R&D investment impact on the location choice on where the real activity
of the R&D investment should be carried out. Theory claims that the presence of
tax haven countries and multinational engagement in profit shifting activities might
actually increase the welfare of well-developed high-tax countries as the possibility
to relocate income refrains firms from relocating the real activity itself (Hong and
Smart, 2010). I hypothesize that firms anticipate tax regulations that hit the profits
that accrue from an investment already at an earlier stage in the decision-making
process. Thus, I investigate the effect of the corporate tax rate that is imposed on
patent income on the location of innovative activity. Furthermore, the analysis of
the statutory corporate tax rate is extended by incorporating the mark-up into the
analysis. The mark-up - as some kind of anti-avoidance mechanism - determines how
much profit remains in the country where the real activity takes place in the case
of cross-border structures. Following previous studies, I investigate the choice of a
patent ownership location and extend the analysis by the exit tax rate, which is also
an anti-avoidance regulation that aims at securing a jurisdiction’s taxing rights. In
this sense, the study also adds to previous literature on anti-avoidance tax regimes
(Lohse and Riedel, 2013; Buettner et al., 2014).
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the
tax considerations of multinational enterprises regarding investments in R&D in
more detail and summarizes the tax factors that are incorporated in the empirical
analysis of this study. Section 5.3 presents the data I use to estimate the empirical
model that is closer described in Section 5.4. The results from the analysis are
presented in Section 5.5, while Section 5.6 is attributed to a robustness check on the
issue of high-quality patents. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Tax Considerations of R&D Intensive Firms
This section summarizes tax aspects that are important for location decisions of
R&D investments from the point of view of a multinational enterprise. For this
purpose, I consider a company that has subsidiaries in several countries and has
to decide where to locate a new R&D investment. A theoretical model of this
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decision problem is introduced by Dischinger and Riedel (2011). According to their
model, the location decision of a new R&D investment can be disentangled into two
separate decisions: the decision on the location of real R&D activity and the decision
on the location of profits stemming from that activity.1 Consequently, the firm can
either locate both real activity and profits in the same country or geographically
separate the locations of real activity and profits. For the purposes of my analysis,
I consider both decisions of the firm. On the first stage, the firm may decide on the
country where it wants to conduct its R&D activity. Subsequently, it decides where
the patent should be owned and will be subject to tax. The problem is solved by
backward induction. Thus, the firm will first consider its payoffs in the second stage
and take the result as given when it decides on the first stage.
Broadly speaking, the firm can structure its R&D activity in two different ways.
First, the firm can do research in the country where it is established and let any
arising intellectual property remain in the same country. This concept is known as
’traditional R&D’. Second, it could engage in a ’contract R&D’ agreement. In this
case, the firm contracts out the research activity to an affiliated company in a country
abroad and pays a remuneration for the costs that occur at the research company.
Effectively, contract R&D leads to a geographical separation of patent inventor and
ownership location.2 The fee paid as remuneration is commonly based on the costs
incurred by the R&D company and usually entails a mark-up at arm’s length. The
inventor is therefore located at the affiliated research company abroad, while any
arising intellectual property rights will be located at the firm who contracted out
the research.3 This is, because the ownership of intellectual property belongs to the
financer who bears all risks and chances from the investment.
1According to Dischinger and Riedel (2011), a firm who decides to relocate the patent away from
where it has been created has to explicitly transfer the patent after its creation. That is, the firm in
a first stage decides where it creates the intangible assets. After its creation, the firm observes the
value of the patent and may then decide to relocate it to another jurisdiction. Moreover, in a third
stage the firm also decides on the transfer price that is charged for the relocation of the intangible
asset. In their paper, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) focus on the decision on the location of patent
ownership and on the transfer price. On the contrary, I assume that the firm may anticipate the
value of the patent and thus, decide on the separation of inventor and patent owner country at an
earlier stage. In the case the firm wants to invent the patent at a different location than where it
owns the patent, the firm will engage in a contract R&D agreement. A later transfer of the patent
after it has been applied for patent protection is not addressed in this study.
2Alternatively, the firm could transfer the arising intellectual property to an affiliated company
abroad after it has been created. This would also lead to a geographical separation of IP invention
and ownership, but only after IP already arose. The cross-border transfer may, however, cause the
imposition of an exit tax that might partly or on the whole set off any tax savings from the transfer.
3A subcase of contract R&D is to set up a pool financing agreement (Jacobs et al., 2011). This
involves several researching companies who jointly participate in the financing and conducting of
the research. Consequently, all participants will also jointly own the arising intellectual property
stemming from the investment. Alternatively, all participants of the research pool can contract out
the research activity to a separate R&D company, who will be remunerated similarly to the contract
R&D agreement described above (Russo, 2007).
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From a tax planning point of view, the main questions are where costs are de-
ducted and profits are taxed. In the case of a traditional R&D investment, costs
are deducted in the same jurisdiction where profits later arise. Similarly, in the case
of a contract R&D agreement the costs are deductible in the hands of the financing
company as a fee paid to the research company. As the IP also arises in the hands
of the financing company, the profits are liable to taxation in the same country.
The major difference between the two concepts is a mark-up paid to the research
company, which constitutes a small profit liable to taxation in the jurisdiction of the
research company. The mark-up has to be at arm’s length and is commonly based
on the application of some kind of cost-plus method (Russo, 2007). The Guidance of
the OECD regarding transfer pricing aspects of intangibles (OECD, 2014) set forth
the determination of the mark-up at arm’s length and establish that ’the analysis of
this issue requires an assessment of (i) the obligations and rights implied by the legal
registrations and agreements between the parties, (ii) the functions performed, the
assets used, and the risks assumed by the parties, (iii) the intangible value anticipated
to be created [...], and (iv) the compensation provided for the functions performed
[...] ’. They go on to clarify that ’one relatively clear case is where a [...](research
company) acts merely as an agent, being reimbursed for its [...](research) expen-
ditures and being directed and controlled in its activities by the owner of the [...]
intangibles. In that case, the [...](research company) ordinarily would be entitled to
compensation appropriate to its agency activities alone. It would not bear or control
the risks associated with the further development of the [...] intangibles, and would
therefore not be entitled to additional remuneration in that regard.’4 As a result,
the size of the mark-up depends on the circumstances of the case, but also on the
strictness of a jurisdiction regarding the interpretation and application of the OECD
Guidance.
Ideally, the costs incurred by an R&D investment are deductible against a high
tax rate, while the profits are taxed at a low rate. This cannot be achieved in fact,
because countries employ anti-avoidance legislation that counter such structures.
In the case of traditional R&D, an ideal structure would be to conduct R&D in a
high-tax country, where costs would be deductible against the high tax rate, and
later transfer the IP to a low-tax country, where profits will ultimately be subject to
tax. However, any tax savings are set off by an efficient exit taxation regime in the
country where the research was conducted. The exit tax is regularly imposed upon
the transfer of an asset to a foreign jurisdiction. The mere transfer cross-border is
4OECD (2014), p.54, para.6.74. The words in brackets were added by the author. The original
case applies to a marketing company. However, para. 6.76 states that ’the principles set out in
the foregoing paragraphs also apply in situations involving the performance of research and develop-
ment functions by a member of an MNE group under a contractual arrangement with an associated
enterprise that is the legal owner of any resulting intangibles.’
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deemed to be an alienation of the asset such that all hidden reserves of the asset
are subject to taxation in the high-tax country. An exit taxation regime works
efficiently, if the deemed value equals the discounted future cash flows and thus,
any tax saving will be compensated for by the exit taxation upon the cross-border
transfer.
In the case of contract R&D, the geographical split of inventor and owner does
not mean that costs can be deducted against a high tax rate in the one country and
profits are liable to a low tax rate in the other country. However, the firm has an
incentive to pay a low mark-up in the inventor country, if the inventor country is a
high-tax jurisdiction. Vice versa, the firm aims to pay a high mark-up in the inventor
country, if the inventor country is a low-tax country. In this regard, the mark-up
determines how much profit is split from the corresponding costs and subject to a
different tax rate. Nevertheless, one has to mention that the determination of the
mark-up is not incumbent upon the taxpayer, but rather upon the tax authorities
of the involved jurisdictions. Consequently, the firm can choose between deducting
the research expenses against a high tax rate and accepting that also profits will be
subject to that high tax rate or benefiting from a low tax rate on profits while the
expenses are deductible only against that low tax rate. Both alternatives can be
achieved via traditional R&D and contract R&D.
In the analysis to come, I investigate both the inventor country and the owner
country decision. Summing up the tax factors that impact on these decisions, I
consider two countries, the inventor country i and the owner country o and a multi-
national enterprise, the firm, that has to decide upon where to allocate its research
activity (the inventor country) and where to finance this activity from (the owner
country). Further, I denote the statutory tax rate τ , the mark-up applied in an
inventor country mi and the exit tax rate applied in an owner country eo. In a first
step, I examine the choice of an inventor country by taking the owner country as
given. In the case the firm decides for traditional R&D, the owner country equals
the inventor country and the relevant tax rate payable on the profits from the R&D
activity will be the statutory tax rate of the owner country. On the contrary, if the
firm sets up a contract R&D agreement, taxes are to be paid in both the inventor and
the owner country. The mark-up determines how much of the profit will be taxed
in the inventor country. The full costs including the mark-up are fully deductible
in the owner country and any exceeding profits will be subject to tax in the owner
country. Formally, the effective tax payable in the inventor country Ti is
Ti =
(
mi
p
)
× τi (5.1)
where p denotes the profit margin earned on the whole R&D investment by the
5.2. Tax Considerations of R&D Intensive Firms 99
firm and τi the statutory tax rate in the inventor country. Correspondingly, the
remaining profit is taxed in the country, where the intellectual property is owned.
Formally, the definition of the effective tax payable in the owner country reads
To =
(
1− mi
p
)
× τo (5.2)
where τo is the statutory tax rate in the owner country. When a firm chooses the
inventor country, it decides whether the inventor country is the same country as the
owner country and thus, whether it conducts its R&D in the traditional form or
whether it contracts out R&D activity to any other country. Precisely, the crucial
tax rate in this choice is a composite tax rate Tc, which is formally defined as
Tc =
{
τo = τi if traditional R&D is chosen(
mi
p
)× τi + (1− mip )× τo if contract R&D is chosen (5.3)
where p is unknown. In order to calculate Tc, an assumption about the size of p
has to be made. It is assumed that p is 20% for all investments (Spengel et al.,
2012a).5 The same considerations apply to the choice of an owner country. On
the second stage a firm learns about the outcome of the decision on the first stage,
i.e. where it is conducting its R&D activity. Thus, a firm will choose the location
of an owner country and will decide between traditional and contract R&D, where
the composite tax rate defined in equation (5.3) is determining. After the firm has
decided on inventor and owner country, it could still move the resulting IP to a
low-tax country by accepting the imposition of an exit tax eo upon the cross-border
transfer of the asset. The profit arising from that IP would still be fully taxed in
the owner country - provided that the tax authority can determine the true value
of the asset - but instead of τo the exit tax rate eo would be levied. One drawback
of the data is that I do not observe any transfers of patents away from the owner
country once the owner has applied for patent protection. However, I argue that
the exit tax eo may already have an impact on the decision of the owner country,
as firms might anticipate that IP can only be transferred to any other country by
5I follow previous work on the calculation of effective tax rates that also assumes a constant rate
of return of 20%. In a related analysis for the calculation of effective tax rates at the industry level,
Spengel et al. (2012b) also apply different return rates for different industries, though merely in a
sensitivity analysis. A vast strand of literature addresses the determination of the returns to R&D
and has been surveyed by Hall et al. (2010). This literature finds rates of returns that strongly vary
between less than 5% to rates above 100% (note the distinction between social and private rates
of returns). As there are many different approaches to determine the returns to R&D, I decided
to follow a fixed rate of return throughout my analysis. Assuming a rate of return of 20% seems
reasonable as Hall et al. (2010) argue that the private returns to R&D will range between 10% and
30% (see also Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1). Moreover, in a sensitivity analysis that is not presented
in this paper I find that the results are robust towards assuming alternative rates of return of 5%,
10% and 15%.
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being charged an exit tax in the owner country.
In the following, the various tax factors discussed above will be empirically as-
sessed in the inventor and the owner country decision of R&D intensive multina-
tional enterprises. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one empirical study
by Hines and Jaffe (2001) that investigates the location choice for real R&D activity
with respect to tax effects. Hines and Jaffe (2001), however, focus on the effects of
investment incentives for R&D. The expected effects of profit taxes on the inven-
tor country choice are therefore a priori ambiguous. However, as already sketched
above, two arguments will be central to firms: the argument of the deductibility
of expenses incurred with the R&D investment - as emphasized by Hines and Jaffe
(2001) - and the argument of profit taxation regarding profits stemming from in-
tellectual property - as emphasized by Griffith et al. (2014) among others. As the
beneficial treatment of one aspect comes at the cost of a disadvantage regarding
the other aspect, it is unclear which argument weighs stronger on average. With
respect to the location decision about an owner country, prior literature has shown
that the statutory tax rate exerts a negative effect (Ernst and Spengel, 2011) as
well as the tax rate differential among affiliated companies (Karkinsky and Riedel,
2012). Similarly, Griffith et al. (2014) find that recently introduced preferential tax
regimes for intellectual property attract the ownership of patents. In line with these
findings, I expect that the statutory tax rate negatively impacts on the location
decision of patent ownership. The newly introduced composite tax rate Tc is a more
precise measure of the tax burden payable on the R&D investment and thus, might
exert a similar effect as the statutory tax rate. On the other hand, one could follow
the same line of argumentation as in the inventor country decision that the firm
has one good reason in favor of a low-tax country and one good reason in favor
of a high-tax country. Hence, it would be unclear whether the tax rate exerts a
negative or a positive effect on the owner country decision. With respect to the exit
tax rate eo I already argued that a negative effect is expected. The exit tax rate
is an anti-tax avoidance measure that harms firms in their free movement of assets
cross-border. Consequently, firms might anticipate that once patent ownership is
located in a country with a high exit tax rate future profits stemming from that
patent will be taxable at the high rate upon the cross-border transfer of the patent.
Furthermore, the interaction effects of the exit tax rate and the statutory and the
composite tax rate are investigated.
5.3 Data
To analyze the effect of the corporate tax system on the location of real R&D
activity as well as the location of patent ownership I use a comprehensive dataset
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on worldwide patent applications. This data contains information on the inventor
country of patents, which I use to measure real R&D activity, and information about
the location of the patent applicant, which I use to measure patent ownership. I
augment this data with tax rate information, data on firm characteristics of the
patent owner and country controls.
5.3.1 Patent and Firm Data
I collect information on worldwide patent applications at national patent offices from
the Orbis Bureau van Dijk database over a time span of 24 years (1990-2013), which
is linked to micro data about the patent applicant. For each patent I observe the
country where the patent was invented and the country where its applicant resides
and is liable to taxes. From a legal perspective, the person who bears all risks and
chances from an investment in R&D, i.e. the person who finances an R&D invest-
ment, is allowed to apply for patent protection at a patent office. This person is
the legal owner of the patent (Muir et al., 1999). For tax purposes, most countries
follow the concept of beneficial ownership to identify the economic owner relevant
for tax purposes. Accordingly, legal and economic ownership may sometimes be
separated. However, since economic ownership is unobservable to the econometri-
cian, I use the legal ownership as a proxy in the analyses to come. Information on
the firm structure, also contained in Orbis, allows us to identify the multinational
enterprise (global ultimate owner) to which the patent applicant belongs. This in-
formation is crucial, because the parent company ultimately decides which affiliate
carries out R&D (inventor) and which one finances the R&D project and applies
for patent protection (owner and patent applicant). Hence, I am able to control for
firm characteristics of the decision maker, the parent company.
I first identified all patent families within the data and removed all duplicates
in order to avoid any double counting of inventions.6 Ultimately, each observation
is a patent which represents an invention. I remain with a sample of 1,187,258
patents that belong to 24,123 parent companies. The choice set of potential location
countries comprises 42 countries, for which I collected detailed tax information. Each
of these can be chosen by the parent company as a location for R&D activity and as
location for patent ownership.7 Moreover, a patent can have multiple applicants and
6Secondary filings can be identified if they carry a priority number. The priority number equals
the application number of the first filing. The applicant has the possibility to extend patent pro-
tection to other countries by using the priority date to determine the novelty of the invention. For
further reference see OECD (2009).
7Note that the country where the applicant resides may not be confused with the country where
patent protection is sought. Patent protection can be sought in various countries, but only one
country is the country where the owner of the patent resides and is liable for taxes.
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multiple inventors. With respect to both applicants and inventors, I only use the
first one named in the application and follow previous studies in doing so (Karkinsky
and Riedel, 2012; Boehm et al., 2012; Ernst and Spengel, 2011; Ernst et al., 2014;
Hines and Jaffe, 2001).8
The dataset allows to observe patents, whose inventor country equals its owner
country, and patents, where the inventor is geographically split from the owner. The
first case constitutes the traditional form of conducting R&D, while the geographical
split of inventor and owner country is interpreted as contract R&D.9 The vast major-
ity of patents was invented following the concept of traditional R&D. Only in 10.6%
of all cases contract R&D was chosen.10 What remains unobservable in the sample
are any cross-border transfers of patents that would trigger the application of an
exit tax. The patent owner that I observe is the patent applicant, who financed the
R&D investment, but after the application the patent could have possibly changed
its owner several times. However, the patent is only observed once in time, at the
date of application.
Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of the sample. The top applicant and inven-
tor countries are the US, Germany and Japan. Moreover, the table provides a break-
down of patents to inventor and owner country. For example, in Germany only 6% of
German-owned patents were invented abroad and 5.2% of German-invented patents
are owned abroad.11 On the other hand, in France 10.5% of France-owned patents
are foreign-invented, but even 35.8% of France-invented patents are owned abroad.
This highlights that in a high-tax country, like France, home-invented patents are
taxed in some foreign country. However, in the US, which is another high-tax coun-
try, this descriptive statistic does not fulfill the hypothesis. In the US, 11.4% of
US-owned patents are foreign invented and only 5.6% of US-invented patents are
owned abroad. Thus, in the case of the US, the percentage of foreign-invented
patents that are owned and taxed in the US is higher than the percentage of patents
that are home-invented but taxed abroad. In contrast, in lower tax countries like
Ireland or The Netherlands, the percentage of patents that were invented abroad
8The application procedure for a patent requires to name a main applicant, the first one, in the
case of multiple applicants. With respect to multiple inventors, Hines and Jaffe (2001) already argue
that in over 90% of all patents the other inventors reside in the same country as the first inventor
and hence, no added value is contained in using this additional information. This also holds true
for my sample, where 93% of patents with multiple inventors have inventors of one country only.
9In this interpretation I follow previous studies (see for example Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012;
Boehm et al., 2012).
10This compares well to EPO data analyzed by Boehm et al. (2012), who identify 8% of geo-
graphically split patents.
11Foreign-invented and home-owned patents for Germany are calculated as (391,683 -
368,047)/391,683 = 6%. Foreign-owned and home-invented patents are calculated as (388,231 -
368,047)/388,231 = 5.2%.
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but then are owned in the low-tax country is much higher than in high-tax coun-
tries. In Ireland, for example, 57% of Irish-owned patents were invented abroad,
while in The Netherlands 28.6% of Dutch-owned patents were invented in a foreign
country. These countries also observe a higher percentage of home-invented and
foreign-owned patents though (48.8% in Ireland, 25% in The Netherlands), which
means that they observe a higher degree of internationalization in general.
5.3.2 Corporate Taxation
To measure the relevant corporate tax regulations applying to the R&D investment
decision, I cooperated with the internationally operating tax consultancy PwC in
collecting the data.12 I designed a questionnaire that was sent to 50 PwC coun-
try offices and received 42 responses. The questionnaire was filled out by a tax
practitioner in the respective country office and sent back to PwC Frankfurt, who
coordinated the survey. By this means, I was able to collect relevant tax information
about the regulations that apply to cross-border R&D investments in 42 countries.
The questionnaire was structured in two parts that addressed R&D relevant tax
aspects. The first part addressed contract R&D while Part II addressed tax conse-
quences of a transfer of an intangible asset cross-border. In Part I, I sketched the
scenario of a contract R&D agreement to make sure that all respondents know the
case I refer to in the questions. Specifically, I have a multinational enterprise in mind
with an R&D performing company in country A. The group’s IP company located
in country B enters into a contract R&D arrangement, whereby the R&D company
performs R&D activities on behalf of the IP company. the IP company, in turn, will
legally own the IP rights developed and pays an arm’s length compensation to the
R&D company. The respondents were then asked to answer all questions from the
perspective of country A, the R&D company’s country. First, I asked whether the
concept of contract R&D is generally accepted in their jurisdiction. All countries
answered that contract R&D is always accepted (40.5%) or is accepted given certain
requirements are met (59.5%). There is no country in the sample, where contract
R&D is not accepted at all. Furthermore, I went on to ask for the mark-up that is
part of a fee paid by a firm contracting out its research activities to a foreign affil-
iate. I first asked, whether ’a cost-plus method will apply in determining the arm’s
length compensation’ for a contract agreement. 22% answered ’Yes, always’ and the
majority of about 78% said that ’It depends, but yes under certain conditions’. Also,
there is no country where the cost-plus method never applies to a contract R&D
agreement. In a follow-up question I asked for the average mark-up applied by a
jurisdiction in the years from 1990 to 2013. Precisely, tax practitioners were asked
12Especially, I want to thank Manuel Imhof from PwC Frankfurt for his great support.
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Table 5.3: Country Coverage
Country mark-up exit tax Country mark-up exit tax
Austria X 2005-2013 Latvia - 2013
Belgium X X Lithuania - X
Brazil X X Malta - X
Bulgaria X X Netherlands - -
Canada - X New Zealand X X
Chile - X Poland - 2013
China X X Portugal - X
Cyprus X X Romania - X
Czech Republic X X Russia - X
Denkmark - X Singapore - -
Egypt X X Slovakia 2004-2013 2004-2013
Estonia X X South Africa 2001-2013 2001-2013
France X X Spain X X
Germany X 1990-2010 Sweden 2013 2008-2013
Hong Kong - X Switzerland - -
Hungary - - Taiwan - -
India - X Thailand - -
Ireland - X Turkey - 2004-2013
Italy - X Ukraine X X
Japan - X United States X -
Korea X X Venezuela - 2008-2013
Total 19 35
Notes: This table provides an overview of the countries for which I have information about their
average mark-up and their exit tax rate. The information has been collected within a survey in
collaboration with PwC. Xindicates full coverage for the period from 1990 to 2013.
’What is the most common mark-up accepted by the tax authority of your jurisdic-
tion? Please indicate the most common mark-up m if the taxpayer has real costs of
100 so that revenues are taken to be 100 + m.’ Column 1 in Table 5.3 depicts which
countries answered to this question.
Column 2 of Table 5.3 presents the countries for which I collected data about their
exit tax rate. Similarly to the section on contract R&D, I first sketched the case to
establish a common ground of understanding in Part II. I imagine a multinational
enterprise with an IP company located in country A. This IP company transfers an
intangible to a foreign affiliate of the same multinational enterprise that is located
in country B. Again, tax practitioners were asked to fill out the questions from
the perspective of country A. I asked them, whether the cross-border transfer of
the legal and/or beneficial ownership of a patent constitutes a taxable event in
their jurisdiction. 95.2% answered with ’Yes’, while only two countries negated the
question. Hong Kong stated that ’In Hong Kong, generally capital gains are not
taxable under profits tax. However, particular facts and circumstances should be
considered for each case and if the transfers are considered trading profits, it will
be taxable under profits tax ’. Hence, the cross-border transfer out of Hong Kong
may be subject to tax in certain cases only. On the other hand, in Singapore, ’the
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transfer of intangible assets, if considered to be a capital asset, is not taxable in
Singapore as it does not tax capital gains. However, post IP transfer transactions
need to be documented appropriately ’. Regarding the amount of tax imposed on
such a transfer, I went on to ask: ’If the transfer of the IP constitutes a taxable
event, what will be the tax imposed? Please indicate the tax t that is imposed if the
transferred asset had a value of 100.’ All other questions are descriptive in nature
and are therefore not used in the empirical analysis.
With respect to the typical caveats in survey research (see Section 3), I believe
that they are of minor relevance in my case. As I do not survey on the level of
the observational unit (which is the patent in this study) but on the aggregate level
of a country, I compare the number of responses to the number of countries that
have been investigated in related studies that use similar estimation methods. For
example, Griffith et al. (2014) analyze 14 countries, Buettner and Ruf (2007) analyze
18 countries, Feld et al. (2013) compare 20 countries and Barrios et al. (2012) 33
countries. Although the response rate is high and 42 countries (84%) sent back the
questionnaire, not all questions were answered properly. Therefore, with respect
to the mark-up variable I only have information about 19 countries, while with
respect to the exit tax rate I am able to include 35 countries in the estimations.
Moreover, I do not fear any measurement error from inappropriate answers, because
I conducted the survey only among tax experts. In this respect, I am convinced
that I even receive the best possible data as I rely on the expert knowledge from
practitioners.
5.3.3 Control Variables
To allow for country- and firm-specific heterogeneity, I include several control vari-
ables into the regression framework. First, I control for several country characteris-
tics that likely have an impact on the decision on where to conduct R&D activities
or to hold intellectual property rights. I include market size as measured by GDP,
since it has been shown that it significantly impacts on location choice (Boehm et al.,
2012; Griffith et al., 2014). In line with prior literature, I expect that market size
exerts a positive effect on the probability that a country is chosen as investment
location. Next, I control for the wage level in a country by additionally including
GDP per capita. This variable should capture the costs of the labor force in a coun-
try, which is especially relevant for R&D investments as these are typically labor
intensive. However, the effect of the wage level on the probability of location is a
priori ambiguous, as has been shown in prior literature (Kimino et al., 2007). On
the one hand, higher wages might signal high skilled workers, which may be crucial
for the success of an R&D project. On the other hand, lower wages provide a cost
advantage to the firm. Another factor that is important in the location decision of
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R&D investments is the technological innovativeness of a country, which I measure
as the number of researchers proportional to the population. I expect that the higher
technological development of a country is positively associated with probability of
location choice. Last, I control for the country’s legal environment which is cap-
tured by an index known as the rule of law provided by the World Justice Project.
This factor contains nine dimensions which are constraints on government powers,
absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security,
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice and informal justice. Rule of
law is expected to exert a positive effect on the probability of location.
In addition, I control for two firm-specific characteristics. First, I include the
bilateral variable distance between the potential location and the country where the
decision maker, the MNE, resides. The distance is calculated between the most
populated cities of the respective countries and is measured in thousand kilometers.
It has been shown that distance has an impact on location choice of FDI (Shatz,
2010). I argue, that the closeness of an R&D location to the headquarter company
could make a location more attractive, because of lower costs of knowledge transfer.
Second, I include a variable that captures whether the MNE is already present in
the potential country for a new R&D investment. The historical presence of the
MNE might have some agglomeration effect and attract further investments in that
country, as has been established by previous literature on agglomeration economies
(Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Head et al., 1995). Hence, I control for the one-year
lag of tangible assets that are attributed to the MNE in the respective location
and expect a positive effect on the probability of location. In order to calculate
this figure, I extract information from the Orbis company account’s database and
data about the ownership structure of the MNE. This allows me to identify all
subsidiaries of the MNE. For my purposes I only consider subsidiaries where the
MNE’s interest exceeds the threshold of 50%. Next, I collect information from the
unconsolidated company accounts from each subsidiary about its reported tangible
assets. Ultimately, I aggregate the one-year lagged tangible assets figure across all
subsidiaries belonging to the same MNE in a respective country.
Table 5.4 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the
empirical analysis. Panel B documents Pearson correlation coefficients on tax, lo-
cation and location-specific firm factors. The statutory tax rate and the composite
tax rate are positively correlated, which is not surprising due to the definition of the
composite tax rate. Also the statutory tax rate is positively correlated with the exit
tax rate. This is, because in most countries the tax rate upon the hidden reserves
of the transferred asset is just the statutory tax rate itself, because the income is
deemed to be ordinary business income. In a few countries, though, a lower tax rate
than the statutory tax rate is levied, for example the capital gains tax rate or a simi-
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lar type of taxation (Kroppen and Silva, 2011). Furthermore, the statutory tax rate
is positively associated with market size and the wage level, indicating that bigger
economies and economies with a higher wage level tend to levy higher corporate tax
rates. On the other hand, technological innovativeness is slightly negatively asso-
ciated with the statutory tax rate. This suggests that economies with a relatively
high number of researchers are not necessarily high-tax countries. The composite
tax rate reveals similar correlations as the statutory tax rate. On the contrary, the
exit tax rate is only positively correlated with market size, but negatively associated
with wage level and technological innovativeness.
5.4 Empirical Model
Following previous literature (Boehm et al., 2012; Griffith et al., 2014) I analyze the
location choice of a multinational enterprise with respect to its R&D investment in a
conditional logit model framework introduced by McFadden (1974, 1976). I assume
that the firm plans to invest in R&D to generate a patent and earn an economic
rent on this patent. Therefore, it has to decide in which country it will locate real
R&D activity and the ownership of the patent. Both, the decision where to locate
real R&D activity and second, the decision where to legally own the patent are
determined partly by tax factors and also by other factors like the economic and
political landscape in the respective country or special attributes of the firm relating
to that country. Some of these factors are observable, others may be unobservable
to the econometrician.
The empirical model assumes that the multinational firm f realizes a payoff from
locating the real R&D activity (the legal ownership, respectively) of patent p in
country i which is given by
pipit = α
>Tit + β>Tpit + γ>Xit + δ>Xfit + pit (5.4)
where T is the vector of tax factors, X the vector of observable country- and firm-
specific characteristics and subscript t indicates the time period. While the statutory
tax rate, the mark-up and the exit tax rate are country-specific variables, the com-
posite tax rate as well as the effective tax rate in the inventor country and the effec-
tive tax rate in the owner country vary across both, countries and patents. Similarly,
the vector of control variables X contains variables that vary across countries only
and variables that vary across countries and firms. Unobservable country-specific
effects are controlled for by the inclusion of country dummy variables. Consequently,
the firm aims to maximize its payoff function and therefore chooses one location over
the other if
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pipi∗t > pipit ∀ i∗ 6= i. (5.5)
The probability that location i∗ is the one chosen from all alternatives is given by
Pr(pipi∗t > pipit | T1t, Tp1t, X1t, Xf1t) =
=
exp(α>Tit + β>Tpit + γ>Xit + δ>Xfit)∑N
n=1 exp(α
>Tnt + β>Tpnt + γ>Xnt + δ>Xfnt)
∀ i ∈ (1, ..., N).
(5.6)
In the following, the parameters α, β, γ and δ will be estimated.
5.5 Results
This section presents results from regressions of a binary choice variable on factors
influencing the decision among the alternatives. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable indicating the alternative that has been chosen from the choice set. The
observational unit is a patent that may be invented and owned in 42 potential
countries.
In a first step I examine the decision where to locate real R&D activity, the results
of which are presented in Table 5.5. In Specification (1) I regress location choice
on the statutory tax rate in the inventor country and control variables. The coeffi-
cient estimate is not significant, indicating that taxes are of minor or no relevance
in the decision on an inventor country. In a next step, I investigate the impact of
the composite tax rate variable, as introduced in Equation (5.3), see Specification
(2). The composite tax rate variable measures the effective tax burden that will be
payable by the multinational firm upon the profits stemming from the investment
in R&D. In contrast to regressing location choice merely on the statutory tax rate,
the composite tax rate better represents the trade-off a firm faces in this decision.
Surprisingly, the composite tax rate exerts a positive effect on location choice, statis-
tically significant at 1%. The positive coefficient estimate indicates that an increase
in the composite tax rate in one country leads to an increase in the probability that
this country is chosen and a decrease in the probability that any other country will
be chosen. The average marginal effect for Germany, for example, is 0.003385 or
0.002480 for the US.13 This means that an increase in the tax rate in Germany (US)
that causes an increase in the composite tax rate by 1% increases the probability
that Germany (the US) is chosen as an inventor country by 0.003385 (0.002480), for
13I calculate the average marginal effect as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
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a fictional observation with all control variables set to sample mean. On the first
glance, this result is surprising, because it suggests that the firm chooses an inventor
country that is associated with a higher tax burden over an inventor country with
a lower one. However, the investment in R&D activity comes along with high costs
and these are most valuable if they can be deducted against a high tax rate.
I, therefore, closer investigate this argument in Specifications (3) to (6). In Speci-
fication (3) I regress location choice on the statutory tax rate of the inventor country
and the mark-up separately. While the statutory tax rate now exerts a significantly
negative effect on location choice, the coefficient estimate on mark-up is significantly
positive. The mark-up determines the tax base that remains taxable in the inventor
country in case the firm chooses to engage in contract R&D. The positive estimate
on mark-up indicates that the firm prefers to invent in a country that demands
a higher mark-up. This makes sense only, if the firm contracts out research to a
low-tax country. The mark-up may not be confused with the final tax burden the
firm faces in the inventor country and thus, I regress location choice on the separate
factors that form part of the composite tax rate variable in Specifications (4) to (6).
The composite tax rate variable consists of the tax Ti a firm has to pay in the
inventor country, as given in equation (5.1), and the tax that is payable on the
remaining part of profit in the owner country, as given in equation (5.2), if the
firm contracts out research to a foreign affiliate. Specification (4) regresses location
choice on Ti and controls. The coefficient estimate on Ti turns out to be negative
and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in the tax that has to be paid
in the inventor country decreases the probability that this country will be chosen
as an inventor location. This result is reasonable, because the researching company
will never incur a loss, but will always receive a remuneration for the costs it incurs
and in most cases also a small amount of profit. Therefore, the costs will not be
deducted against the tax rate that is applicable in the inventor country and, thus,
the argument of deductibility does not apply. Specification (5), on the other hand,
regresses location choice on the tax burden that the firm would face in the owner
country if the firm engages in contract R&D. The significantly positive coefficient
estimate suggests that a location is more likely to be chosen as an inventor country, if
the tax payable in the owner country thereby increases. The tax payable in the owner
country is partly determined by the inventor country, because only profits exceeding
the mark-up are taxable in the owner country. All else equal, the tax burden in the
owner country decreases in the mark-up of the inventor country, and vice versa. That
is, a decrease in the mark-up of a country leads to an increase in the tax burden in
the owner country and a higher probability that the country is chosen as an inventor
location. Again, this result seems to be counter-intuitive at first sight. However,
the firm will deduct the costs incurred by the R&D investment in the country where
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the patent is owned. Hence, the firm prefers to deduct costs against a high tax
rate, at the expense that profits are subject to a higher tax rate. Last, I regress
location choice on both, Ti and To, and find that the positive coefficient estimate on
To remains significantly, while the estimate on Ti is not significant anymore.
Overall, the findings confirm the notion that the argument of deductibility of
costs against a high tax rate is more important than the argument of a low profit
tax rate. As outlined in Section 5.2, the firm may choose between financing the R&D
investment from a high-tax location which means deductibility of costs against a high
tax rate and a high profit tax rate, on the other hand. Or the firm may choose to
finance the investment from a low-tax location which would result in a low profit
tax rate, but also in the deductibility of costs against the low rate. Consequently,
it is not surprising that the statutory tax rate in the inventor country does not
impact significantly on the decision on where to locate real R&D activity, because it
does not necessarily determine the deductibility of costs nor the taxation of profits.
Much more important is the composite tax rate variable that better represents the
relevant tax criterion in this decision. The argument of deductibility seems to be of
high importance to firms, since a higher composite tax rate exerts a positive effect
on location choice. According to the underlying assumptions, this also means that
a higher tax is associated with a higher payoff to the firm (see Equation (5.5)).
One possible explanation for this could be that firms engage in later profit shifting
activities and therefore do not a priori care about a high profit tax rate. In order
to explore this line of argumentation, I also investigate the location decision on the
owner country.
With respect to other factors that I controlled for in the regression analyses, the
results confirm that the market size positively impacts on the decision where to
locate real R&D activity. The effect is statistically significant at 1% throughout all
specifications. Furthermore, it is also remarkable that the coefficient estimates of
both country-firm-specific variables show a very robust effect across all specifications
of Table 5.5. First, distance to MNE exerts a negative effect on location choice that
is statistically significant at 1%. This finding indicates that research activity is
preferably located closer to the headquarter company. A second interesting finding
is that the presence of the MNE in a certain country seems to attract research
activity. The coefficient estimate on MNE presence is significantly positive at 1%
suggesting that the stronger the presence of an MNE in a country, the more likely
it is that the MNE will locate further R&D activity in that country.
Table 5.6 presents results on the owner country decision. Again, the dependent
variable in all regressions is a binary choice variable, now indicating which alterna-
tive was chosen as an owner country for IP. In Specification (1), I regress location
choice on the statutory tax rate of the owner country and do not find a significant
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Table 5.5: Regression Results for Inventor Country Decision
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τi -0.002
(0.005)
Tc 0.032***
(0.012)
mi 0.282***
(0.096)
Ti -0.030** -0.008
(0.013) (0.011)
To 0.148*** 0.145***
(0.035) (0.035)
market size 3.457*** 4.092*** 4.521*** 4.814*** 4.920*** 4.990***
(0.427) (0.393) (0.410) (0.389) (0.425) (0.405)
wage level -0.131*** -0.092* -0.036 0.002 -0.009 -0.001
(0.015) (0.049) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047)
tech. innovat. 1.536 -19.398*** -52.950*** -31.381*** -31.677*** -31.578***
(4.131) (6.408) (11.049) (9.087) (9.031) (8.891)
distance to MNE -0.438*** -0.417*** -0.425*** -0.425*** -0.429*** -0.429***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
MNE presence 0.086*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
rule of law -0.258 0.403 0.285 0.120 -0.143 -0.171
(0.273) (0.298) (0.317) (0.350) (0.427) (0.436)
Observations 15,874,749 6,371,481 5,528,464 5,528,464 5,496,416 5,496,416
Cases 463,040 446,995 391,781 391,781 389,489 389,489
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary choice variable taking on the value
1 if the respective country was chosen as inventor location among all alternative countries and zero
otherwise. For variable definitions see Table 5.4. All estimations are based on conditional logit.
Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust towards heteroscadasticity and clustering at the level of the MNE.
effect. Similarly, I regress location choice on the composite tax rate variable in
Specification (2). Contrary to the inventor country decision, the coefficient estimate
on the composite tax rate variable is not significantly positive in the owner country
decision. The simplest explanation for this finding would be that there is no statis-
tically significant impact of the composite tax rate variable on the owner country
decision. However, the positive effect in the inventor country decision draws upon
the conjecture that firms benefit from the deduction of R&D costs against a high
tax rate. This argument should also hold in the owner country decision, because the
owner of the patent is also the one who finances the investments. Since the two de-
cisions are somewhat related in this regard, I also expect to observe a similar result
with respect to the composite tax rate variable. Another explanation is that two
effects might cancel each other out in this location decision. Prior studies already
investigated the location choice of the patent owner and document negative tax ef-
fects on location choice (Griffith et al., 2014; Boehm et al., 2012; Karkinsky and
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Riedel, 2012; Ernst and Spengel, 2011). For example, Griffith et al. (2014) analyze
the location choice for patent ownership in a mixed logit framework and find a sta-
tistically negative impact of the statutory tax rate. Similarly, Boehm et al. (2012)
find that the tax rate negatively impacts on location choice. Both studies interpret
their results as reflecting profit relocations to low-tax countries. This effect might
also be present in my sample, as well as a positive effect resulting from the use of
deductions. Hence, it is also likely that a negative effect of the tax rate compensates
for a positive effect.
Furthermore, I examine the effect of the exit tax rate on the owner country deci-
sion, controlling for the statutory tax rate in Specification (3) and for the composite
tax rate variable in Specification (4). As outlined in Section 5.2 firms might fear a
high exit tax rate in the country where they locate property, because an exit tax
harms the tax-free movement to a foreign country. Therefore, firms could abstain
from locating property in a high-tax country that restricts any exit possibilities.
Indeed, I find a statistically significant and negative effect of the exit tax rate on
location choice in Specification (4). I go on to argue that the exit tax should ap-
pear even more as a barrier in high-tax countries. Following this argumentation, I
interact the exit tax rate both with the statutory tax rate (Specification (5)) and
with the composite tax rate variable (Specification (6)). Interestingly, this line of
argumentation cannot be confirmed by the empirical findings. In Specification (5)
the exit tax rate and also the statutory income tax rate exert a negative effect on
the owner country decision. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term though,
which would be expected to be negative as well, does not show a negative impact
on location choice. Thus, in a high-tax country the exit tax exerts a less negative
effect on location choice than in a low-tax country. The results are similar if instead
of the statutory tax rate the composite tax rate variable is interacted with the exit
tax. In Specification (6) the interaction term is also positive, while the effect of the
exit tax and the composite tax rate variable are both negative, indicating that the
exit tax is less harmful towards investment if the firm faces a higher tax burden as
compared to facing a low tax burden in a country.
With regard to all other control variables included in the regressions, the results
show that the inventor and owner country decision are similar in many respects.
The coefficient estimates of market size are positively significant throughout all
specifications. The wage level is negatively significant only in Specifications (4) and
(6) indicating that the effect is not robust across all specifications. In contrast to the
inventor country decision, technological innovativeness does not exert a significant
effect on the owner country decision. Again, I find robust effects of both country-
firm-specific variables. Thus, a location is more likely to be chosen as an owner
country if it is closer to the headquarter of the MNE and if the MNE is already
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Table 5.6: Regression Results for Owner Country Decision
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τo 0.001 -0.044 -0.110***
(0.007) (0.028) (0.038)
Tc 0.010 0.005 -0.427***
(0.014) (0.032) (0.057)
eo 0.016 -0.025*** -0.111*** -0.552***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.030) (0.044)
τo × eo 0.002***
(0.001)
Tc × eo 0.010***
(0.001)
market size 3.704*** 5.150*** 4.616*** 5.805*** 5.140*** 4.749***
(0.509) (0.479) (0.573) (0.654) (0.480) (0.804)
wage level 0.004 0.004 -0.057 -0.218*** -0.112 -0.695***
(0.045) (0.063) (0.088) (0.084) (0.077) (0.127)
tech.innovat. 2.706 -2.421 7.438 3.933 3.741 -3.861
(4.896) (5.041) (4.657) (4.539) (4.103) (7.035)
distance to MNE -0.559*** -0.526*** -0.526*** -0.475*** -0.526*** -0.454***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.047) (0.042) (0.047) (0.041)
MNE presence 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.165*** 0.177*** 0.165*** 0.174***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
rule of law -0.199 0.426 -0.069 0.862* 0.311 1.333***
(0.338) (0.446) (0.310) (0.490) (0.275) (0.475)
Observations 15,924,206 13,220,713 6,036,071 5,054,165 6,036,071 5,054,165
Cases 464,185 385,533 255,995 214,992 255,995 214,992
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary choice variable taking on the value
1 if the respective country was chosen as patent ownership location among all alternative countries
and zero otherwise. For variable definitions see Table 5.4. All estimations are based on conditional
logit. Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗) indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust towards heteroscadasticity and clustering at the level of
the MNE.
present in that country.
Summing up the results from Table 5.6, the statutory tax rate and the composite
tax rate variable are not found to exert a significant and robust effect on location
choice. One reason that could be responsible for this finding is that two opposite
effects actually are present and cancel each other out. That is, firms might anticipate
the profit potential of the research project and locate high profitable patents in low-
tax countries to benefit from a low profit tax burden when the project yields high
returns. On the other hand, if a low profit potential is anticipated firms may want
to locate the patent in a high-tax country. In this case, they do not fear to be hit by
a high profit tax rate, because they only earn a small return anyway. Additionally,
they can make use of deductions against a high tax rate. This idea has already been
introduced in Chapter 4, where indirect evidence is provided to substantiate this
idea, and will be further picked up in Section 5.6.
With regard to the exit tax rate, I find statistically significant evidence that an
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increase in the exit tax rate is associated with a decrease in the probability that
this country is chosen as a location for patent ownership. Thus, I conclude that
indeed firms anticipate their profit shifting opportunities and related anti-avoidance
regulations in the decision from where to finance an R&D investment, because this
will be the location where the patent will be ultimately subject to tax. Last, the
results suggest that in high-tax countries - with respect to both, the statutory tax
rate and the composite tax rate variable - the exit tax impacts less negatively on
location choice than in low-tax countries. Although one would not expect to see
this result, an explanation could be that firms who decide to locate a patent in a
high-tax country do so for the reason of deducting the costs against a high tax rate.
As already discussed above, they do not expect to render high returns on such an
investment and therefore, view a high exit tax rate as less disadvantageous than in
the case of a patent that is expected to yield a high return and that is located in
a low-tax country. Consequently, these findings suggest that it could be worthwhile
to closer investigate the argument that patents, which are expected to yield high
returns, differently respond to taxes than patents, which are expected to yield low
returns or even incur a loss.
5.6 Robustness Checks
In a robustness check I closer examine whether patents with a higher profit potential
differently react to taxes than patents with less profit potential. Following previous
studies I measure profit potential by the quality of a patent (Ernst et al., 2014;
Boehm et al., 2012; Griffith et al., 2014). In the literature, different measures of
quality have been applied. Ernst et al. (2014) and Boehm et al. (2012) rely on
an index that has been introduced by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and Hall
(2007). This index is based on three underlying indicators, which are patent family,
forward citations and technological classes and is calculated using factor analysis (see
also Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2). In contrast, Griffith et al. (2014) use a dummy variable
that equals one if the patent is part of a triadic patent family and zero otherwise. A
triadic patent family is given if for a patent a related patent application is filed at
each of the EPO, the US Patent and Trademark office and the Japan Patent Office.
The authors argue that triadic patents are of higher quality because firms only will
accept the costs of filing for patent protection at the major patent offices worldwide
if they expect the patent to yield high economic rents.
For the purpose of my analysis, I rely on the three indicators for patent qual-
ity already applied in Chapter 4, which are patent family, forward citations and
technological classes. The data for these indicators is provided by the Orbis Patent
database (Bureau van Dijk). The family size of a patent covers all countries where
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patent protection is sought. These will be the countries where the patentee wants
to use the patent in the production process and where the products are ultimately
sold to the consumer. Since the cost for patent application increases in the number
of countries where protection is sought, a firm will only apply in several countries
if it expects the profits to outweigh the cost. Consequently, the size of a patent’s
family can be interpreted as an indicator of the patent’s quality and its future earn-
ings potential. In the data, I only observe patent applications from national patent
offices. Therefore, I do not double count any filings at the EPO, where a bundle of
national patent applications is administered within one application. I identify the
patent family via the priority number that every secondary filing carries and that
equals the first application number. Furthermore, forward citations provide infor-
mation about how often a patent has been cited by following patent applications.
The citations are an instrument to determine the scope of the patent right relative
to prior art in the field. However, not necessarily all innovations which draw on
an existing patent in fact acknowledge the reference. Therefore, all necessary cita-
tions are added to the application by the patent examiner during the filing process.
Moreover, an external patent examiner has the benefit of following a consistent and
objective patent citation practice. The number of forward citations provides some
information on the importance of the invention for future research in the field and
hence, will be another indicator of quality of a patent. Forward citations are a sep-
arate data item in the Orbis database. I summed up all forward citations to receive
the total number for the analysis. Last, I rely on the number of technological classes
that have been shown by previous research to be an indicator of technological qual-
ity (Lerner, 1994). This is a measure of the scope of application of the respective
technology. The technological classes are listed in the patent document and are
eight digit codes of the International Patent Classification (IPC) system. Similarly
to forward citations, this number is calculated as the sum of technological classes,
which are listed in a separate data item in Orbis.
I identify a high-quality patent by means of a dummy variable that takes on
the value one if at least two of the indicators exceed the sample mean, and zero
otherwise. The so calculated quality variable has mean 0.16 and standard deviation
0.37.14 15.7% of all patents are high-quality patents. In the analysis, I interact
quality with the main tax variables to see whether tax effects are different for high-
and low-quality patents. In general, I expect that firms care more about the profit
tax rate than about the deductibility of costs, with respect to high-quality patents.
In other words, I expect to see a negative and significant coefficient estimate on the
interaction term of the tax parameters with quality. The results are presented in
14The mean and the standard deviation are calculated based on the estimation sample used in
Specification (1) of Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7: Further Regression Results: High- vs. Low-Quality Patents
Inventor Location Choice Owner Location Choice
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
τi,o -0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.008)
τi,o ×
quality -0.004 -0.012*
(0.005) (0.006)
Tc 0.039*** 0.016
(0.010) (0.014)
Tc ×
quality 0.015 -0.032***
(0.011) (0.012)
Ti -0.034**
(0.013)
Ti ×
quality 0.021**
(0.009)
To 0.152***
(0.035)
To ×
quality -0.020***
(0.006)
eo -0.006
(0.006)
eo ×
quality -0.010***
(0.004)
market size 3.467*** -0.141 4.815*** 4.912*** 3.737*** 5.162*** 4.123***
(0.431) (1.024) (0.389) (0.424) (0.516) (0.479) (0.736)
wage level -0.023 0.087 0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.034) (0.059) (0.045) (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
tech. inno. 1.643 -9.272 -31.606*** -30.286*** 2.954 -1.682 8.144*
(4.129) (5.801) (9.139) (9.025) (4.885) (5.057) (4.786)
distance -0.433*** -0.407*** -0.424*** -0.429*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.017) (0.02) (0.018) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
presence 0.086*** 0.053*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.163***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
rule of law -0.261 0.027 0.154 -0.119 -0.209 0.413 0.007
(0.273) (0.347) (0.352) (0.430) (0.339) (0.448) (0.290)
Observations 15,874,749 4,739,565 5,528,464 5,496,416 15,924,206 13,220,713 6,036,071
Cases 374,983 121,899 156,152 155,238 376,805 312,982 154,032
Notes: The dependent variable is a binary choice variable taking on the value 1 if the respective
country was chosen as inventor location among all alternative countries and zero otherwise in
specifications (1) to (4). In specifications (5) to (7) the binary choice variable takes on the value 1
if the respective country was chosen as patent ownership location and zero otherwise. For variable
definitions see Table 5.4. All estimations are based on conditional logit. Asterisks (∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗)
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust towards heteroscadasticity and clustering at the level of the MNE.
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Table 5.7.
Specifications (1) to (4) are referring to the inventor location choice. The findings
presented in Table 5.5 reveal that the deductibility of costs against a high tax rate
is a very important argument to firms in the inventor country decision, as a higher
composite tax rate increases the likelihood that a firm chooses a location for real
R&D activity. This result still holds when interacting the composite tax rate vari-
able with quality, see Specification (2) of Table 5.7. The effect is even applicable to
high-quality patents, as the coefficient estimate of the interaction term turns out to
be non-significant. Looking at the tax burden measure in the inventor country Ti
for contract R&D agreements, its effect on location choice is significantly negative
regarding low-quality patents, but almost fully compensated by the significantly pos-
itive interaction effect for high-quality patents (see Specification (3)). That means,
that for high-quality patents the tax burden they face in the inventor country if
they engage in a contract R&D agreement plays almost no role. On the other hand,
the tax burden in the owner country exerts a less positive effect on location choice
for high-quality patents (see Specification (4)). The result is reasonable, because
high-quality patents are expected to render high returns and thus, the argument
of deductibility of costs is of less importance as compared to the concern about a
high profit tax rate. Nevertheless, in the inventor location choice the argument of
deductibility still prevails over the argument of a low profit tax rate, even for high-
quality patents. The results confirm my hypothesis in that the deductibility is of
less relevance for high-quality patents as compared to low-quality patents.
The results regarding the owner location choice are presented in Specifications
(5) to (7) of Table 5.7. Specification (5) regresses the statutory tax rate of the
owner country on owner location choice. As in Table 5.6 the statutory tax rate
does not significantly impact on location choice. However, for high-quality patents I
observe a negative effect on location choice indicating that the probability to locate
a high-quality patent in a country decreases if the statutory tax rate in that country
increases. The effect is statistically significant at 10%. The same effect is found for
the composite tax rate variable and the exit tax rate. In both cases, the negative
effect is statistically significant at 1%. Together, these results suggest that in the
owner location choice firms care more about the profit tax rate that is imposed on
the returns from R&D. Especially high-quality patents are less likely to be located
in a country that has a high tax rate, a high composite tax burden and a high exit
tax rate. The effect of the exit tax rate in Specification (7) also documents that
firms anticipate adverse tax regulations on a later transfer of assets cross-border.
Overall, the results from Table 5.7 confirm the hypothesis that firms are more
concerned about a high profit tax rate than about the deductibility of costs in the
decision on an owner location than in the decision on an inventor location. This
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finding is especially important for high-quality patents. The findings of Specifica-
tions (1) to (4) in Table 5.7 also reveal that in the inventor location choice firms
choose to locate real R&D activity in a location with a higher profit tax rate to
make use of deductions of costs incurred against the high tax rate, even in the case
of a high-quality patent. As this is counter-intuitive, firms apparently follow other
structures to circumvent high profit taxation if patents yield high returns. For ex-
ample, they could engage in the later transfer of patents to a low-tax location after
they have benefited from deducting costs against a high tax rate. A hint in favor
of this conjecture are the significantly negative coefficient estimates on the exit tax
rate and on the interaction term of the exit tax rate with the quality dummy in the
owner location choice (see Specifications (4) to (6) in Table 5.6 and Specification (7)
in Table 5.7).
5.7 Conclusion
Recent developments intend to prevent multinational enterprises from implementing
tax practices that merely aim to reduce the overall tax burden of the firm and thus,
lead to severe losses in countries’ tax revenues. The OECD’s report on base erosion
and profit shifting (OECD, 2013b) also discusses structures that involve R&D firms
collaborating within cost sharing or cost contribution arrangements with a view to
generate intellectual property, deduct the costs in a high-tax jurisdiction and locate
the intellectual property in another jurisdiction where its profits are subject to a
low tax rate. To tackle such practices by introducing new and effective anti-tax
avoidance measures, it is important to know how firms may react to such measures.
Therefore, this study investigates the sensitivity of innovative activity to taxes.
Specifically, I examine whether the tax burden a firm will face by locating its R&D
activity in a certain country has an impact on the choice of location for real R&D
activity. In this analysis, I will further investigate the effects of anti-tax avoidance
measures on the location of innovative activity as well as on the location of patent
ownership. This is a crucial question, because if firms anticipate adverse effects
from anti-tax avoidance measures and refrain from locating real R&D activity in
the respective country, the anti-tax avoidance measure did not achieve the desired
result of securing a country’s tax base. Rather, it had led to a disinvestment in
the respective country with negative welfare effects on employment and the lack of
spillovers from innovation.
This study presents evidence that firms care more about the deductibility of costs
against a high tax rate than about the high tax rate on profits when they decide
where they should locate a new R&D project. Thus, the composite tax variable,
which measures the tax burden a firm possibly faces when investing in a respective
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country, exerts a positive effect on location choice. Consequently, I conclude that
firms do not anticipate adverse tax effects on profits from R&D when deciding on the
location of innovative activity, but rather think in shorter terms and decide to locate
R&D activity in a country where costs are most valuable and can be deducted against
a high tax rate. On the other hand, however, the tax rate on profits seems to be of
higher importance in the decision on patent ownership, although the model fails to
identify a robust negative effect of the statutory and composite tax rate on location
choice. A possible explanation could be that both effects, the deductibility of costs
and the tax burden on profits, cancel each other out since they act in opposite
directions. Nevertheless, I do find a statistically significant effect of the exit tax
rate on location choice about patent ownership. As the exit tax rate negatively
impacts on location choice, I conclude that firms indeed anticipate adverse effects
from anti-tax avoidance measures in the patent ownership location choice. This
finding is further substantiated by the findings that in a high-tax country the exit
tax exerts a less negative effect on location choice than in a low-tax country or, put
differently, that if the exit tax is high the statutory tax rate exerts a less negative
effect on the patent ownership location choice. On first sight, this finding seems to
be counter-intuitive. One would have expected that firms view the exit tax to be
even more harmful given that the patent is located in a high-tax country, because
the exit tax prevents from moving the patent into a low-tax location. However, the
finding also emphasizes that if the firms would not anticipate adverse effects from
a tight exit tax regime, it may find itself in a situation where the patent is owned
in a high-tax jurisdiction and cannot be relocated to a low-tax jurisdiction due to
a high exit tax. In such a case, I would expect to observe a negative sign on the
interaction term of exit tax and the statutory tax rate. As the regression results,
however, return a positive sign of the interaction term, I conclude that firms do not
even find themselves in situations sketched above. Thus, I further conclude that
firms do anticipate that a tight exit tax regime would prevent them from relocating
patents to low-tax jurisdictions later to avoid being subject to a high profit tax rate
and, hence, do not even locate patents in jurisdictions that impose a high exit tax
rate. This finding also confirms the notion by Mutti and Grubert (2009) that firms
apparently employ other structures, not observable to the econometrician, to avoid
profits being subject to a high tax rate.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The aim of the presented thesis was to provide empirical evidence on the microeco-
nomics of R&D investments with regard to corporate taxes. In particular, the core
research question was how firms react to existing tax regulations that are either de-
signed to incentivize R&D activity or to secure the fiscal sovereignty of states over
profits stemming from R&D activity. Three studies have been undertaken to gain
more insights in the behavior of firms with respect to their R&D investments. First,
a survey study was conducted among 47 top financial and tax managers of very
large multinational companies to learn about the decision-making process in R&D
intensive multinationals. Second, the question whether R&D tax incentives exert an
effect on the quality of R&D projects was tested using data on patent applications to
the European Patent Office. Third, evidence on the impact of taxes on the location
decisions of R&D investments is provided. The results from the presented studies
are summarized in the following:
1. The first part of analyses in our questionnaire was devoted to descriptive ev-
idence to draw a picture of the firms in our sample with respect to their
views on R&D tax planning. It provides insights as to what considerations
are important to them and what motives drives them to act like they do when
investing in R&D and IP, respectively. Thus, in a first question we asked them
what factors are important in the decision on the amount of R&D spending.
Among financial, accounting and tax factors, the answers reveal that finan-
cial and accounting factors are important factors influencing the amount of
R&D spending, but taxes are less important. We conclude that R&D invest-
ments seem to critically depend on the availability of equity capital and on the
liquidity of firms.
2. In a second question, we asked what general country characteristics are im-
portant to firms in their decision to locate R&D activity in one country or
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another. Similarly, we ask which of these characteristics are important in the
location decision for IP. Regarding the R&D location decision, the most im-
portant factor are the skills and availability of the workforce. Not surprisingly,
tax costs are the least important country characteristic. With respect to the
IP location decision, the most important factor is the legal stability and the
security of IP, while tax costs are rated second least important. Comparing
the answers that were given to the R&D location decision question with the
answers from the IP location decision question, the answers differ significantly
in three of five country characteristics. Tax costs are slightly more important
in the location decision of IP than of R&D. We conclude, that the results
highlight the separation of the two location decisions in the decision-making
process regarding R&D investments.
3. Furthermore, we compare various tax factors with each other and ask firms
to indicate their importance in the R&D and the IP location decision. The
results show that the most important factor for the location of R&D activity
is the regulation that determines the deductions for R&D expenditure and the
most important factor for the location of IP is the double tax treaty network.
Moreover, the second an third most important tax factor in the IP location
decision are the transfer pricing regulations of a country and the imposition
of an exit tax upon the cross-border transfer of assets. R&D and IP location
decision also significantly differ in two aspects: the applicable profit tax rate
and the imposition of an exit tax are important factors in the IP location
decision, while they are of less importance in the R&D location decision. In
sum, it seems that in the location decision of IP tax planning considerations
are of higher importance as compared to the R&D location decision.
4. One advantage of survey research is that motives can be detected that drive
firm’s behavior. We thus asked about the considerations in the decision to
locate patents away from where R&D took place and motives why firms con-
sidered to locate patents at a low-tax affiliate. Respondents agree that they
considered the fact that contract R&D is a means to geographically separate
the IP location from the location where the associated R&D activity took
place. Moreover, they agree to the notion that exit taxes are an important
obstacle to the cross-border transfer of patents within the group. Nevertheless,
when we asked how they actually achieve to locate patents in low-tax countries,
they answered that they rather sell patents to affiliates in low-tax countries
than conduct R&D activity in a low-tax country to apply for patent protec-
tion afterwards. The most important motive to consider relocating patents to
low-tax affiliates is that the expected return related to a patent is high. Also,
respondents agree that the relocation of patents to low-tax affiliates reduced
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the overall tax burden of the MNE and that it can be achieved in a rather
simple way, because patents are mobile assets.
5. More generally, we were also interested how R&D is organized within a multi-
national firm to get an idea what kind of structures are commonly implemented
by firms. The most prevalent form of organization was in-house R&D, followed
by contract R&D within the group and pool-financing agreements among sev-
eral affiliates. Last ranks outsourcing of R&D activity to a third party, e.g.
universities or research institutes.
6. We also posed one question that relates to traditional R&D tax incentives like
tax credits or additional allowances for R&D expenditure. We were interested
which attribute of an R&D tax incentive is most effective in raising additional
R&D spending. Our findings confirm prior literature in that on average re-
spondents view an immediate impact on liquidity to be the most important
attribute of a tax incentive, followed by planning certainty and simplicity in
its administration. Tax planning considerations as reflected by restrictions
on the location of R&D activity and the location of patents, respectively are
ranked least important. This result is in line with our previous findings, that
tax planning considerations are less present in business decisions relating to
real R&D activity.
7. In a regression analysis, we test a theory, based on the organizational design
literature, for the intensity in which the tax department coordinates with man-
agers from other business units to intervene with real investment decisions.
The allocation of management and control in the business decision process
finds expression in the coordination intensity between agents in the firm. Our
theoretical considerations predict that R&D intensity is an important deter-
minant of the tax department’s role. We indeed find supporting evidence that
in R&D intensive multinational firms the tax department operates more as a
controller than as a manager. In particular, tax departments of R&D inten-
sive firms make less tax planning effort, are less ambitious to minimize the tax
burden of the firm, are later involved in the decision-making process of a new
investment project, but are more likely to have a veto right in the decision
on a new investment project as compared to less R&D intensive firms. Con-
ditional on R&D intensity, however, the level of intangible assets in the firm
is associated with more tax planning efforts and ambitions. Our results are
statistically significant and robust towards several sensitivity checks.
8. The insights obtained from the survey study allow us to anticipate potential
consequences of profit shifting restrictions for the tax department’s role in
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R&D intensive firms. If such restrictions are put in place, tax planning ac-
tivities will no longer be shifted to the second stage of the R&D investment
process, as IP transfers will be too costly to implement. Thus, forgone tax
savings in uncoordinated investment decisions will become increasingly irre-
versible and tax executives may be incited to intervene earlier and with a
stronger focus on decision management. This notion is in line with previous
theoretical predictions of adverse investment effects of profit shifting restric-
tions. While more research on the interrelation of tax avoidance and real
economic decisions is certainly required, our findings provide additional sup-
port for a careful consideration of the potentially ambiguous effects of tight
anti-avoidance legislation.
9. Chapter 4 presents a study on the impact of tax incentives on the quality
of corporate R&D projects, i.e. their innovativeness and earnings potential.
The study contributes to a strand of research that empirically assessed the
effect of special tax provisions on the quantity of R&D activities. We distin-
guish between traditional R&D tax incentives, like tax credits or additional
allowances, and the patent income tax rate, which is the corporate income tax
rate accounting for patent box regime where applicable. Exploiting a dataset
on patent applications to the European Patent Office, we find that a low
patent income tax rate raises the average profitability and innovation level of
the projects undertaken in a country. The effect is statistically significant and
economically relevant and prevails in a number of sensitivity checks. Generous
R&D tax credits and tax allowances are in contrast found to exert a negative
impact on project quality.
10. The results from the study of R&D quality may have important implications
for the design of tax instruments that aim at fostering and raising R&D activity
undertaken by firms. In recent years, we observe a trend in Europe towards
the introduction of tax regimes that significantly reduce the corporate tax rate
on income from innovation, so-called patent boxes. Policy makers justified the
introduction of such regimes with the aim to attract and foster innovative R&D
activities. Our findings confirm this notion and suggest that low patent income
tax rates are indeed instrumental in attracting R&D projects with an above
average earnings potential and innovativeness. On the other hand, we do not
find an analogous effect for traditional R&D tax incentives, like tax credits
or additional allowances. In fact, our results suggest that traditional R&D
tax incentives reduce the average project quality. From a welfare perspective,
positive welfare consequences of increases in R&D quantity induced by R&D
tax credits and allowances may be partly counteracted by negative effects on
average project quality (i.e. lower profitability and thus, a lower contribution
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to tax revenues, and less spillovers on other firms in the economy). With
respect to low patent income tax rates, the welfare assessment is positive from
a national perspective as low patent income taxes do not only expand R&D
activity (as suggested by previous work) but also trigger the inflow of R&D
activity with above average quality. The picture looks less optimistic from
an international perspective though. In particular, as countries compete for
internationally mobile R&D projects, projects gained by one country are lost
by another. As governments do not account for the consequences of their
policy choices on other countries, patent income tax rates are set inefficiently
low from a global perspective.
11. The study on the impact of taxes on R&D location decisions reveals that tax
factors do impact on R&D location decisions, but they exert different effects
in different location choices. In particular, I examine the location of real R&D
activity (as proxied by the country of the patent inventor) and the location
of IP (as proxied by the country of the patent owner). With respect to the
location choice of real R&D activity, the results show that firms care more
about the deductibility of costs against a high tax rate than about the high
tax rate on profits. This conclusion is reflected in the positive impact of taxes
on inventor location choice indicating that a country with a higher tax rate is
more likely to be chosen as an inventor location than a country with a lower
tax rate. I explain this finding, that on first sight seems counter-intuitive,
by the fact that deductible costs are most valuable in high-tax countries. As
during the phase of invention only costs occur, the firm primarily benefits
from deducting these costs against a high tax rate. These results also hold for
high-quality patents.
12. Furthermore, I also investigate the effect of taxes on the location choice of the
patent owner country. The baseline results do not confirm that the effective
tax burden a firm faces in a country exerts a significant effect on the location
choice for patent ownership. However, the exit tax rate of a country negatively
and statistically significantly impacts on the owner country decision. Together
these findings suggest that while the effective tax burden in the owner country
does not play a significant role for the firm, the firm anticipates adverse tax
effects from cross-border relocations of patents caused by an exit taxation
regime and thus, is less prone to locate a patent in a country with a high exit
tax rate. Further regression results suggest that for high-quality patents the
effects of the corporate tax rate are indeed significant. The findings show that
high-quality patents are less likely to be owned in countries that trigger a high
tax burden for the firm.
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13. Overall, the study of tax effects on R&D location decisions highlights the
importance of expense deductibility in the first stage of the R&D process,
when the investment is made and costs occur. Moreover, the results emphasize
that in the location choice for patent ownership (the second stage of the R&D
process), firms anticipate adverse tax effects from a tight exit tax regime and
thus, abstain from locating patents in jurisdictions that impose a high exit tax
rate. The corporate tax rate, in turn, does not exert a significantly negative
effect on patent owner location choice, except for high-quality patents where
it negatively impacts on location choice.
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